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ABSTRACT
There is an increasing need for multi-agent systems to operate under decentralised control
regimes that support openness (individual components can enter and leave at will) and enable
components representing distinct stakeholders with different aims and objectives to interact ef-
fectively. To this end, this thesis explores issues associated with using techniques from Game
Theory and Mechanism Design to organise and analyse such systems. In particular, emphasis
is given to distributed mechanisms in which there is distributed allocation (no single centre de-
termines the allocation of the resources or the tasks) and distributed information (agents require
information privately known by other agents in order to determine their own valuation or cost).
Such mechanisms are important because, in comparison to their centralised counterparts, they
are robust to a single-point failure, the computational burden can be potentially shared amongst
many agents, and there is a reduction in bottlenecks since not all communication need pass
through a single point. As a result, distributed mechanisms are better suited to many types of
multi-agent application.
To provide a grounding for the mechanisms we develop, the thesis contains a running example
of a multi-sensor network scenario. In these systems, distributed allocation mechanisms are de-
sirable since they are robust and reduce bottlenecks in the communication system. Furthermore,
we show that distributed information naturally arises by deriving an information-theoretic val-
uation function. This scenario also gives rise to two additional requirements that are addressed
within this thesis: (i) constrained capacity, whereby suppliers can only provide a limited amount
of goods or services at any given time and (ii) uncertainty in task completion, whereby sensors
potentially fail after they have been assigned tasks.
Specifically, we focus on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and investigate ways
of extending it so as to address the requirements that arise within distributed setting in general
and sensor networks. In particular, we choose the VCG as our point of departure since it is
a mechanism that is efficient, individually rational and incentive compatible. Unfortunately, it
is brittle in the sense that it does not conserve these desirable properties when considering the
requirements that we outlined above. Therefore, we develop novel mechanisms that do.
In more detail, the first part of this thesis considers two distributed allocation mechanisms —
a simultaneous auction environment and Continuous Double Auction (CDA). In the former,
bidders place sealed bids in a number of selling auctions which are concurrently offering items.
This results in a distributed allocation whereby the winner at each auction is determined by
the seller conducting it. For this case, we derive the optimal strategy of the bidders using a
game-theoretic approach. In the CDA, buyers and sellers, respectively, submit bids and asks
continuously and the market clears when a bid is higher than an ask; meaning that the allocation
is again determined in a distributed way. Furthermore, CDAs are known to yield close to efficient
allocations, under certain conditions, even when utilising very simple strategies. However, in
ii
our case, we need to modify their format in order to deal with the requirement of constrained
capacity. In both of these mechanisms, we study the system’s loss in efficiency that ensues from
distributing the allocation and find that it is 1e in the simultaneous auction case and upto 35% in
the continuous double auction case.
The second part of this thesis is concerned with designing mechanisms when agents have distrib-
uted information within the system. Such settings are more general than those more traditionally
studied in that they encompass the fact that agents can potentially change their valuation or cost
upon knowing a signal about the system (which they have not observed) that was hitherto un-
known to them. Specifically, we first show that interdependent valuations arise naturally within
a sensor network when we develop an information-theoretic valuation function. To account for
this, we significantly extend the VCG mechanism in order to deal with these interdependent
valuations. We then go on to develop a mechanism that can deal with uncertainty in task allo-
cation. In both of these cases, our mechanisms are shown to be efficient, individually rational
and incentive compatible. Moreover, their computational properties are studied and efficient
algorithms are designed (based on linear and dynamic programming) in order to speed up the
computation of the allocation problem which is generally NP-hard.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is an increasing need for computer systems that operate a decentralised control regime,
that are open (individual components can enter and leave at will) and that contain a number
of components representing distinct stakeholders with different aims and objectives. Relevant
examples include grid computing [Foster and Kesselman, 1999], the semantic web [Berners-
Lee, 1999], pervasive computing [Huang et al., 1999], e-commerce [Wellman, 2004], mobile
computing [Radrinath et al., 1993] and peer-to-peer systems [Shneidman and Parkes, 2003].
For these complex systems, it has been argued that agent-based approaches, with their emphasis
on autonomous actions and flexible interactions, are a natural computational model [Jennings,
2001]. In such Multi-Agent Systems (MASs), there are two fundamental design issues that
need to be addressed. First, there is a need to specify the protocols that govern the interactions.
These cover issues such as how the actions of the agents translate into an outcome, what range
of actions are available to the participants, and whether the interactions occur over a series of
steps or are one-shot. Second, given the prevailing protocol, there is a need to define the strategy
(mapping from state history to action) for each agent.
Now, in some cases, a designer may be able to impose both the protocol and the strategy of each
agent. In such settings, the agents can cooperate to find a good system-wide solution [Padhy
et al., 2006; Jennings and Bussmann, 2003; Pynadath and Tambe, 2003; Shoham and Tennen-
holtz, 1992]. This cooperation amongst agents can be structured using a variety of planning, dis-
tributed constraint optimisation, coalition formation and scheduling algorithms that have been
proposed [Lesser and Corkill, 1981; Durfee and Lesser, 1989; Boutilier, 1999; Ramamritham
et al., 1989; Yokoo et al., 1998; Dang et al., 2006]. However, such methods fail in systems where
the agents represent distinct stakeholders whose aim is to maximise their own profit in the sys-
tem (e.g. in Grid computing where the agents represent different end users and in e-commerce
scenarios where the agents represent the buyers and sellers). They fail because in such cases
they present the opportunity for the agents to gain an advantage by misreporting their position
(either their needs or their resources). For example, an agent might over-report its need for
memory capacity on a computational grid so that when the distributed constraint optimisation
process is carried out, it gets allocated more memory than its share in an efficient allocation.
1
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Another example is in peer-to-peer systems where the case of free-riding (i.e. where agents
under-state their available resource so as not to be asked to contribute to the system) has been
well documented [Adar and Huberman, 2000]. In both of these cases and many others besides,
the safest assumption to make is that if agents can act so as to get more benefit, then they will do
so. Thus, by default, agents should be assumed to be self-interested, rational problem solvers.
Stated in this way, it is obvious that microeconomics [MasColell et al., 1995] — the study of
the decision-making behaviour of self-interested agents as they interact with their environment
— should be able to provide useful insights into the design process for systems that operate a
decentralised control regime. Specifically, a clear parallel emerges between the self-interested
agents that are trying to find their best strategy in large, open, distributed computer systems and
the economic model of rational beings trying to maximise their gain from a market. In particular,
there are two points of focus from which a designer needs to carry out a non-cooperative strategic
analysis. In the first one, the designer of a system can only impose the protocol (and has no
control over what strategies the agents adopt) and designs it so as to ensure that certain properties
are guaranteed within the desired protocol. In the second one, the designer of a participating
agent is faced with a particular system having a pre-specified protocol and designs the strategy
of an agent such that it maximises its utility (or profit) in the system.
Given this insight, this thesis focuses on applying the theories developed in microeconomics
to the analysis and design of distributed protocols for MASs, that is, protocols in which the
allocation of resources and the gathering of information are carried out by multiple agents (cf.
the gathering of information into a single agent (the centre) which then determines the allocation
in centralised protocols). In fact, these market-based techniques are already starting to be applied
in domains such as grid computing [Wolski et al., 2001], peer-to-peer systems [Shneidman and
Parkes, 2003], multirobot coordination [Gerkey and Mataric, 2002b] and mobile computing
[Bredin et al.]. In this vein, in this thesis, we choose the particular application scenario of Multi-
Sensor Networks (MSNs) where each sensor node is represented as an agent (the justification
for this choice is given in section 1.2). Thus, we will take into consideration the particular
constraints that these MSNs impose on the design process. Specifically, in a MSN, a distributed
control scheme is preferred since a trusted centre that decides on the outcome may not always
be present or desirable (since it is then a critical single point of failure). Furthermore, as a result
of physical and temporal constraints, a single sensor may not be able to be tasked to do all the
readings required within the system (e.g. the maximum number of readings a sensor can make
may be limited by its battery power or the maximum swivel speed of its sensor head). Moreover,
in MSNs, the distributed information gathered is typically fused together which means that the
value of an observation is contingent on signals that are observed by other agents. Finally,
sensors might fail in undertaking tasks that have been assigned to them. These failures may
occur due to uncontrolled reasons (e.g. a sudden battery failure will stop a sensor from making
a reading of the environment) or due to a conscious decision (e.g. the sensor diverts resources
to another more rewarding task).
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In dealing with these constraints, the first part of this thesis analyses and designs markets in
which the allocation is not determined centrally by a controlling agent. In the second part of the
thesis, mechanisms which deal with distributed information are designed. In both parts, we are
also concerned with developing protocols that are resilient to the deficiencies of the individual
agents (such as their limited capacity to perform tasks and provide resources as well as their
propensity to fail). Specifically, this thesis addresses the following requirements:
Requirement 1. Distributed Allocation: The allocation of tasks and resources within the
system should be carried out without the use of a central controller.
Requirement 2. Limited Capacity: The protocol should be able to deal with the situation
whereby individual agents being limited in the number of tasks they can carry out.
Requirement 3. Distributed (Interdependent) Information: The protocol should incor-
porate the fact that agents may form their preferences over the allocations based on
private signals observed by other agents.
Requirement 4. Uncertainty in Task Completion: The protocol should be robust to the
fact that certain agents may fail to successfully carry out the tasks assigned to them.
It should be noted that whilst these requirements are inspired from a MSN scenario, the analyses
and solutions we present are broadly applicable to open MASs in general. To this end, we now
provide a background in order to position the challenges that this thesis has addressed in the
broad set of challenges that MAS designers encounter when designing and analysing distributed
mechanisms.
1.1 Background
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of the problems that this thesis seeks
to address. Specifically, we will provide an overview of the economic foundations of this en-
deavour and then detail the challenges that become more imperative in a MAS (as opposed to
traditional economic settings). We then give a broad overview of the MSN scenario which is em-
ployed as a running example throughout this thesis. In so doing, we provide the background for
our work by positioning it on the canvas of challenges that need to be addressed when designing
MASs and, more specifically, MSNs with selfish agents.
1.1.1 Economic Foundations
In micro-economics, there are two strands dealing with the result of aggregating the decision-
making of individual agents:
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1. Theory of Competitive Equilibrium [MasColell et al., 1995]. This studies the equilibrium
conditions (conditions characterising the stable state) that arise when a large number of
agents compete with each other in a given environment. Here, each agent is assumed to
be rational in that it tries to maximise its utility (a measure of the “goodness” the agent
derives from the outcome), based on its information about the environment.
2. Game Theory [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]. This studies the behaviour of agents in in-
teractive decision problems where the actions of one agent affect both the selected actions
of another and the resulting equilibrium.
The main difference between these two theories is in how the agent models its environment
before making a decision. The former assumes that each agent is interested only in some envi-
ronmental parameters (such as prices and availability of resources), whereas in the latter each
agent additionally takes into account the behaviour of other agents and how they may influence
these parameters. Thus in game theory, the behaviour of other agents is incorporated into an
agent’s decision making process1. Though we investigate both these approaches in this thesis,
the work described herein focuses mainly on the latter. This is because it is a more principled
way of achieving desirable properties in a MAS (in that it relies on mathematical models to
prove certain properties, rather than experimental evaluation). Furthermore, as we discuss in
chapter 2, designing systems using game-theoretic approaches gives us the necessary condi-
tions for designing systems where there might not be a central controller. In particular, we use
game theory to design multi-agent systems that address the last three requirements listed above
(limited capacity, interdependent information and uncertainty in task completion). However,
one important shortcoming of designing systems using game theory is that the resultant sys-
tem is almost invariably centralised2. On the other hand, approaches adopting the competitive
equilibrium tend to ascribe very little power to a centre or have no centre at all. Thus, these
approaches can shed light on how to design systems using game theoretic techniques, but which
have distributed allocation mechanisms.
To date, both of these approaches have been investigated in MASs. Wellman’s seminal work on
Market Oriented Programming [Wellman, 1993] was based on the competitive equilibrium ap-
proach and has subsequently been extended to numerous applications [Clearwater, 1996; Kraus,
2001]. In this work, the main point of focus has been the design of agent strategies for rela-
tively complex market institutions in which the agents are assumed to be selfish but not strictly
rational (as defined in Chapter 2)3. In particular, strategies have been developed using various
above mentioned heuristics for these specific settings [He et al., 2006; Vytelingum et al., 2004;
1In very large systems the two theories yield similar models and answers since a single agent then has little effect
on the whole environment (especially if the environment is nearing equilibrium).
2One could argue that this shortcoming is a result of researchers using the revelation principle (discussed in
chapter 2) too literally, rather than of game theory in itself. However, the fact is that most systems designed using
game theory involve a centre.
3This occurs since the agents make decisions without considering the full impact of their actions on other agents
Friedman and Rust [1992]. This may be due to their lack of knowledge of the other agent’s action set, the payoff
matrix, or the fact that they believe that their actions will not have an impact in large market.
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Airiau and Sen, 2003; Byde et al., 2000; Yarom et al., 2004]. In this context, one of the simplest
and most commonly studied institutions is the CDA in which traders submit offers to buy (bid)
and offers to sell (ask) at any time during the trading period and in which the market clears4
continuously [Friedman and Rust, 1992]. As a result, certain of the global properties of such
institutions, such as speed of convergence of the market towards the equilibrium and the prox-
imity of experimental and theoretical equilibria5, rely on the particular strategies that the agents
adopt. In fact, in [Vytelingum et al., 2004] we design a strategy which performs better than
current strategies in both a local (profit-maximising) and global context. However, in this thesis,
since we concentrate on the baseline performance of protocols, we employ the methodology
advocated by [Gode and Sunder, 1993] and apply it to the CDA protocol we design in chapter 4
(thereby simultaneously addressing requirements 1 and 2).
Game theory has also been heavily used to analyse and design strategies in various markets
[Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber, 1979; Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003; Fatima et al., 2005].
Such game-theoretic approaches to the design of strategies (which we use in chapter 3 for a
distributed marketplace) differ from the heuristic approaches in that they yield predictable equi-
librium strategies under the assumption that the agents are rational. As a result, the design of
protocols for predictable systems (i.e. systems in which certain global properties can be guaran-
teed) within MASs has been mainly based on Game Theory [Parkes, 2001; Zlotkin and Rosen-
schein, 1996; Sarne and Kraus, 2005; Sandholm, 2003; Wurman et al., 2001]. Furthermore, this
approach models the interactions between agents mathematically, resulting in a more principled
way of building protocols whereby the properties of the protocol can be proven or disproven the-
oretically rather than empirically. In particular, the techniques used are drawn from Mechanism
Design (MD) which is the area of micro-economics concerned with how to design systems,
using tools developed by game theory analysis (e.g. Nash Equilibrium, Dominant Strategy,
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium), such that certain system-wide properties (e.g. efficiency, stability,
fairness) emerge from the interaction of the constituent components. Here the mechanism is
viewed as the whole system; consisting of the set of agents with their utility functions, their
action sets and the protocol. In contrast to Market Oriented Programming, agents in this case
will always adopt one strategy since they are incentivised to do so as a result of the design of the
protocol6. In the MAS context, MD has been mostly used for the design of auction protocols
for the allocation of resources and tasks and in this thesis we study how to design mechanisms
under the constraints imposed by MASs (chapters 4, 5 and 6). However, we will first discuss
the broad range of challenges that arise in designing MASs using MD (sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3),
before focusing on the specific challenges we address in this thesis.
4The market clears as soon as a bid exceeds an ask.
5The theoretical equilibrium is the one achieved as the number of agents in the market tends to infinity.
6The adoption of one strategy is the objective of the design of the mechanism. In certain protocols, agents may
face multiple equilibria, in which case the system designer can introduce a correlating device so as to favor the
adoption of one of the equilibria [Fudenberg and Levine, 1993].
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1.1.2 Computational Challenges
As a result of the assumptions made in traditional MD, its application in MASs is not straight-
forward. In traditional MD, for example, agents are assumed to be rational and no consideration
is given to how computationally hard it is to select the appropriate strategy, the centre is as-
sumed to be able to compute the outcome of the protocol once the agents have transmitted their
strategies to it, the agents are assumed to undertake and successfully complete tasks assigned
to them, communication between the agents and the system is generally assumed to be free and
faultless, and the system is assumed to know the number of agents that are present [Dash et al.,
2003; Parkes, 2001; Rubinstein, 2002; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002; Dash et al., 2004; Glazer
and Rubinstein, 1998]. However these assumptions are problematic in computational settings
because in addition to the issues that we highlighted in the previous section, the following chal-
lenges are also present:
1. The mechanism will not be able to compute the outcome if this is an intractable problem
(e.g. computing the allocation in certain types of sealed bid auctions is what prevented
their application in FCC spectrum auctions [Klemperer, 2002]).
2. The agents themselves do not have the unbounded computational power required for cal-
culating their preferences for all possible outcomes as is required, in general, to produce
an optimal strategy.
3. Communication is not necessarily cost-free and may also be prone to errors.
4. The set of agents may vary with time due to the open nature of the system.
5. The presence of money, a common denominator by which every good can be valued, is
an important component in traditional MD. However, in many MASs, such a common
nume´raire does not exist naturally and in many cases has to found or constructed.
The field that seeks to address some of these limitations and, thereby, apply MD techniques to
computational problems is called Computational Mechanism Design (CMD). It could be argued
that a new field is not required since we can decompose the problem of using MD in a MAS
into its economic part (MD) and its computational part (MAS) and then attack the problem in
a modular fashion. However this approach fails to recognise that at each stage of the design
process both economic and computational principles need to be addressed. In fact, in many
cases, principles from one of the areas can help to solve a problem in the other. For example,
one could make finding an undesirable equilibrium strategy (economic problem) so intractable
(computational solution) that no agent would be able or wish to do so. Similarly, one could
make optimal strategies tractable (computational problem) by designing mechanisms that have
a simple, truth-revealing equilibrium (economic solution).
However, despite the range of challenges that are present in CMD, so far research has mainly
concentrated on specifying centralised protocols that operate under the constraints imposed by
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limited computational resources [Parkes, 2001; Sandholm, 2003; Nisan and Ronen, 1999]7. As
a result, there is an inherent assumption in most existing work in this area that the agents have a
direct line of communication with this centre and can play their strategies or reveal their types
simultaneously. Furthermore, it has been assumed that each agent forms its valuation based
solely on information that is privately observed by it. However these assumptions do not always
hold in distributed open systems and hence there is a strong need to move from CMD into
the realms of Distributed Mechanism Design (DMD). To this end, the next section details the
additional challenges involved in moving from CMD to DMD.
1.1.3 Distribution Challenges
DMD is concerned with the design of large-scale distributed systems consisting of multiple
autonomous, selfish and rational agents in which there is no centre imposing an outcome and
in which both the information or communication protocol are distributed over the agents. Thus,
DMD is still concerned with the computational problems outlined in the previous section, but it
differs in that there is no centre that decides on the outcome and the information an agent uses
to make its choices is distributed. Such distributed mechanisms have a number of advantages
over their centralised counterparts including:
Tractability. A distributed mechanism allows the burden of computation to be transferred from
a central node in the mechanism to the numerous constituent agents that go to make up
the system. This is akin to transforming the problem into a distributed optimisation task
that exploits the computational resources of many agents.
Robustness. In a centralised mechanism, the communication channels linking the centre are
critical for the system and failure may incapacitate the operation of the entire system.
However in a decentralised setting, failure of these channels will not incapacitate the
mechanism, though it may lead to a sub-optimal solution.
Trustworthiness. The issue of trustworthiness in the centre is an ever-present problem in a
centralised mechanism. This is, we believe, a factor that has limited the use of Inter-
net auctions since the agents have to trust that the auctioneer will not manipulate the
mechanism for its own profit. In a distributed mechanism, since there is no central agent
computing the outcome, there can be a higher degree of trust in the mechanism once the
incentive issues to do with agents are addressed. However, the problem of trust between
agents assumes greater importance in this context than in the centralised mechanism since
now each agent depends on each other to carry out the mechanism.
Reduction of Bottlenecks. In distributed mechanisms there is no longer a single point through
which all communication has to pass. Thus, there is no longer such an obvious and large
bottleneck.
7The work is also referred to as Algorithmic Mechanism Design by [Nisan and Ronen, 1999].
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However, these advantages come at a price. At one extreme, it may be possible to dispense with
MD altogether and simply ask about the “price of anarchy” [Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden,
2002] or the economic cost of just implementing distributed solutions with no carefully designed
mechanism. In many cases, we believe that this cost will be too high and the challenge for the
community remains in designing distributed mechanisms that retain the normative goals of MD.
To this end, we explain the three core challenges in DMD [Dash et al., 2003]:
1. Distribution of allocation: In traditional MD, there is a centre that computes and en-
forces the outcomes. However, in DMD, we aim to study mechanisms in which such a
centre does not exist. Such a constraint may arise naturally due to the computational struc-
ture of a system (as discussed above) or may be imposed by the system designer seeking
the advantages of a distributed mechanism. For example, in current P2P networks, such
as Gnutella and KaZaa, free-riding is a well-documented problem. In response, a num-
ber of studies have considered the economics of tit-for-tat where agents can only receive
resources to the degree that they contribute them [Lai et al., 2003]. However, such a tit-
for-tat approach is blind to the heterogeneity of local agents, that will likely differ in their
computational resources and data content and quality. To this end, a classical approach
in which the allocation is not computed by a central agent has been to implement mar-
kets akin to the CDA. However, such mechanisms rely on multiple trades before a stable
allocation is determined. Furthermore, the assumption of direct lines of communication
to a central information repository is still present (i.e. agents know which current items
are available and at what price they are trading). As a result, there is a heavy commu-
nication load in such mechanisms. Another approach in this context is to implement a
mechanism using distributed algorithms, whilst addressing the additional incentive con-
siderations that occur when the same agents (with the set of agents being greater than
two) that are implementing the mechanism are also strategic and self-interested [Shneid-
man and Parkes, 2003; Parkes and Shneidman, 2004]. However, whilst the computational
burden has been removed from the centre in this approach, the centre is still required in
order to enforce the mechanism. Finally, another line of research has investigated the
use of distributed auctions held simultaneously by a number of sellers in order to allocate
goods [Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber, 1979; Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996; Gerding
et al., 2006a,b; Greenwald et al., 2001; Airiau and Sen, 2003; Preist et al., 2001]. In this
case, whilst there is no centre either computing or enforcing the mechanism, the strategic
decisions made by the agents need to be studied and the equilibrium is not guaranteed to
be efficient.
2. Distribution of information: In traditional MD, agents are assumed to privately observe
an idiosyncratic signal (such as their tastes and preferences) and then formulate their val-
uation as a function of this signal. This signal is commonly referred to as the type of the
agent and the resulting valuation is known as its private valuation. However, in distributed
settings agents often form their valuations of the items based on the information observed
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by other agents, resulting in interdependent valuations8. For example, in grid computing,
an agent estimating the cost of performing a particular task would base its estimate on
which resources it will require in order to complete the task. These resources will typ-
ically be distributed over the grid with a number of agents having access to them. As a
result, it will have to base its cost estimate on the signals observed by other agents, thereby
resulting in interdependent valuations. Thus an agent might require x seconds on a micro-
processor (to which it has direct access and can observe) and y bytes of memory (which
another agent monitors) to complete a task. Another example is in P2P systems, where
very often the value of a particular download to an agent might depend on how much the
other agents value that download. This is especially true for downloads of systems that
require a network to work, such as online games and chat engines where there has to be a
sufficient number of users for the download to be worthwhile or when downloading files
that appeal to a large base of users such as popular songs and movie clips.
3. Distribution of communication system: In DMD we can no longer assume direct lines
of communication and hence need to rely on the agents themselves routing information for
other agents. For example, in an inter-domain routing problem, each of the nodes routing
traffic can be considered as an agent in a MAS. Hence, since these agents can lie about the
cost incurred in passing messages in their routes, a DMD approach is required to provide
agents with incentives to reveal truthful information and support the selection of the short-
est path for the routing of messages. However this efficient outcome should be computed
without overburdening the network with messages just to find it! Research in this area has
developed mechanisms that have been tailored to specific topologies [Feigenbaum et al.,
2002, 2001]. This, in turn, may point to adopting a design methodology similar to that in
traditional MD, where solutions and mechanisms are developed for restricted topologies
(as opposed to specific utility functions and trading environments in MD).
In summary, in this section, we have provided a list of the key challenges that exist when de-
signing MASs using MD. However, as stated earlier, we shall concentrate in this thesis on four
specific requirements that need to be addressed. Requirements 2 and 4 concentrate on challenges
that fall under CMD, while requirements 1 and 3 address the first two challenges of DMD. We
note here that we will not be addressing the challenges of distributed communication since we
feel that it has been already been researched quite extensively [Shneidman and Parkes, 2003;
Feigenbaum et al., 2002, 2001; Monderer and Tennenholtz, 1999; Bachrach and Rosenschein,
2005; Anderegg and Eidenbenz, 2003]. We next provide an overview of the MSN scenario, from
which these requirements have been inspired.
8This problem is documented in purely economic settings as well (such as wildcatters bidding for a strip of
land with potential resources under it [Krishna, 2002; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001]).
However, it becomes more endemic in computational settings since as a result of the network of agents, information
gathered by one agent more often than not affects that of the others.
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1.2 Running Scenario
Multi-Sensor Networks (MSNs) are networks of small sensor nodes where each node typically
consists of a micro-controller, a radio front-end, a power supply and one or more sensors for
sensing the physical environment [Akyildiz et al., 2002; Padhy et al., 2006; Deshpande et al.,
2004; Rao et al., 1991; Culler et al., 2004]. As such, they require a decentralised control regime
(pertaining to both the way that the sensors perform their tasks and where information is distrib-
uted amongst the sensors) and are potentially open systems with distinct stakeholders. Hence,
they provide a compelling area for the application of MAS since they are open, dynamic systems
in which there are numerous points at which decisions and actions have to be carried out. Specif-
ically, each agent (residing in the micro-controller) takes decisions on the following aspects (as
shown in figure 1.1):
1. Task Scheduling: The agent decides the timing and nature of the sensing tasks that the
sensor node should carry out.
2. Resource Allocation: The agent decides on the apportionment of the limited resource (e.g.
power, bandwidth and/or computational resource) between the different tasks it may be
required to carry out.
3. Communication Protocol: The agent decides the sources from which to receive data, the
data it will transmit and the sinks to which to transmit data.
Thus, the network of sensors, in which each sensor is autonomously deciding on its actions and
resource usage, can naturally be represented as a MAS. Now, in cases where all the sensor nodes
are owned by a single stakeholder, this is best modelled using a cooperative MAS approach in
which the agents are designed so as to work in tandem towards the system goal [Padhy et al.,
2006; Deshpande et al., 2004; Akyildiz et al., 2002]. However, there are increasingly applica-
tions where each sensor (or group of sensors) may be individually-owned by different stake-
holders. Such scenarios occur in applications like traffic control where each sensor is owned by
a particular vehicle [Wu et al., 2005], in pico-satellite projects where multiple companies own
very small satellites monitoring a certain area [Heidt et al., 2000], and in disaster relief examples
where different governmental and non-governmental organisations share information gathered
by their sensors to coordinate efforts in a natural disaster [Jennings et al., 2006]. In such appli-
cations, the sensors are operating in competitive rather than cooperative environments, and, as
such, will attempt to optimise their own gain from the network, at a cost to the overall perfor-
mance of the entire network. This selfish sensor perspective can still be applied when a group of
sensors are owned by different stakeholders. In this case, there can be a broker sensor that offer-
s/seeks services on the behalf of the network. These services will be comprised of collections
of the atomic services provided by the individual sensors and thus the task allocation problem
would occur both at the level of the market and the broker level. We do not investigate this
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perspective any further within this thesis since we believe that the groundwork for individual
selfish sensors should first be laid before investigating such hierarchical systems.
In more detail, figure 1.1 shows a typical sensor network with the physical and agent-based
representation of each sensor node. The sensors within this MSN have three possible capabili-
ties, namely to sense the temperature and pressure of the environment, as well as visually track
targets. Each sensor has a schedule of sensing tasks during which they gather data from the
environment. They then send and receive data from each other using the bandwidth constrained
communication links. In this thesis, we study how these types of MSNs can be managed using
the economic mechanisms we develop. In particular, the requirements that have been outlined
above are all reflected within the MSN depicted in figure 1.1 in the following way:
1. Within a MSN, sensors can be tasked by other sensors to sense various signals from the
environment against a payment. Now, a trusted centre may not exist in such scenarios
leading to sensors holding simultaneous auctions for their services. This scenario, from
which requirement 1 is inspired, in studied in greater detail in chapter 3.
2. Sensors are typically constrained by the amount of power and/or bandwidth which is
available to them. This leads to the sensor being able to carry out only a few of the total
tasks that are demanded. As a result, we incorporate such sensors with limited capacity
(requirement 2) into the design of the mechanism in chapter 4.
3. The value for the particular data gathered by a sensor can depend on the data which has
been gathered by other sensors. This is especially true when sensors fuse information and
results in the interdependent valuation model (requirement 3) considered in chapter 5.
4. A sensor may not always report a true value due to a variety of reasons including faults,
maliciousness or noisy communication channels. Thus requirement 4 is inspired from
such a failure-prone environment and is dealt with in chapter 6.
Having thus provided the scenario for this thesis, we now briefly cover some of the related
research in the area of market-based task allocation within sensor networks. The specifics of the
related work on each of the above issues are dealt with in the corresponding chapter.
1.2.1 Market-Based Task Allocation in Sensor Networks
Task allocation within sensor networks has traditionally been analysed under the assumption
that the sensors will work towards the global objective of the MSN. This has been due to the
fact that most of these MSNs are owned by a single stakeholder and has thus resulted in the
adoption of cooperative approaches [Padhy et al., 2006; Lesser et al., 2003; Clearwater, 1996].
However, market-based techniques are increasingly being adopted in order to control sensor net-
works. Within this space, a number of approaches consider imbuing the sensors with selfishness
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FIGURE 1.1: An overview of a MSN showing the physical components of a sensor node, the
decisions faced by an agents controlling a node, and common problems encountered within the
network.
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in order to achieve a distributed control regime (e.g. [Gerkey and Mataric, 2002a; Sadagopan
and Krishnamachari, 2004; Rogers et al., 2005]), whilst [Dash et al., 2005] consider sensors that
are selfish due to their distinct ownerships. We consider each of these main items of related
work in turn.
In more detail, Gerkey and Mataric [2002a] develop the MURDOCH protocol, which is loosely
based on a multiple auction model, for task allocation amongst a system of robots (which is a
collection of sensors and actuators). More specifically, in one particular instance of this protocol,
the following correspondence with auctions would hold: the item being auctioned would be a
task, the auctioneer would be the robot requesting the task, and the bid is a fitness measure which
other idle robots provide. However, since they are operating within a cooperative environment
no payments are made in the system. Rather, selfishness and the auction protocol are used as a
means of carrying out a distributed allocation mechanism. The concept of selfishness is further
investigated in [Sadagopan and Krishnamachari, 2004] where they study how the routing of data
from sensors to a certain destination in the MSN. They construct a game whereby despite the
selfish actions of the agents, an optimal load-balanced data gathering tree results in the network.
However, the concept of selfishness is selectively applied since the agents higher up in the data
gathering tree have to commit to providing bandwidth for transmission of data until they are
saturated. These agents are thus providing a service for no apparent gain. Rogers et al. [2005]
correct this by designing a protocol in which parent nodes in the networks are incentivised to
forward data by the payments provided by the child nodes. These payments are conditioned on
the power that a sensor expends when forwarding data and the resulting protocol has a close to
optimal performance. However, the designed payment protocol is based on the assumption of
an inverse square power law governing the power expenditure (and hence is not generalisable to
cases where this law is not obeyed) and is not robust to selfishness since it does not contain a way
of guaranteeing that the parent node will conform to the protocol once it has been paid (such as
in [Blankenburg et al., 2005]). The selfishness-related drawbacks of the systems discussed here
are not major if the whole system is owned by a single stakeholder who can program each sensor
to behave as it wishes. This is because the sensors will then conform to the designed protocol
and selfishness is used as a means to achieve a decentralised allocation scheme. However, it
also implies that these systems would fail if they were adopted in a context where the sensors
are owned by different stakeholders and thus are selfish by nature rather than by design. This
is because such sensors will be designed by each individual stakeholder that can take advantage
of these drawbacks for their selfish gain, which will, in turn lead to a degradation of system
performance.
In contrast, in [Dash et al., 2005] a centralised auction is designed for the allocation of data
between self-interested sensors. In this protocol, the value the sensors place on data gathered
from other sensors is dependent on their own private information, as well as that of the other
sensors. A trusted centre computes the allocation and then provides the payments once the
allocation is carried out. This protocol is discussed in greater depth in chapter 5.
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Having thus explained the context of the research conducted within this thesis, we now detail
the specific research contributions.
1.3 Research Contributions
The research reported in this thesis stems from our analysis and design of distributed allocation
and distributed information mechanisms. This research thus provides the following insights into
these two crucial aspects of distributed mechanisms:
• Distributed Allocation: Distributed allocation mechanisms require no centre to compute
and enforce the overall allocation. In this context, we study two such mechanisms: simul-
taneous auctions (in Chapter 3) and the CDA (in Chapter 4). In both cases, we find that
the efficiency of the distributed mechanism implemented is less than the full efficiency
that can be achieved with centralised mechanism. Thus, we can infer that there is a cost
of distributing a mechanism in that we can no longer achieve full efficiency. Nevertheless,
we find that this cost is not overly prohibitive and in certain scenarios may be justified in
order to gain the advantages of distributed mechanisms. Furthermore, the implementation
of distributed allocation mechanisms for scenarios involving multiple goods and complex
utility functions is not straightforward and thereby requires a significant design effort.
• Distributed Information: Distributed information mechanisms pertain to those situa-
tions where the agents require distributed information in order to formulate their pref-
erences over outcomes. In such cases, we find that traditional mechanisms cannot in-
centivise the agents to choose strategies that lead to desirable outcomes. Therefore, we
design novel efficient mechanisms (in Chapters 5 and 6) to deal with such distributed
information.
Furthermore, in studying the computational properties of the centralised mechanisms we de-
sign in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we find that often the computation of the solution is hard. This
results from the fact that such mechanisms require the exact computation of solutions in order
to guarantee their economic properties. Nevertheless, we reduce the computational load on the
centre in each of these mechanisms by designing appropriate algorithms that exploit the problem
structure.
Finally, we study the application scenario of a MSN composed of individually-owned sensors.
This provides a canonical problem in which the specific requirements we outlined earlier are
exhibited. We find that before designing mechanisms for these problems, it is important to
properly formulate the specific goals that each individual sensor is trying to achieve. Moreover,
in addressing the specific requirements we advance the state of the art in the following areas:
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1. Distributed Allocation. In Chapter 3, we develop for the first time the optimal strategy of
a buyer wishing to acquire a single unit in a simultaneous auction market consisting of a
number of sellers each auctioning off a single identical item. This allows us to analyse the
equilibrium behaviour when the buyers in the market are of three types: (i) global (such
buyers can bid in all auctions), (ii) dynamic local (such buyers can only bid at one auction,
but can randomly choose which auction to participate in) and (iii) static local (such buyers
can only bid in one predetermined auction). We also prove that the lower bound on the
efficiency of such markets is 1− 1e . Furthermore, in Chapter 4, we develop a novel clearing
scheme (employing a distributed allocation mechanism based on the CDA) so as to deal
with constrained capacity suppliers. We empirically show that the efficiency of such a
mechanism is fairly high (around 83%), even when employing very basic bidding and
selling strategies 9.
2. Limited Capacity. We develop two new mechanisms for the case of multiple suppliers
with limited capacities competing to satisfy a demand. The first mechanism is centralised
and ensures the desirable properties of incentive compatibility, efficiency, individual ra-
tionality and robustness via the introduction of a novel penalty scheme. We provide an
algorithm that computes the allocation in pseudo-polynomial time. The second mecha-
nism is the distributed mechanism mentioned above and is based on the CDA protocol.
This mechanism requires the design of a novel clearing scheme in order to address the
issue of constrained capacities. Furthermore, this mechanism is fair in that it allows an
approximately equal sharing of profits between buyers and sellers.
3. Distributed (Interdependent) Information. We show for the first time how to derive
utility functions for a MSN scenario from information theory using a distributed infor-
mation filter (which is a distributed way of measuring the information gain that a mea-
surement provides). Furthermore, we develop a novel mechanism for the allocation of
multiple goods (tasks) in the case when agents form their valuations from observations
made by other agents (i.e. interdependent valuations). This mechanism is proven to be
incentive compatible, efficient and individual rational.
4. Uncertainty in Task Completion. We develop a novel mechanism that accounts for the
case in which an assigned allocation may not always be completed to the pre-specified
level. Furthermore, different agents have different views about whether an allocation
has been completed successfully. Thus, each agent has a measure of how well the other
agents are likely to perform a particular task (which we term as trust). Hence, for the
first time, we incorporate trust within the design of a mechanism. We then go on to study
the economic properties of the mechanism and evaluate its performance against other
closely-related mechanisms. We finally implement our mechanism using both linear and
dynamic programming techniques that reduces the complexity of computing the optimal
allocations and payments.
9The use of more sophisticated strategies generally leads to an increase in efficiency [Vytelingum et al., 2004]
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FIGURE 1.2: Positioning of work done in this thesis in relation to challenges involved in CMD
and DMD.
To summarise, the work described in this thesis addresses a number of issues that arise when
using MD for the design of MASs. In effect, our aim is to apply the theoretical work developed
herein to MSN scenarios and simultaneously design distributed systems that address the chal-
lenges that have been outlined in the previous sections. This is illustrated diagrammatically by
figure 1.2 which shows how the various strands of our work (which are detailed in the different
chapters) are positioned according to whether they deal with distributed allocation or distributed
information.
The work carried out in relation to this thesis has resulted in the publication of the following
papers which are reported within this thesis:
• R. K. Dash, D. C. Parkes and N. R. Jennings (2003) “Computational Mechanism Design:
A Call to Arms” IEEE Intelligent Systems 18 (6) 40-47. (Chapters 1 and 2)
• E. H. Gerding, R. K. Dash, D. C. K. Yuen and N. R. Jennings (2006). Optimal Bidding
Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes, Proc. of the 8th
Int. Workshop on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, (AAMAS 06), 10-17.
(Chapter 3)
• R. K. Dash, P. Vytelingum, A. Rogers, E. David and N. R. Jennings (2006) Market-based
task allocation mechanisms for limited capacity suppliers IEEE Trans on SMC (Part A).
(Chapter 4)
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• R. K. Dash, A. Rogers, S. Reece, S. Roberts, and N. R. Jennings (2005) Constrained
bandwidth allocation in multi-sensor information fusion: a mechanism design approach
Proc. 8th Int. Conf. on Information Fusion, Philadelphia, USA. (Chapter 5)
• R. K. Dash, A. Rogers and N. R. Jennings (2004) “A mechanism for multiple goods and
interdependent valuations” Proc. 6th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated E-Commerce,
New York, USA, 197-210. (Chapter 5)
• A. Rogers, R. K. Dash, S. Reece, S. Roberts, and N. R. Jennings (2006) Computational
Mechanism Design for MultiSensor Information Fusion Proc. 5th Int. Conf. on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 06), Hakodate, Japan. (Demo Pa-
per)(Chapter 5)
• A. Rogers, R. K. Dash, N. R. Jennings, S. Reece and S. Roberts (2006) Computational
mechanism design for information fusion within sensor networks Proc. 9th Int. Conf. on
Information Fusion (Fusion 06), Florence, Italy. (Chapter 5)
• R. K. Dash, S. D. Ramchurn, and N. R. Jennings (2004) ”Trust-based mechanism design”
Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS04),
New York, USA 748-755. (Chapter 6)
Furthermore, this work has also spawned a number of publications that are not been reported
here (since they do not fit perfectly into the context of this thesis). Nevertheless, these papers
relate to this thesis in the following ways:
• V. D. Dang, R. K. Dash, A. Rogers and N. R. Jennings (2006) Overlapping coalition
formation for task distribution in multi-sensor networks Proc. 21st National Conference
on AI (AAAI), Boston, USA.
This paper investigates the use of cooperative coalition formation with sensor networks
when sensors can belong to more than one coalition. It is related to the MSN scenario
considered in this thesis and builds upon the use of an information theoretic base for
utility functions (as in Chapter 5). However, in this paper, the sensors are cooperative and
the focus is on devising algorithms that allow such a computationally complex task to be
achieved.
• E. Gerding, A. Rogers, R. K. Dash and N. R. Jennings (2006) Competing Sellers in Online
Markets: Reserve Prices, Shill Bidding, and Auction Fees Proc. 5th Int. Conf. on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 06), Hakodate, Japan, 1208-1210.
This paper investigates how sellers can improve their revenue in a simultaneous auction
environment using two common devices, namely reserve pricing (where they set a pub-
licly known minimum price for sale) and shilling (where they anonymously collude with
a bidder to set a minimum sale price). As such, this paper is related to the simultaneous
auction environment studied within Chapter 3, though it concentrates on the seller side of
the auction.
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• P. Padhy, R. K. Dash, K. Martinez and N. R. Jennings (2006) A utility-based sensing and
communication model for a glacial sensor network Proc. 5th Int. Conf. on Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 06), Hakodate, Japan, 1353-1360.
This paper investigates the use of utility functions within a MSN in order to maximise the
data gathered by the sensors, whilst minimising the power consumed. It is related to the
MSN scenario considered in this thesis though differs crucially in that it operates within
a cooperative rather than a selfish context.
• P. Vytelingum, R. K. Dash, M. He, and N. R. Jennings (2005) A framework for designing
strategies for trading agents Proc. Int Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis,
IJCAI 05, Edinburgh, Scotland, 7-13.
• P. Vytelingum, R. K. Dash, M. He, A. Sykulski and N. R. Jennings (2006) Trading strate-
gies for markets: A design framework and its application Lecture Notes in Artificial In-
telligence
These papers propose a framework for designing strategies for trading agents that takes
into consideration the various signals that these agents receive whilst trading. It has then
been applied in order to design a strategy for the the trading agent competition [Wellman
et al., 2004]. This research is related to Chapters 3 and 4, in that it concentrates on the
design of strategies, though the technique employed has a heuristic base rather than the
game-theoretic one used in Chapter 3.
• P. Vytelingum, R.K. Dash, E. David and N. R. Jennings (2004) ”A risk-based bidding
strategy for continuous double auctions” Proc. 16th European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (ECAI 04), Valencia, Spain, 79-83.
This paper investigates the use of risk with a bidding strategy for the CDA by changing the
degree of aggressiveness of the strategy in relation to its value/cost and its prediction of
the equilibrium price. The resultant strategy outperforms current strategies that have been
proposed for the CDA and improves market efficiency. It is thus related to the research
carried out in Chapter 4 on the CDA mechanism.
• B. Blankenburg, R. K. Dash, S. D. Ramchurn, M. Klusch, and N. R. Jennings (2005)
Trusted kernel-based coalition formation Proc. 4th Int Joint Conf on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 05), Utrecht, Netherlands.
This paper considers task allocation with uncertainty in task completion when using a
cooperative game theoretic approach. As such, it is related to Chapter 6, though the
solution concepts employed are based on coalitional games rather than MD.
• I. Rezek, S. J. Roberts, A. Rogers, R. K. Dash and N. R. Jennings (2005) Unifying learning
in games and graphical models Proc. 8th Int. Conf. on Information Fusion, Philadelphia,
USA.
This paper looks at integrating fictitious play (which is a model of learning in games)
with probabilistic graphical models. As such it is related to the underlying technique used
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within this thesis, namely game theory and views the field from a probabilistic point of
view.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This section outlines the structure of the thesis giving a summary of the work presented in each
chapter.
Chapter 2 discusses the theories relevant to our work, by reviewing the economic principles
behind mechanism design. We discuss the possibility and impossibility results that relate to the
different game theoretic equilibria, thereby outlining the implementable social choice functions
(i.e functions that specify what the desirable system-wide properties are).
Chapters 3 and 4 consider the case of distributed allocation in which there is no trusted centre
that collects all the bids and performs the required calculation for an allocation. However, they
differ in the distributed protocol which they implement. Chapter 3 considers the case where
there is no coordination mechanism available to the buyers and sellers. In contrast, Chapter 4
compares the CDA protocol (in which there is an indirect coordination mechanism in the form
of the billboard posting current bids and asks) to a canonical centralised protocol (the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves Mechanism).
In Chapter 3, we first discuss a scenario in which buyer-sensors have to bid for tasks to be
performed by seller-sensors. The scenario leads to a model whereby multiple sellers are selling
identical items simultaneously, whereas buyers have to choose the bids they place at each of
the sellers. We study the optimal strategies that the global bidders should employ when faced
with different combinations of local and global bidders. In so doing, we prove that the global
bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, irrespective of a local bidder’s
valuation distribution. We then study the computational problem of finding the optimal strategy
and prove that, for non-decreasing valuation distributions, the problem of finding the optimal
bids reduces to two dimensions. These results hold both in the case where the number of local
bidders is known ( i.e. static local bidders) and when this number is determined by a Poisson
distribution (i.e. dynamic local bidders). In addition, by combining analytical and simulation
results, we demonstrate that similar results hold in the case of several global bidders, provided
that the market consists of both global and local bidders. Finally, we address the efficiency of
the overall market, and show that information about the number of local bidders is an important
determinant for the way in which a global bidder affects efficiency.
In Chapter 4 we discuss a scenario which concerns the supply of tasks by sellers in a market
where the total demand exceeds the maximum that any of the individual sellers can supply. The
sellers have a particular cost structure consisting of a fixed cost and a unit cost of production.
We develop a modified centralised protocol in which we allow the sellers to communicate these
defining characteristics of their cost function along with their capacity. We also show that the
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application of a penalty scheme is sufficient to ensure desirable economic properties of the
mechanism. We also study the computational complexity of finding the best allocation using
this protocol. We then analyse the CDA where both sellers and buyers participate in a market
and thus the items that needs to be allocated are distributed over all agents in the systems, but
every agent knows which items are being allocated and the status of the market. We study the
economic properties of our modified CDA protocol by using very simple strategies and show
that the performance of this protocol is satisfactory when compared to the centralised protocol.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we study another form of distribution, namely the distribution of infor-
mation (which can be characterised as the interdependence of valuations). Chapter 5 develops
a general mechanism for the case when there are multiple items in the market and the valua-
tions of a buyer depend on its own observation, as well as signals observed by other buyers in
the system. To this end, in Chapter 6, we look at a particular form of interdependent signals,
namely trust, and develop a mechanism that incentivises the agents to report truthfully about
their observed trust measure.
More specifically, in Chapter 5, we argue that interdependent valuations are common in MASs
and then go on to develop a general mechanism that has desirable economic properties. We
study its computational properties and show that the mechanism adds a computational load
only on the centre (as compared to classic mechanisms). We also investigate an application
for this mechanism which concerns a multi-sensor target detection scenario in which multiple
individually-owned sensors are monitoring a particular area with each sensor having a particular
accuracy of measurement. We model this as a MAS and propose a valuation function based
around Information Theory that calculates the value each sensor has for information gained by
other sensors.
In Chapter 6 we design a mechanism in which the uncertainty in the completion of a task is
taken into account. We first investigate the case when each agent can report on its own uncer-
tainty. We then analyse the more general case where each agent can report on other agents’
uncertainties. Thus, we cannot hope to achieve a strong equilibrium (like in Chapter 5) and in-
stead opt for a weaker equilibrium condition (ex-ante Nash equilibrium). We analyse the prop-
erties of this mechanism and benchmark it against other comparable mechanisms. We study
the computational properties of our mechanism and implement it using both linear and dynamic
programming techniques that reduce the amount of computation required for finding the optimal
allocations and payments by reducing the size of the search space and reusing past solutions.
Finally in Chapter 7, we summarize the main achievements of this thesis and how well they
satisfy the requirements discussed in this chapter. We also discuss the broad future research
directions that have been identified for the fields of DMD and its application within MSNs.
Chapter 2
Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design (MD) is the area of micro-economics concerned with how to design systems,
using tools developed by game theory analysis, such that certain system-wide properties emerge
from the interaction of the constituent components. As such it provides the basis on which a
large part of this thesis rests. We therefore provide in this section a brief mathematical outline
of the rich and important body of research to which MD has given rise (see [Jackson, 2000; Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1994; MasColell et al., 1995; Krishna, 2002; Klemperer, 2002] for more
comprehensive reviews.). This chapter thus presents traditional MD, which has concerned itself
with how to satisfy certain economic criteria (such as efficiently allocating resources, maximis-
ing revenues or having a fair system) given the setting of selfish agents in interactive decision
making. The newer challenges within mechanism design, namely computational and distribu-
tion challenges have been reviewed in Chapter 1 and the related work specific to each chapter is
discussed more extensively in each of the chapters.
In more detail, we will first present a basic model of a mechanism in Section 2.1 and explain
how different solution concepts may arise in mechanisms in Section 2.2. We then present some
of the social choice functions that traditional MD has concerned itself with in Section 2.3. We
explain what can and what cannot be achieved in Section 2.4. Within this section, we present an
important mechanism, namely the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which we refer
to extensively within this thesis.
2.1 Mechanisms
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = (I,Θ, S, g(.)) consists of a set of agents I = {1 . . . , I}
that each have a strategy set Si. Each agent chooses its strategy si ∈ Si from its particular
strategy set given the private information contained in its types θi ∈ Θi and an outcome function,
g : S1 × · · · × SI → O, which sets the outcome. The way that each agent chooses its strategy
depends on how we model that agent. For example, it is commonly assumed that agents choose
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their strategy so as to achieve their best outcome. The “goodness” of the outcome o ∈ O is
measured by a utility function [Varian, 1999] that gives a numerical value to each outcome
(higher being better) with ui : O × Θi → ℜ. Thus the assumption of each agent looking for
its best outcome, also known as the rationality assumption [Rubinstein, 2002], can be stated in
terms of the utility function as:
Assumption 2.1. Rationality Assumption. An agent is termed rational if it chooses its best
strategy, s∗i
s∗i = arg max
si∈Σi
E[ui(g(s1, . . . , sI))] (2.1)
where E[.] is the expectation operator.
Given this setting, the mechanism is then designed so as to satisfy certain criteria which are
encompassed in the social choice function (SCF) scf : Θ1 × · · · × ΘI → O. We hence have
scf(θ) being the outcome that satisfies the particular criteria set by the designer. Since the aim
of the mechanism is to achieve scf(θ), we can restate the objective of the designer as being:
g(s1, . . . , sI) = scf(θ) (2.2)
We say that a mechanism Γ implements scf(θ) whenever equation 2.2 is satisfied. The central
question in MD asks which set of desiderata (or which scf(θ)) can and cannot be achieved
under a certain solution concept (which is a state that can be predicted to occur given a certain
mechanism). This question is partially answered in terms of results, termed possibility and
impossibility theories, which are discussed in greater detail in section 2.4 (after a discussion on
the solution concepts and desirable desiderata set). One obvious way of trying to achieve scf(θ)
is to ask the agents to report their types truthfully such that si = θi and then set g(.) = scf(.).
Such mechanisms, in which Si = Θi, are called direct mechanisms (a.k.a direct revelation
mechanisms):
Definition 2.1. Direct Mechanism. A direct mechanism is one in which the strategy space, Si,
available to each agent is reporting its type Θi.
However, a straightforward implementation of a direct mechanism does not guarantee that the
agents would communicate the true values, θ. In order for this to happen, we need to build into
the mechanism the incentives for the agents to reveal their types truthfully. If any agent i finds
that ui(g(θˆi, θ−i)) ≥ ui(g(θi, θ−i)) where the reported type θˆi 6= θi, then it has an incentive to
report θˆi. Hence, we require ui(g(θˆi, θ−i)) < ui(g(θi, θ−i)) for all i ∈ I to ensure that each
agent reports its true type. Mechanisms in which this occurs are called incentive compatible
mechanisms:
Definition 2.2. Incentive Compatible Mechanism. In an incentive compatible mechanism,
each agent i ∈ I has an incentive to tell the truth about its type; that is, ui(g(θi, θ−i)) >
ui(g(θˆi, θ−i)), ∀ θˆi ∈ Θi, θˆi 6= θi.
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Thus we can see that we can implement the desired scf(.) by selecting a direct mechanism in
which g(.) = scf(.) and setting the outcome function such that the mechanism is incentive
compatible. This insight is commonly termed the revelation principle:
Theorem 2.3. Revelation Principle. The revelation principle states that if a mechanism Γ =
(I,Θ, S, g(.)) implements scf(.), then there exists an incentive-compatible direct revelation
(ICDR) mechanism, Γ = (I,Θ, scf(.)) that implements scf(.).
The revelation principle is a powerful tool for analysis. It enables attention to be restricted to
the class of ICDR mechanisms in the derivation of mechanisms that are possible/impossible to
implement. These mechanisms are easier to analyse since we only need to consider the case
where agents have the restricted strategy space of just revealing their types. However, it should
be borne in mind that the revelation principle does not imply that we only ever need to consider
ICDR mechanisms. This is because these mechanisms may not have the desired computational
properties. In short, the revelation principle is of prime importance within MD because of two
main considerations:
1. Theoretical. It concentrates attention on incentive-compatible direct mechanisms for the
development of impossibility and possibility results.
2. Practical. A designer can characterise the scf(.) that needs to be satisfied in ICDR mech-
anisms. Then, this can be used to provide a normative guide for the outcome and payments
that must be computed in a realised implementation, that need not itself be an ICDR mech-
anism. Hence, the revelation principle provides a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for the existence of distributed mechanisms and hence provides a good basis for DMD.
It is important to emphasise what the revelation principle does not provide. First, to reiterate the
last point on practicality, it provides normative goals for mechanism design, but does not imply
that the only mechanisms that are interesting in practice are direct-revelation mechanisms. As
we discussed in chapter 1, there are a whole host of reasons why centralised direct-revelation
mechanisms may be problematic from a computational perspective. Second, the normative goals
are only relevant when agents are actually able to play the equilibrium strategies assumed in
mechanism design. This assumption may itself not be reasonable with computationally-bounded
agents.
To illustrate the points made in this section, we consider the example of the single-item English
auction (in which agents can bid at the current ask price or leave the auction and the price in-
creases by some minimal bid increment ǫ > 0 until only one agent is left). Using the revelation
principle, it is known that this non-ICDR mechanism1 can be transformed into an equivalent
ICDR mechanism, in this case a Vickrey auction (a sealed-bid action where the winner is the
1This is non-ICDR since agents only reveal their private value incrementally, thereby giving only the information
that their value is higher (or not) than the current bid.
Chapter 2 Mechanism Design 24
highest bidder but who pays the second highest bid) [Krishna, 2002]. In more detail, the Eng-
lish auction ensures that the item is allocated to the agent having the highest valuation of the
item (an economic desideratum termed allocative efficiency). The Vickrey auction also has the
same property, but it is an ICDR mechanism since the agents reveal their types (in this case the
valuation of the items) and it is incentive-compatible (the agents can be proven to have highest
utility when revealing their types truthfully). Notice, however, that the auctions are conducted in
a different manner; the most salient difference being that the English auction is iterative in that
bidders incrementally increase their bids, while in the Vickrey auction there is a single submis-
sion of bids. This demonstrates how a direct mechanism can have an indirect counterpart that
satisfies the same theoretical goals, but which has very different practical implementations.
Having discussed the ICDR mechanisms, we now need to study the solution concepts. The role
of these concepts is to indicate which particular action or strategy a rational agent would employ
under the mechanism we are designing. This, in turn, allows an analysis and prediction of the
mechanisms that is being designed.
2.2 Solution Concepts
Mechanism design requires a solution concept to predict the strategies the agents will select in
various circumstances. Knowing these strategies will, in turn, ensure that the properties of a
particular mechanism can be predicted. Ostensibly, a mechanism may implement scf(θ) under
a wide variety of solution concepts, of which we only provide a few of the most important ones
here (see [MasColell et al., 1995] for a more in-depth study). As stated in chapter 1, it is up
to the designer to select the appropriate solution concept which is achieved by setting S and
g(s). These design parameters, along with the design environment, will lead to different kinds
of solutions arising. For analysis, we can partition games into cooperative and non-cooperative
games.
In this thesis we focus on competitive game theory purely because it has been the more re-
searched field in terms of mechanism design and is more applicable to the situations which we
wish to study (see Chapter 1). We present the three most important solution concepts in com-
petitive game theory below (see [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] for a fuller treatment). Each
of the solution concepts presented require stronger assumptions about agents and are, therefore,
a weaker implementation concept (i.e. the confidence with which the equilibrium can be pre-
dicted is weaker or the environment in which the implementation is carried out is more restric-
tive). Nevertheless, all these solution concepts are based around the notion of a best-response
strategy, which is the best strategy to play given the (expected) actions of other agents. These
solution concepts relate to strategic games (a.k.a normal form games).
Definition 2.4. Strategic Game. A strategic game is one where each agent i ∈ I chooses its
strategy si ∈ Si based on its preferences or type θi ∈ Θi which then leads to an outcome o ∈ O
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determined by the outcome function g(.). Thus a strategic game is completely defined by the
tuple Γ = (I,Θ, S, g(.))
Thus a strategic game is a one-shot game. The agents choose their actions and the outcome
function determines the outcome. To this end, within stategic games we define the following
three equilibrium solutions:
Definition 2.5. Dominant Strategy. In a dominant strategy equilibrium each agent has a best-
response strategy no matter what strategy is selected by the other agents. Formally, we have:
s∗i (θi) = argmaxsi
ui(θi, g(si(θi), s−i(θ−i))), ∀s−i,∀θ−i (2.3)
for all θi ∈ Θi.
Definition 2.6. ex post Nash. Each agent’s strategy is a best-response to the strategy of other
agents, no matter what their types, as long as they also play an equilibrium strategy:
s∗i (θi) = argmaxsi
ui(θi, g(si(θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i))), ∀θ−i (2.4)
for all θi ∈ Θi, where s∗−i(θ−i) denotes the strategies selected by other agents.
Definition 2.7. Bayesian-Nash. Each agent selects a best-response strategy to maximise its
expected utility given its beliefs about the distribution over types:
s∗i (θi) = argmaxsi
Eθ−i [ui(θi, g(si(θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)))] (2.5)
for all θi ∈ Θi.
A dominant strategy equilibrium is a very robust solution concept because an agent does not
need to form beliefs either about the rationality of other agents or about the distribution over
the types of other agents. An example of a dominant strategy implementation is the Vickrey
auction. In this auction, the best strategy for an agent is to bid truthfully. This is irrespective of
what the other agents bid.
An ex post Nash equilibrium requires common knowledge about the rationality of agents, but
does not require any knowledge about type distributions. In this sense, ex post Nash has a no-
regret property such that an agent does not want to deviate from its strategy even once it knows
the strategies and types of other agents. As a simple example, a straightforward bidding strategy
in which an agent bids in each round of an ascending-price Vickrey auction 2 to maximise its
utility is an ex post Nash equilibrium [Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Parkes, 2001].3
2This is a modified Vickrey auction where now the auction is conducted over multiple rounds. At each round, the
results of the previous round are known and the auction ends when there is no change in results over two rounds.
3This is not a dominant strategy in this relaxed auction because another agent might condition a “crazy strategy”
such as “I will bid to $1 million” on the price hitting a particular target value. In this case an agent that would
otherwise win should submit a jump bid past this target value.
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The weakest solution concept adopted in mechanism design is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
(BNE). In a BNE an agent must both hold beliefs about the rationality of other agents, and also
correct beliefs about the distribution on types of other agents. The first-price sealed bid auction
is a classic example with a simple Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. For example, given a symmetric
distribution of agent types with values that are identically and independently distributed vi ∼
U(0, 1) the symmetric BNE is for agents to play s∗i (vi) = (|I| − 1)vi/|I|.
Given these solution concepts, we now focus on what properties we want to emerge from the
mechanism when a solution has been reached.
2.3 Implementation of Social Choice Functions
Social choice functions are functions that are used to describe the outcomes in a game. As
designers we seek to implement SCFs with desirable properties, and in the strongest-possible
equilibrium solution concept (because this then guarantees that the properties will be achieved).
However, we will see that there are often properties that cannot be implemented in any mecha-
nism, even in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Typical desiderata in SCFs include [MasColell et al., 1995]:
Pareto optimality: SCF scf(·) chooses an outcome o∗ such that there is no other outcome
o′ ∈ O in which one agent is better off without one of the others being worse-off. (i.e. at
o∗, if ui(θi, o′) > ui(θi, o∗) for some i then uj(θj , o′) < uj(θj , o∗) for some j 6= i.)
Maximise social welfare: SCF scf(·) chooses an outcome o∗ to maximise the total utility of
agents, i.e. scf(θ) = maxo∈O[
∑
i∈N ui(θi, o)]. Social-welfare maximising outcomes are
always Pareto optimal, and are sometimes called the efficient outcome.
Maximise utility of centre: Maximise the expected utility to the auctioneer across all possible
mechanisms. Here, we consider outcomes that decompose into an allocation and agent
payments, and select a SCF scf(·) that maximises the expected value of the centre for any
goods not sold and the expected payment received by the centre.
Another constraint that is often placed on SCFs that involve payments is that of budget-balance,
such that the total payment made by agents should exactly equal zero (so that money is neither
injected into a system nor removed from it). This property is especially important in systems
that must be self-sustaining and require no external benefactor to input money into the system,
or a central authority that collects payments.
Finally, a designer of an open system should provide an incentive for agents to join the system.
Such individually-rational mechanisms ensure the agent perceives a greater interest in joining
the mechanism rather than remaining outside it.
Chapter 2 Mechanism Design 27
We now have the ingredients to construct mechanisms that satisfy particular desiderata. How-
ever, as we shall see in the next section, there are some fundamental constraints on the mecha-
nisms we can build to satisfy a certain set of desiderata.
2.4 Important Impossibility and Possibility Theorems
In this section, we briefly cover some of the key impossibility results (results that prove the im-
possibility of implementing certain SCFs under certain solution concepts) and possibility results
(which define mechanisms in which the environment and solution concept are chosen such that
certain SCFs are always satisfied). We have already expressed an avowed desire to implement
mechanisms in dominant strategies in section 2.2 due to the strength of the solution concept.
However, an important negative result, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem [Gib-
bard, 1973], states that it might be impossible to do so. Before stating the theorem, we shall first
define a dictatorial SCF:
Definition 2.8. Dictatorial. A SCF scf(.) is dictatorial if ∃i : ∀θ = {θ1, . . . , θI} ∈ Θ,
scf(θ) ∈ {o ∈ O : ui(o, θi) ≥ ui(o′, θi) ∀o′ ∈ O}
Thus, in a dictatorial SCF, the outcome is always the chosen outcome of only one agent. The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is then:
Theorem 2.9. Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem. In a setting consisting of
• agents with general utility functions (i.e they are derived from complete, transitive and
strict preferences),
• a finite set of outcomes O, with more than 3 possible outcomes (i.e. |O| ≥ 3)
any SCF which is incentive-compatible in dominant strategies is dictatorial.
The above theorem is quite negative, because coupled with the revelation principle, it implies
that we cannot implement any mechanism based on dominant strategy given the (quite general)
conditions in these settings. As a result, even pareto-optimality, one of the most basic desidera-
tum, cannot be satisfied. One way to circumvent this impossibility result is to restrict the utility
functions of the agents and the environment in which they are operating. The restriction most
commonly applied is a simple exchange environment (one in which goods are not produced but
only exchanged) in which the agents are assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function. In
order to define a quasi-linear utility function, we first decompose the outcome into two parts.
Let o = (k, t) denote the outcome with k ∈ K defining the allocation in the space of possible
allocations K and let t = (t1, . . . , tN ) be the transfer of money among agents.
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Definition 2.10. Quasi-linear Utility Function. A quasi-linear utility function is one which
can be expressed as:
ui(k, ti, θi) = vi(k, θi) + ti (2.6)
where vi(k, θi) is the value of allocation k to agent i given its type θi.
Thus an agent with a quasi-linear utility function does not differentiate between two outcomes,
one in which there is an allocation k with no transfers of money and another one in which there
is no allocation and it is being paid its value of the allocation, vi(k, θi).
We will now present two mechanisms – the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) and d’Aspremont-
Gerard-Varet (dAGVA) in the next section that achieve different sets of the SCF. The mecha-
nisms are similar in that both achieve incentive-compatibility and efficiency. However, whilst
the VCG mechanism is individually-rational but not budget-balanced, the dAGVA mechanism
is budget-balanced but not individually-rational.
2.4.1 Direct Mechanisms
With the restriction of quasi-linearity, we then have a family of direct mechanisms, termed
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, that implement an efficient and individually-rational SCF
where truth-telling is a dominant strategy [Groves, 1973; Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Mas-
Colell et al., 1995]. These mechanisms form the basis of much of the work presented in this
thesis.
The VCG mechanism has an outcome function specified by an allocation ruleM and a payment
function r4. A typical forward VCG auction proceeds as follows5 :
1. The auctioneer posts the set of items M it wishes to sell.
2. Each agent i then reports its valuation function vi(K, θi) for every possible allocation
K ∈ K. K is the set of all possible sets of the items in M .
3. Each agent i also reports its type θ̂i.
4. The centre then solves the following equation to find the efficient allocation:
K̂∗ = argmax
K∈K
∑
i∈I
vi(K, θ̂i) (2.7)
4Though a complete mechanism is defined by the tuple < I,Θ, S, g(.) >, we will in the case of auctions refer to
the outcome function g(.) (which is defined by the tuple <M, r >) as the mechanism. This is because auctions are
direct mechanisms whereby the strategy space S is the same as the type space Θ.
5A forward auction is one in which the auctioneer sells items and receives bids for them, whereas a reverse auction
is one in which the auctioneer is buying items and receives asks for them.
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5. It also computes each transfer ri from each agent as:
ri =
max
K∈K
∑
j∈−i
vj(K, θ̂j)
−
∑
j∈−i
vj(K̂
∗, θ̂j)
 where − i ≡ I \ i (2.8)
The VCG mechanism is strategyproof i.e. it is incentive-compatible under dominant strategies
[MasColell et al., 1995]. It achieves its strategyproofness via its payment scheme which aligns
the utility of the agent with the agent’s marginal contribution to the mechanism. In fact, in a
VCG mechanism, it can be observed that if an allocation K̂∗ is implemented, then the agent
derives a utility of:
ui(K, θi) = vi(K̂
∗, θi)− ri(K̂∗, θ̂i)
= vi(K̂
∗, θi) +
∑
j∈−i
vj(K̂
∗, θ̂j)
−
max
K∈K
∑
j∈−i
vj(K, θ̂j)
 (2.9)
Thus, agent i can only manipulate (and try to maximise) the first two terms of equation 2.9.
We also note that this is the same maximisation that is precisely done by the centre in equation
2.7. Thus, no matter what the other agents report, agent i can do no better than report its
valuation truthfully, thereby leading to the mechanism being strategyproof. Furthermore, since
the marginal contribution of an agent can only ever be non-negative, it can also be deduced that
the VCG is also individually-rational. Finally, given that all agents report truthfully, then the
mechanism implements the efficient allocation K∗ which satisfies:
K∗ = argmax
K∈K
∑
i∈I
vi(K, θi) (2.10)
However the VCG mechanism is not budget balanced. It often runs at a budget deficit although
in an auction setting, the mechanism will run at a surplus to the auctioneer. Budget balance is
an important criteria, for example, in the generalised setting of exchanges with multiple buyers
and sellers and a mechanism serving as an intermediary. Even within these settings, the VCG
mechanism is not budget-balanced and will run at a deficit [Parkes et al., 2001]. In fact, the Hur-
wicz impossibility theorem [Hurwicz] tells us it is futile to search for an incentive-compatible
mechanism implementing efficient, budget balanced SCF in dominant strategies:
Theorem 2.11. Hurwicz Impossibility Theorem. There does not exist any incentive-compatible
mechanism that implements a SCF that is efficient and budget-balanced in dominant strategy
equilibrium, even with quasi-linear preferences.
There are then two ways around this problem. We can clear exchanges sub-optimally to explic-
itly sacrifice some efficiency in return for budget-balance [McAfee, 1992; Parkes et al., 2001].
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Alternatively, in order to be able to achieve budget-balance and efficiency, we can use a weaker
implementation concept (namely Bayesian-Nash equilibrium). Under this solution concept, it is
then possible to use the d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet-Arrow (dAGVA) mechanism [d’Aspremont
and Gerard-Varet, 1979; Arrow] so as to achieve both budget balance, efficiency and incentive
compatibility. Though we do not use the dAGVA in this thesis, we intend to use it in future work
due to the fact that it is also budget-balanced. We thus present it here for completeness. We also
believe that in certain systems, this requirement may be quite important and thus justify the use
of mechanisms derived from the dAGVA despite the weaker solution concept.
The dAGVA mechanism, also known as an “expected form” Groves mechanism, achieves indi-
vidual rationality, efficiency and budget-balance under Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. It consists
of an allocation rule which is the same as in the VCG mechanism but differs crucially in its
payment scheme (though the structure is quite similar). The “expected form” arises in this case
because the centre forms an expectation over the types of the agents in −i when calculating the
impact of agent i. In more detail, the dAGVA mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. The auctioneer posts the set of items M it wishes to sell.
2. Each agent i then reports its valuation function vi(K, θi) for every possible allocation
K ∈ K
3. Each agent i also reports its type θ̂i
4. The centre then solves the following equation to find the efficient allocation:
K̂∗ = argmax
K∈K
∑
i∈I
vi(K, θ̂i) (2.11)
5. It also computes each transfer ri from each agent as:
ri = xi(θ̂−i)− Eθ−i
max
K∈K
∑
j∈−i
vj(K(θ̂i, θ−i), θj)
 (2.12)
The dAGVA mechanism thus preserves incentive-compatibility since in this case the expected
utility that an agent derives is then:
ui(K, θ̂i) = Eθ−i
[
max
K∈K
vi(K(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)
]
− ri(K, θi)
= Eθ−i
[
max
K∈K
∑
i∈I
vi(K(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)
]
− xi(θ̂−i)
(2.13)
Thus, we again have that the agent can only control the first part of the transfer in equation 2.13,
which it maximises when submitting θ̂i = θi.
Chapter 2 Mechanism Design 31
Eff B.B IR Solution Possible Environment
Concept & Impossible
No Dominant Gibbard - General
No Satterthwaite
No
Yes No Yes Dominant VCG Quasi-linear utility
Exchange Env
No No Dominant Hurwicz Exchange Env
Yes Yes No Bayesian dAGVA Quasi-linear utility
Nash Exchange Env
No No No Bayesian Myerson Quasi-linear utility
Nash Satterthwaite Exchange Env
TABLE 2.1: Table showing possibility and impossibility results. The first three columns show
the SCFs that can/cannot be achieved in tandem
The dAGVA mechanism can also achieve budget-balance by careful selection of the function
xi(θ̂−i). In effect, for budget-balance, we require that
∑
i∈I ri = 0 which implies that:
∑
i∈I
xi(θ̂−i)− Eθ−i
max
K∈K
∑
j∈−i
vj(K(θ̂i, θ−i), θj)
 = 0
Thus, any xi(θ̂−i) satisfying the above, would lead to a budget-balanced mechanism. One pos-
sible form is that xi(θ̂−i) is the average of the negative part of the transfer of all the other agents
(see equation 2.12):
xi(θ̂−i) =
1
|I| − 1
∑
j∈−i
Eθ−j
max
K∈K
∑
j∈−i
vj(K(θ̂j , θ−j), θj)

However, achieving incentive-compatibility, budget-balance, efficiency and individual rational-
ity in the dAGVA mechanism is impossible due to the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility The-
orem [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983].
Theorem 2.12. Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem. There does not exist any mech-
anism that implements a SCF that is efficient, budget-balanced and individually rational in
Bayesian-Nash strategy equilibrium, even with quasi-linear preferences.
Hence, in the context of designing systems for MAS, we can either use the VCG mechanism
in order to achieve efficiency, incentive-compatibility and individual rationality under dominant
strategies or opt for the weaker solution concept of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium so as to achieve
budget-balance as well while sacrificing individual rationality. Table 2.1 presents a summary of
the results discussed in this section.
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2.5 Summary
In this section we have given a brief overview of the economic principles involved in mechanism
design. We provided a generic model of a mechanism and discussed some of the different
solution concepts under which a mechanism may be implemented. We then studied a number of
desiderata which we might wish a SCF to be endowed with while explaining which particular set
can or cannot be achieved under the respective solution concepts. While discussing the theories
in this chapter, we have implicitly made three assumptions (which are also common to most
work in these areas):
1. There is always a trusted centre that can gather the necessary data from the agents nd can
compute and enforce the outcome.
2. In a reverse auction, an agent has the capacity to fulfill the demand required by the auc-
tioneer.
3. An agent’s valuation or cost is derived from a private observation of its type only.
4. Once an agent has been allocated a task in a reverse auction, it will complete it to the
predefined specifications which have been agreed with the allocator.
However, as we argued chapter 1, these assumptions do not always hold in MASs. Thus,in the
next four chapters, we deal with the challenges posed by removing each assumption. Specifi-
cally, we study the case where there is no trusted centre in Chapter 3 by analysing a simultaneous
auction scenario. We then remove the assumption of unconstrained capacity in Chapter 4 and
design a centralised mechanism with desirable SCFs for this case. Within this chapter, we also
design a distributed mechanism and compare its performance with that of the centralised one.
We then address the third assumption by designing a mechanism for multiple goods and in-
terdependent valuations in Chapter 5. Finally, we remove the last assumption in Chapter 6 by
considering agents that have a certain failure rate and we go on to design a mechanism with
desirable SCFs for this case.
Part I
Distributed Allocation Mechanisms
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The first part of this thesis will consider issues associated with distributed allocation mecha-
nisms. This is a core challenge within distributed mechanisms (as highlighted in red in figure
I.1). Specifically, this challenge considers how to design mechanisms when there is no trusted
centre who collects data from all the agents and determines the allocation of resources and pay-
ments within the system.
 Distributed Mechanism
Employing Simultaneous
Auctions (Chapter 3)
Distributed
Allocation
(Part I)
Distributed
Information
(Part II)
Design of
Protocol
Strategy Design
and Analysis
Computational
Mechanism
Design
Mechanism for
Interdependent
Valuations (Chapter 5)
Mechanism with
Uncertainty in Task
Allocation (Chapter 6)
Mechanism with
Constrained Capacity
Suppliers(Chapter 4)
Design Perspective Design Challenge
FIGURE I.1: The challenges addressed and the design perspective of part I of the thesis
Within distributed allocation mechanisms, the allocation of resources and payments must be
determined via the interactions of each agent rather than at a central point. Such mechanisms
are very attractive for sensor networks since they have the advantages of tractability, robust-
ness, trustworthiness and reduction of bottlenecks (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discus-
sion). Now, within a cooperative setting, distributed task allocation has been extensively studied
[Lesser and Corkill, 1981; Jennings and Bussmann, 2003; Pynadath and Tambe, 2003; Kraus
et al., 1998]. However, the implementation of these mechanisms remain a challenge when con-
sidering selfish agents since these agents act to maximise their own utilities and therefore would
not collaborate unless there is an incentive to do so. As a result, the distributed allocation
mechanisms we study in this thesis all show a certain loss of efficiency when compared to their
centralised counterparts.
In more detail, Chapter 3 reports on the optimal strategies that should be adopted by agents
within a simultaneous auction environment. Here the distributed allocation occurs since each of
the seller agents independently determine which buyer agent will be allocated their service. We
then analyse another distributed mechanism based on the CDA in Chapter 4 whilst considering
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constrained capacity suppliers. In this case, the distributed allocation emerges out of the interac-
tions between buyers and sellers. In order to benchmark the distributed mechanism, we design
a centralised protocol for this scenario.
Chapter 3
A Mechanism Employing
Simultaneous Auctions
In this chapter, we address requirement 1 of this thesis (as detailed in chapter 1), by studying
a distributed allocation mechanism. We do so by analysing a market in which the goods are
auctioned concurrently by a number of sellers, rather than by a single centralised auctioneer.
Thus, the allocation of the goods is not computed by a centre, but rather is determined by the
behaviour of the buyers in each of the parallel auctions. This therefore results in a distributed
allocation mechanism whose properties we study in this chapter. Furthermore, we choose these
simultaneous auctions, since they provide us with a baseline performance for distributed allo-
cation mechanisms in which the agents are selfish. This is because neither the sellers nor the
buyers can coordinate in order to set the price of an item (unlike in the CDA where this occurs
indirectly via a billboard).
In order to study the distributed allocation mechanism, we first need to design and analyse the
optimal strategy for a bidder (assumed to be rational) in such a market. We can then investigate
an important global property of this distributed market, namely its efficiency, contingent upon
this strategy. Now, the optimal strategy for a bidder is dependent on the type of competing
bidders it faces and the amount of knowledge it has about the market (as we shall see later on
in this chapter). Furthermore, the efficiency of the market depends on the type of bidders that
participate in these markets.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 places this research in the
global context of MASs and details the advances we make to the state of the art in this area. In
Section 3.2, we describe the MSN scenario in which such distributed auctions occur. We then
discuss the related work in the field of simultaneous auction in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we
describe the bidders and the auctions in more detail. In Section 3.5 we investigate the case with a
single global bidder and characterise the optimal bidding behaviour for it. Section 3.6 considers
the case with multiple global bidders and in Section 3.7 we address the market efficiency and
the impact of a global bidder. Section 3.8 concludes and discusses future work.
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a surge in the application of auctions, both online and within
multi-agent systems [Airiau and Sen, 2003; Clearwater, 1996; Gerding et al., 2006b; Dash et al.,
2005; Rosenthal and Wang, 1996; Roth and Ockenfels, 2002]. As a result, there are an increasing
number of auctions offering very similar or even identical goods and services. In eBay alone, for
example, there are often hundreds or sometimes even thousands of concurrent auctions running
worldwide selling such substitutable items1. Against this background, it is important to develop
bidding strategies that agents can use to operate effectively across a wide number of auctions.
To this end, in this chapter we devise and analyse optimal bidding strategies for a bidder that
participates in multiple simultaneous auctions for goods that are perfect substitutes.
To date, much of the existing literature on simultaneous auctions focuses either on complemen-
tarities, where the value of items together is greater than the sum of the individual items, or
on heuristic strategies for simultaneous auctions (see Section 3.3 for more details). In contrast,
here we consider bidding strategies analytically and for the case of perfect substitutes. In par-
ticular, our focus is on simultaneous Vickrey or second-price sealed bid auctions. We choose
these because they are communication efficient (since they are direct mechanisms as defined in
Chapter 2) and well known for their capacity to induce truthful bidding [Krishna, 2002], which
makes them suitable for many multi-agent system settings. Within this setting, we are able to
characterise, for the first time, a bidder’s utility-maximising strategy for bidding in any number
of such auctions and for any type of bidder valuation distribution.
In more detail, we first consider a market where a single bidder, called the global bidder, can
bid in any number of auctions, whereas the other bidders, called the local bidders, are assumed
to bid only in a single auction. For this case, we find the following results:
• Whereas in the case of a single second-price auction a bidder’s best strategy is to bid its
true value, this is generally not the case for a global bidder. As we shall show, its best
strategy is in fact to bid below its true value.
• We are able to prove that, even if a global bidder requires only one item, the expected
utility is maximised by participating in all the auctions that are selling the desired item.
• Finding the optimal bid for each auction can be an arduous task when considering all
possible combinations. However, for most common bidder valuation distributions, we are
able to significantly reduce this search space.
• Empirically, we find that a bidder’s expected utility is maximised by bidding at a relatively
high value in one of the auctions, and equal or lower in all other auctions.
We then go on to consider markets with more than one global bidder. Due to the complexity of
the problem, we combine analytical results with a discrete simulation in order to numerically
1To illustrate, at the time of writing, over one thousand eBay auctions were selling the iPod mini 4GB.
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derive the optimal bidding strategy. By so doing, we find that, in a market with only global
bidders, the optimal strategy does not converge. In fact it fluctuates between two states. If the
market consists of both local and global bidders, however, the global bidders’ strategy quickly
reaches a stable solution and we approximate a symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome.
Finally, we consider the issue of market efficiency when there are such simultaneous auctions.
Efficiency is an important system-wide consideration within multi-agent systems since it char-
acterises how well the allocations in the system maximise the overall utility (see section 2.3).
Now, efficiency is maximised when the goods are allocated to those who value them the most.
However, a certain amount of inefficiency is inherent to a distributed market where the auctions
are held separately. In this chapter, we measure the inefficiency of markets with local bidders
only and consider the impact of global bidders on this inefficiency. In so doing, we first prove
that the efficiency of distributed markets with only local bidders has a lower bound given by
1 − 1/e. Furthermore, we find that the presence of a global bidder has a slight, but positive,
impact on the efficiency when the number of local bidders is known, but is, in general, negative
when there exists uncertainty about the exact number of bidders. Therefore, information about
the market plays an important role in the social welfare of the system.
In the next section, we discuss how a market consisting of multiple simultaneous auctions arises
within the MSN scenario we introduced in section 1.2.
3.2 Distributed Allocation within the MSN Scenario
Within this chapter, we consider a sensor network in which a trusted centre does not exist (as
shown in figure 3.2). Given this constraint, the individual sensors in the region of interest then
have to sell their services independently, whilst the sensors wishing to acquire data about this
region will have to choose which auction(s) to attend and participate in.
Hence, this MSN can be modelled as a distributed market in which simultaneous auctions of
the same sensing service are being conducted by sensors of a particular type. The bidders in
this market are the sensors wishing to acquire data that this service potentially provides. Now,
each of these buying sensors will attach different levels of importance to the data due to the
different reasons they may require it for (e.g. a sensor that is carrying out wide-area surveillance
for military purposes will be more interested in improving its view if it detects a plane-like
body than a sensor interested in habitat-monitoring). As a result, each of these buying sensors
will have a certain individual value for the service which will be determined by the goal set by
their owners. Furthermore, the buyers do not discriminate between the services provided by
the different agents and thus the item provided by each of the selling sensors can be viewed as
completely substitutable. We shall consider two types of sensors in this scenario. The first type
is one that is severely constrained in the bandwidth available to it and therefore decides to bid
at only one auction (since it cannot commit bandwidth to receiving more than one service). In
contrast, the second type has sufficient bandwidth to place bids at all the available auctions.
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FIGURE 3.1: Multisensor scenario showing highlighting the distributed mechanism require-
ment addressed within this chapter.
Having thus described our scenario, we now provide an overview of the research that has been
carried out within simultaneous auctions.
3.3 Related Work
Research in the area of simultaneous auctions can be segmented along two broad lines. On the
one hand, there is the game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous auctions which concentrates on
studying the equilibrium strategy of rational agents [Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber, 1979;
Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996; Lang and Rosenthal, 1991; Rosenthal and Wang, 1996; Szentes
and Rosenthal, 2003]. Such analyses are typically used when the auction format employed in
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the simultaneous auctions is the same (e.g. there are N second-price auctions or N first-price
auctions). On the other hand, heuristic strategies have been developed for more complex settings
when the sellers offer different types of auctions or the buyers need to buy bundles of goods
over distributed auctions [Airiau and Sen, 2003; Byde et al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 2001;
Anthony and Jennings, 2003]. This chapter adopts the former approach in studying a market
of M second-price simultaneous auctions since this approach yields provably optimal bidding
strategies. Furthermore, it allows us to predict equilibrium strategies and thus the steady state in
the markets. This then allows us to place worst-case guarantees on such distributed allocation
mechanisms.
In this case, the seminal paper by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber [1979] provides one of the
starting points for the game-theoretic analysis of distributed markets where buyers have sub-
stitutable goods. Their work analyses a market consisting of couples having equal valuations
that want to bid for a dresser. Thus, the couple’s bid space can at most contain two bids since
the husband and wife can be at most at two geographically distributed auctions simultaneously.
They derive a mixed Nash equilibrium (see section 2.2) for the special case where the number of
buyers is large and also study the efficiency of such a market and show that for local bidders the
market efficiency is 1− 1/e. Our analysis differs from theirs in that we study simultaneous auc-
tions in which bidders have different valuations and the global bidder can bid in all the auctions
simultaneously (which is entirely possible for the sensor scenario we consider (as discussed in
section 3.2), as well as more generally in online auctions).
Following this, Krishna and Rosenthal [1996] then studied the case of simultaneous auctions
with complementary goods. They analyse the case of both local and global bidders and char-
acterise the bidding of the buyers and resultant market efficiency. The setting they provide is
further extended to the case of common values by Rosenthal and Wang [1996]. However, neither
of these works extend easily to the case of substitutable goods which we consider. This case is
studied in [Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003], but the scenario considered is restricted to three sellers
and two global bidders and with each bidder having the same value (and thereby knowing the
value of other bidders). The space of symmetric mixed equilibrium strategies is derived for this
special case, but again our result is more general.
3.4 Bidding in Multiple Vickrey Auctions
The model consists of M sellers, each of whom acts as an auctioneer. Each seller auctions one
item; these items are complete substitutes (i.e., they are equal in terms of value and a bidder
obtains no additional benefit from winning more than one item). The M auctions are executed
simultaneously; that is, they end simultaneously and no information about the outcome of any
of the auctions becomes available until the bids are placed2. We also assume that all the auctions
2Although this chapter focuses on sealed-bid auctions, where this is the case, the conditions are similar for last-
minute bidding in iterative auctions such as eBay [Roth and Ockenfels, 2002].
Chapter 3 A Mechanism Employing Simultaneous Auctions 41
are symmetric (i.e. a bidder does not prefer one auction over another). Finally, we assume free
disposal (i.e. a bidder can freely dispose of items if it is allocated more than it requested) and
bidders with quasi-linear utility functions (see Section 2.4).
3.4.1 The Auctions
The seller’s auction is implemented as a second-price sealed bid auction, where the highest
bidder wins but pays the second-highest price. This format has several advantages for an agent-
based setting. Firstly, it is communication efficient. Secondly, for the single-auction case (i.e.,
where a bidder places a bid in at most one auction), the optimal strategy is to bid the true
value and thus requires no computation (once the valuation of the item is known). This strategy
is also weakly dominant3 (see chapter 2) and is therefore independent of the other bidders’
decisions. As a result, it requires no information about the preferences of other agents (such as
the distribution of the valuations).
3.4.2 Global and Local Bidders
We distinguish between global bidders and local bidders. The former can bid in any number
of auctions, whereas the latter only bid in a single auction. Local bidders are assumed to bid
according to the weakly dominant strategy and bid their true valuation. We consider two ways
of modelling local bidders: static and dynamic. In the first model, the number of local bidders
is assumed to be known and equal to Nl for each auction. In the latter model, on the other hand,
the average number of bidders is equal to Nl, but the exact number is unknown and may vary
for each auction. This uncertainty is modelled using a Poisson distribution (more details are
provided in Section 3.5.1).
As we will later show, a global bidder that bids optimally has a higher expected utility compared
to a local bidder, even though the items are complete substitutes and a bidder only requires one
of them. Nevertheless, we can identify a number of compelling reasons why not all bidders
would choose to bid globally 4:
• Information. Bidders may simply not be aware of other auctions selling the same type of
item. Even if this is known, however, a bidder may not have sufficient information about
the distribution of the valuations of other bidders and the number of participating bidders.
Whereas this information is not required when bidding in a single auction (because of the
3A weakly dominant strategy differs from a dominant one in that employing a weakly dominant strategy results
in the agent deriving at least as much utility as employing any other strategy (as opposed to deriving strictly more
utility in the dominant strategy case). Since the difference is not consequential in the choice of the strategy, we shall
henceforth refer to equilibrium strategy in a Vickrey auction or a VCG mechanism as dominant.
4It can be argued that the latter three reasons can be incorporated into the utility function of the agent so as to give
a more grounded model. However, this is beyond the scope of this chapter, but nevertheless, explains why bidders
do not bid globally.
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dominance property in a second-price auction), it is important when bidding in multiple
simultaneous auctions. Such information can be obtained by an expert user or be learned
over time, but is often not available to a novice.
• Bounded Rationality. As will become clear from this chapter, an optimal strategy for a
global bidder is harder to compute than a local one. A bidder will therefore only bid glob-
ally if the costs of computing the optimal strategy outweigh the benefits of the additional
utility.
• Participation Costs. Although the bidding itself may be automated by an autonomous
agent, it still takes time and/or money, such as entry fees and time to setup an account,
to participate in a new auction. Occasional users may not be willing to make such an
investment, and they restrict themselves to sellers or auctions with which they are familiar.
• Risk Attitude. Although a global bidder obtains a higher utility on average, such a bidder
runs a risk of incurring a loss (i.e., a negative utility) when winning multiple auctions. A
risk averse bidder may not be willing to take that chance, and so may choose to participate
only in a single auction to avoid such a potential loss.
• Budget Constraints. Related to the previous point, a budget constrained bidder may not
have sufficient funds to make a loss in case it wins more than one auction. In more detail,
for a fixed budget b, the sum of bids should not exceed b, thereby limiting the number of
auctions a bidder can participate in and/or lowering the actual bids that are placed in those
auctions.
From the above, we believe it is reasonable to expect a combination of global and local bidders,
and for only a few of them to be global bidders. In this chapter, we analyse the case of a single
global bidder theoretically, and then use a computational approach to address the case with at
least two such bidders.
3.5 A Single Global Bidder
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis of the optimal bidding strategy for a global
bidder, given that all other bidders are local and simply bid their true valuation. After we de-
scribe the global bidder’s expected utility in Section 3.5.1, we show in Section 3.5.2 that it is
always optimal for such a bidder to participate in the maximum number of auctions available.
Subsequently, in Section 3.5.3 we discuss how to significantly reduce the complexity of finding
the optimal bids for the multi-auction problem, and we then apply these methods to find optimal
strategies for specific examples.
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3.5.1 The Global Bidder’s Expected Utility
We use the following notation. The number of sellers (or auctions) is M ≥ 2 and the number of
local bidders isNl ≥ 1. A bidder’s valuation v ∈ [0, vmax] is randomly drawn from a cumulative
distribution F with probability density f , where f is continuous, strictly positive and has support
[0, vmax]. A global bid B is a set containing a bid bi ∈ [0, vmax] for each auction 1 ≤ i ≤ M
(the bids may be different for different auctions). For ease of exposition, we introduce the
cumulative distribution function for the first-order statistics G(b) = F (b)Nl ∈ [0, 1], denoting
the probability of winning a specific auction conditional on placing bid b in this auction, and
its probability density g(b) = dG(b)/db = NlF (b)Nl−1f(b). Now, the expected utility U for a
global bidder with global bid B and valuation v is given by:
U(B, v) = v
1− ∏
bi∈B
(1−G(bi))
−∑
bi∈B
∫ bi
0
yg(y)dy (3.1)
Here, the left part of the equation is the valuation multiplied by the probability that the global
bidder wins at least one of the M auctions and thus corresponds to the expected benefit. In
more detail, note that 1 − G(bi) is the probability of not winning auction i when bidding bi,∏
bi∈B
(1−G(bi)) is the probability of not winning any auction, and thus 1−
∏
bi∈B
(1−G(bi))
is the probability of winning at least one auction. The right part of equation 3.1 corresponds
to the total expected costs or payments. To see the latter, note that the expected payment of
a single second-price auction when bidding b equals
∫ b
0 yg(y)dy (see [Krishna, 2002]) and is
independent of the expected payments for other auctions.
Clearly, equation 3.1 applies to the model with static local bidders (i.e., where the number of
bidders is known and equal for each auction (see Section 3.4.2)). However, we can use the same
equation to model dynamic local bidders in the following way:
Lemma 1. By replacing the first-order statistic G(y) with:
Gˆ(y) = eNl(F (y)−1) (3.2)
and the corresponding density function g(y) with gˆ(y) = Nl f(y)eNl(F (y)−1), equation 3.1
becomes the expected utility where the number of local bidders in each auction is described by
a Poisson distribution with average Nl (i.e. where the probability that n local bidders participate
is given by P (n) = Nnl e−Nl/n!).
Proof. To prove this, we first show that G(·) and F (·) can be modified such that the number of
bidders per auction is given by a binomial distribution (where a bidder’s decision to participate
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is given by a Bernoulli trial 5) as follows:
G′(y) = F ′(y)Nl = (1− p+ pF (y))N , (3.3)
where p is the probability that a bidder participates in the auction, and N is the total number
of bidders. To see this, note that not participating is equivalent to bidding zero. As a result,
F ′(0) = 1− p since there is a 1− p probability that a bidder bids zero at a specific auction, and
F ′(y) = F ′(0)+pF (y) since there is a probability p that a bidder bids according to the original
distribution F (y). Now, the average number of participating bidders is given by Nl = pN . By
replacing p with Nl/N , equation 3.3 becomes G′(y) = (1−Nl/N+(Nl/N)F (y))N . Note that
a Poisson distribution is given by the limit of a binomial distribution. By keeping Nl constant
and taking the limit N →∞, we then obtain G′(y) = eNl(F (y)−1) = Gˆ(y).
The results that follow apply to both the static and dynamic model unless stated otherwise.
3.5.2 Participation in Multiple Auctions
We now show that, for any valuation 0 < v < vmax, a utility-maximising global bidder should
always place non-zero bids in all available auctions. To prove this, we show that the expected
utility increases when placing an arbitrarily small bid compared to not participating in an auc-
tion. More formally:
Theorem 3.1. Consider a global bidder with valuation 0 < v < vmax and global bid B, where
bi ≤ v for all bi ∈ B. Suppose bj /∈ B for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, then there exists a bj > 0 such
that U(B ∪ {bj}, v) > U(B, v).
Proof. Using equation 3.1, the marginal expected utility for participating in an additional auc-
tion can be written as:
U(B ∪ {bj}, b)− U(B, v) = vG(bj)
∏
bi∈B
(1−G(bi))−
∫ bj
0
yg(y)dy (3.4)
Now, using integration by parts, we have
∫ bj
0 yg(y) = bjG(bj) −
∫ bj
0 G(y)dy and the above
equation can be rewritten as:
U(B ∪ {bj}, b)− U(B, v) = G(bj)
v ∏
bi∈B
(1−G(bi))− bj
+ ∫ bj
0
G(y)dy (3.5)
Let bj = ǫ, where ǫ is an arbitrarily small strictly positive value. Clearly, G(bj) and
∫ bj
0 G(y)dy
are then both strictly positive (since f(y) > 0). Moreover, given that bi ≤ v < vmax for bi ∈ B
5This is a commonly assumed distribution that governs the participation of bidders within auctions [David et al.,
2005]
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and that v > 0, it follows that v
∏
bi∈B
(1 − G(bi)) > 0. Now, suppose bj = 12v
∏
bi∈B
(1 −
G(bi)), then U(B∪{bj}, b)−U(B, v) = G(bj)
[
1
2v
∏
bi∈B
(1−G(bi))
]
+
∫ bj
0 G(y)dy > 0 and
thus U(B ∪ {bj}, b) > U(B, v).
3.5.3 The Optimal Global Bid
A general solution to the optimal global bid requires the maximisation of equation 3.1 in M
dimensions, an arduous task, even when applying numerical methods. In this section, however,
we show how to reduce the entire bid space to two dimensions in most cases (one continuous,
and one discrete), thereby significantly simplifying the problem at hand. First, however, in order
to find the optimal solutions to equation 3.1, we set the partial derivatives to zero:
∂U
∂bi
= g(bi)
v ∏
bj∈B\{bi}
(1−G(bj)) − bi
 = 0 (3.6)
Now, equality 3.6 holds when either g(bi) = 0 or
∏
bj∈B\{bi}
(1 − G(bj))v − bi = 0. In the
dynamic model, g(bi) is always greater than zero, and can therefore be ignored (since g(0) =
Nf(0)e−Nl and we assume f(y) > 0). In the static model, g(bi) = 0 only when bi = 0.
However, theorem 3.1 shows that the optimal bid is non-zero for 0 < v < vmax. Therefore, we
can ignore the first part, and the second part yields:
bi = v
∏
bj∈B\{bi}
(1−G(bj)) (3.7)
In other words, the optimal bid in auction i is equal to the bidder’s valuation multiplied by the
probability of not winning any of the other auctions. It is straightforward to show that the second
partial derivative is negative, confirming that the solution is indeed a maximum when keeping
all other bids constant. Thus, equation 3.7 provides a means to derive the optimal bid for auction
i, given the bids in all other auctions.
3.5.3.1 Reducing the Search Space
In what follows, we show that, for non-decreasing probability density functions, such as the
uniform and logarithmic distribution, the optimal global bid consists of at most two different
values for anyM ≥ 2. That is, the search space for finding the optimal bid can then be reduced to
two continuous values. Let these values be bhigh and blow, where bhigh ≥ blow. More formally:
Theorem 3.2. Suppose the probability density function f is non-decreasing within the range
[0, vmax], then the following proposition holds: given v > 0, for any bi ∈ B, either bi = bhigh,
bi = blow, or bi = bhigh = blow.
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Proof. Using equation 3.7, we can produce M equations, one for each auction, with M un-
knowns. Now, by combining these equations, we obtain the following relationship: b1(1 −
G(b1)) = b2(1 − G(b2)) = . . . = bm(1 − G(bm)). By defining H(b) = b(1 − G(b)) we can
rewrite the equation to:
H(b1) = H(b2) = . . . = H(bm) = v
∏
bj∈B
(1−G(bj)) (3.8)
In order to prove that there exist at most two different bids, it is sufficient to show that b =
H−1(y) has at most two solutions that satisfy 0 ≤ b ≤ vmax for any y. To see this, suppose
there exists a third solution bj 6= blow 6= bhigh. From equation 3.8 it then follows that there
exists a y such that H(bj) = H(blow) = H(bhigh) = y. Therefore, H−1(y) must have at least
three solutions, which is a contradiction.
Note that a sufficient condition for the above to hold is for H(b) to be strictly concave6 for
0 ≤ b ≤ vmax. Now, the function H is strictly concave if and only if the following holds:
d2H
db2
=
d
db
(1− b · g(b)−G(b)) = −
(
b
dg
db
+ 2g(b)
)
< 0
By performing standard calculations, we obtain the following condition for the static model:
b
(
(Nl − 1)f(b)
Nl
F (b)
+Nl
f ′(b)
f(b)
)
> −2 for 0 ≤ b ≤ vmax, (3.9)
and similarly for the dynamic model we have:
b
(
Nl f(b) +
f ′(b)
f(b)
)
> −2 for 0 ≤ b ≤ vmax, (3.10)
where f ′(b) = df/db. Since both f and F are positive, conditions 3.9 and 3.10 clearly hold for
f ′(b) ≥ 0. In other words, conditions 3.9 and 3.10 show that H(b) is strictly concave when the
probability density function is non-decreasing for 0 ≤ b ≤ vmax.
Note from conditions 3.9 and 3.10 that the requirement of non-decreasing density functions is
sufficient, but far from necessary. Although we are as yet not able to make a more precise
formal characterisation, in practice even most density functions with decreasing parts satisfy
these conditions. Moreover, the requirement for H(b) to be strictly concave is also stronger than
necessary in order to guarantee only two solutions. As a result, for practical purposes, we expect
the reduction of the search space to apply in most cases.
Given there are at most 2 possible bids, blow and bhigh, we can further reduce the search space
by expressing one bid in terms of the other. Suppose the buyer places a bid of blow in Mlow
6More precisely, H(b) can be either strictly convex or strictly concave. However, it is easy to see that H is not
convex since H(0) = H(vmax) = 0, and H(b) ≥ 0 for 0 < b < vmax.
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auctions and bhigh for the remaining Mhigh = M −Mlow auctions, equation 3.7 then becomes:
blow = v(1−G(blow))Mlow−1(1−G(bhigh))Mhigh ,
and can be rearranged to give:
bhigh = G
−1
(
1−
[
blow
v(1−G(blow))Mlow−1
] 1
Mhigh
)
(3.11)
Here, the inverse function G−1(·) can usually be obtained quite easily. Furthermore, note that,
if Mlow = 1 or Mhigh = 1, equation 3.7 can be used directly to find the desired value.
Using the above, we are able to reduce the bid search space to a single continuous dimension,
given Mlow or Mhigh. However, we do not know the number of auctions in which to bid blow
and bhigh, and thus we need to search M different combinations to find the optimal global bid.
Moreover, for each combination, the optimal blow and bhigh can vary. Therefore, in order to
find the optimal bid for a bidder with valuation v, it is sufficient to search along one continuous
variable blow ∈ [0, v], and a discrete variable Mlow = M −Mhigh ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
3.5.3.2 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we present results from an empirical study and characterise the optimal global bid
for specific cases. Furthermore, we measure the actual utility improvement that can be obtained
when using the global strategy. The results presented here are based on a uniform distribution
of the valuations with vmax = 1, and the static local bidder model, but they generalise to the
dynamic model and other distributions. Figure 3.2 illustrates the optimal global bids and the
corresponding expected utility for various M and Nl = 5, but again the bid curves for different
values of M and Nl follow a very similar pattern. Here, the bid is normalised by the valuation v
to give the bid fraction x = b/v. Note that, when x = 1, a bidder bids its true value.
As shown in Figure 3.2, for bidders with a relatively low valuation, the optimal strategy is to
submit M equal bids at, or very close to, the true value. The optimal bid fraction then gradually
decreases for higher valuations. Interestingly, in most cases, placing equal bids is no longer the
optimal strategy after the valuation reaches a certain point. At this point, a so-called pitchfork
bifurcation is observed and the optimal bids split into two values: a single high bid and M − 1
low bids. This transition is smooth for M = 2, but exhibits an abrupt jump for M ≥ 3. In
all experiments, however, we consistently observe that the optimal strategy is always to place a
high bid in one auction, and an equal or lower bid in all other auctions. In case of a bifurcation
and when the valuation approaches vmax, the optimal high bid becomes very close to the true
value and the low bids go to almost zero7.
7Note in Figure 3.2 that the low bids are significantly higher than zero at this point. This is because as v ap-
proaches vmax, the low bids have very little impact on the utility and finding the optimum numerically at this point
requires an extremely high precision.
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FIGURE 3.2: The optimal bid fractions x = b/v and corresponding expected utility forNl = 5,
static local bidders, and varying M .
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the utility of a global bidder becomes progressively higher with more
auctions. In absolute terms, the improvement is especially high for bidders that have an above
average valuation, but not too close to vmax. The bidders in this range thus benefit most from
bidding globally. This is because bidders with very low valuations have a very small chance
of winning any auction, whereas bidders with a very high valuation have a high probability of
winning a single auction and benefit less from participating in more auctions. In contrast, if we
consider the utility relative to bidding in a single auction, this is much higher for bidders with
relatively low valuations . In particular, we notice that a global bidder with a low valuation can
improve its utility by up to M times the expected utility of bidding locally. Intuitively, this is
because the chance of winning one of the auctions increases by up to a factor M , whereas the
increase in the expected cost is negligible. For high valuation buyers, however, the benefit is not
that obvious because the chances of winning are relatively high even in case of a single auction.
3.6 Multiple Global Bidders
As argued in section 3.4.2, we expect a real-world market to exhibit a mix of global and local
bidders. Whereas so far we assumed a single global bidder, in this section we consider a set-
ting where multiple global bidders and local bidders interact. The analysis of this problem is
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complex, however, as the optimal bidding strategy of a global bidder depends on the strategy of
other global bidders. A typical analytical approach is to find the symmetric Nash equilibrium
solution [Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber, 1979; Gerding et al., 2006b; Rosenthal and Wang,
1996; Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003], which occurs when all global bidders use the same strategy
to produce their bids, and no (global) bidder has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the
chosen strategy. Due to the complexity of the problem, however, here we combine a computa-
tional simulation approach with the analytical results from section 3.5. The simulation works by
iteratively finding the best response to the optimal bidding strategies in the previous iteration. If
this results in a stable outcome (i.e., when the current and previous optimal bidding strategies
are the same), the solution is by definition a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium.
In more detail, the simulation is based on the observation that the valuation distribution F of the
local bidders corresponds to the distribution of bids (since local bidders bid their true valuation).
Therefore, by maximising equation 3.1 we find the best response given the current distribution
of bids. Now, we first discretize the space of possible valuations and bids. Then, by performing
this maximisation for each bidder type, where a bidder type is defined by its (discrete) valuation
v, we find a new distribution of bids. Note that this distribution can include bids from any
number of both global and local bidders, where the latter simply bid their true valuation. This
distribution of bids can then be used to find a new best response, resulting in a new distribution
of bids, and so on, for a fixed number of iterations or until a stable solution has been found.
In what follows, we first describe the simulation settings, and then apply the simulation to set-
tings with global bidders only, followed by settings with both global and local bidders.
3.6.1 The Setting
The simulation is based on discrete valuations and bids. The valuations are natural numbers
ranging from 1 to vmax ∈ N, where vmax is set to 1000. Each valuation v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , vmax}
occurs with equal probability, equivalent to a uniform valuation distribution in the continuous
case. Note, however, that even though the bidder valuations are distributed uniformly, the result-
ing distribution of bids is typically not uniform (since global bidders typically bid below their
valuation). The number of different bid levels that a bidder is allowed is set to L ∈ N. Thus,
a bidder with valuation v can place the bids b ∈ {v/L, 2v/L, . . . , v}. For the results reported
here, we use L = 300. The initial state can play an important role in the experiments. There-
fore, to ensure our results are robust, experiments are repeated with different random initial bid
distributions. In the following, we assume the number of local bidders to be static and use Ng
and Nl to denote the number of global and local bidders respectively.
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FIGURE 3.3: Best response strategy for 2 auctions and 3 global bidders without local bidders
(a), and with 10 local bidders (b), averaged over 10 iterations and 20 runs with different initial
conditions. The measurements are taken after an initialisation period of 10 iterations. The
error-bars indicate the standard deviation.
3.6.2 The Results
First, we describe the results with no local bidders (i.e., Nl = 0). For this case, we find that the
simulation does not converge to a stable state. That is, when the number of (global) bidders is
at least 2, the best response strategy keeps fluctuating, irrespective of the number of iterations,
and of the initial state. The fluctuations, however, show a distinct pattern and more or less
alternate between two states. Specifically, figure 3.3a depicts the average best response strategy
forNg = 3 andM = 2. Here, the standard deviation is a gauge for the amount of fluctuation and
thus the instability of the strategy. In general, we find that the best response for low valuations
remain stable, whereas the strategy for bidders with high valuations fluctuates heavily, as is
shown in Figure 3.3a. These results are robust for different initial conditions and simulation
parameters.
If we include local bidders, on the other hand, we observe that the strategies stabilise. In par-
ticular, Figure 3.3b shows the simulation results for the same settings as before except with
both local and global bidders. As can be seen from this figure, the variation is very slight and
only around the bifurcation point. We note that these outcomes are obtained after only a few
iterations of the simulation. The results show that the principal conclusions in case of a single
global bidder carry over to the case of multiple global bidders. That is, the optimal strategy is to
participate in all auctions and to bid high in one auction, and equal or lower in other auctions. A
similar bifurcation point is also observed. These results are also obtained for other values of M ,
Nl, and Ng. Moreover, the results are very robust to changes to the parameters of the simulation.
To conclude, even though a theoretical analysis proves difficult in case of several global bid-
ders, we can approximate a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium for specific settings using a discrete
simulation in case the system consists of both local and global bidders. Our experiments show
that, even in the case of multiple global bidders, the best strategy is to bid in multiple auctions.
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Thus, our simulation can be used as a tool to predict the market equilibrium and to find the op-
timal bidding strategy for practical settings where we expect a combination of local and global
bidders.
3.7 Market Efficiency
Efficiency is an important system-wide property since it characterises to what extent the market
maximises social welfare (i.e. the sum of utilities of all agents in the market). To this end, in
this section we study the efficiency of markets with either static or dynamic local bidders, and
the impact that a global bidder has on the efficiency in these markets. Specifically, efficiency in
this context is maximised when the bidders with the M highest valuations in the entire market
obtain a single item each. More formally, we define the efficiency of an allocation as:
Definition 3.3. Efficiency of Allocation. The efficiency ηK of an allocation K is the obtained
social welfare proportional to the maximum social welfare that can be achieved in the market
and is given by:
ηK =
∑N
i=1 vi(K)∑N
i=1 vi(K
∗)
, (3.12)
where K∗ = argmaxK∈K
∑N
i=1 vi(K) is an efficient allocation, K is the set of all possible
allocations, and vi(K) is bidder i’s utility for the allocation K ∈ K .
Now, as argued in the section 3.1, a market consisting of a number of distributed sellers is likely
to be inefficient 8. Within this market, the loss of efficiency arises from the fact that when the
buyers select an auction they are not aware of the other buyers who are going to be in that
auction. As a result, despite the individual second-price auctions being efficient (see chapter
2), the overall market might not be so. In order to visualise the effect of the buyers’ decision,
consider a market of 3 buyers, {B1, B2, B3} (ordered such that B1 has the highest valuation
and B3 has the lowest) and 2 sellers, {S1, S2}. Then there is a possibility that B1 and B2
compete against one another in one auction thereby allowing B3 to win the other auction. This
results in an overall inefficient allocation since B1 and B3 win a good each. Figure 3.4 shows
four possible outputs which could result in this auction, with the first one being the inefficient
output discussed. This loss could certainly be mitigated if the buyers were free to move across
auctions and were aware of the participants in each auction. This is however a case that we do
not consider here since we are interested in knowing how much efficiency is lost in a distributed
market.
8An exception is when Nl = 1 and bidders are static, since the market is then completely efficient without a
global bidder. However, since this is a very special case and does not apply to other settings, we do not discuss it
further here.
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3.7.1 Local Bidders Only
The expected efficiency of a market consisting of local bidders only would depend on the prob-
ability that each of the possible allocations occur. Now, there are two statistical variables which
will affect the calculation of the expected efficiency: (i) the values drawn by the bidders and
(ii) the auctioneer at which they elect to bid. The former depends on f(v) whereas the latter is
dependent on the strategy of the bidders (which in the case of uninformed buyers is to pick an
auctioneer at random). We first derive the efficiency of a market when the values of the buyers
are known.
Theorem 3.4. A market consisting of several distributed auctions conducted by M sellers with
N uninformed buyers (whose values for the object are ordered as {v1, . . . , vN}) has an expected
efficiency of:
E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) =
∑N
i=1 vi(
M−1
M )
i−1∑min(M,N)
i=1 vi
(3.13)
Proof. The expected efficiency of the market is dependent upon the expected overall value that
the market derives. This, in turn, is dependent on two factors; namely the value of a particular
allocation and the probability that that allocation occurs. The probability that buyer i wins a
particular auction conducted by seller j is given by:
P (i wins auction j) =
i−1∏
k=1
P (k does not turn up at auctionj)
× P (i turns up at an auctionj)
=
(
M − 1
M
)i−1
× 1
M
Since there are M independent auctions being held, then the probability that i wins is given by(
M−1
M
)i−1
. Thus, the expected utility from this market is given by:
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E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) =
∑N
i=1 vi(
M−1
M )
i−1∑min(M,N)
i=1 vi
Equation 3.13 provides us with an expected efficiency measure given the number of buyers, N ,
the number of sellers, M , and the buyer’s valuations {vB1 , . . . , vBN}. Now, if the valuations are
not known, we can derive the expected efficiency from the probability density function of the
valuations as:
E(η, f(v),M,N) = E
[∑N
i=1 vi(
M−1
M )
i−1∑min(M,N)
i=1 vi
]
=
N∑
i=1
E
[
vi(
M−1
M )
i−1∑min(M,N)
i=1 vi
]
Figure 3.5 shows the expected efficiency that occurs when the number of buyers is varied from 1
to 25 and the number of sellers is varied from 3 to 15 and the buyers’ valuations are drawn from
the uniform distribution U [0, 1]. As can be observed, there is first an initial linear decrease in
efficiency and then there is a logarithmic increase in efficiency as the number of buyers increase.
This is because there are two effects which are being seen in the graphs. As the number of
buyers increase, there are more possible states where inefficiency can occur (i.e. when high-
value buyers end up within the same auction.). However, simultaneously, the buyers’ valuations
are less likely to be very different such that the resultant loss of efficiency is small. At the
beginning, when the number of buyers is roughly less than or equal to the number of sellers, the
first effect dominates thereby decreasing the efficiency. Then the second effect starts being the
dominating factor as the number of buyers increase. Another interesting point to note from the
above graph is that the minimum expected efficiency of this protocol decreases at a decreasing
rate as the number of sellers increase. This suggests that the minimum expected efficiency is
probably bounded. In fact, the expected efficiency is bounded at 1− 1/e as we now prove.
Theorem 3.5. The minimum expected efficiency of a distributed market consisting of uninformed
buyers is bounded at 1− 1/e.
Proof. Let x be such that:
x =
∑min(M,N)
i=1 vi
min(M,N)
Then, since M−1M < 1, it follows that:
N∑
i=1
vi(
M − 1
M
)i−1 ≥
N∑
i=1
x(
M − 1
M
)i−1
which implies that:
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FIGURE 3.5: Expected efficiency of distributed market (singly-endowed sellers and single-
object buyers) of homogeneous goods with upto 15 sellers and 25 buyers and buyers’ valuations
drawn from a uniform distribution.
∑N
i=1 vi(
M−1
M )
i−1∑min(M,N)
i=1 vi
≥
∑N
i=1 x(
M−1
M )
i−1
xmin(M,N)
and hence, from equation 3.13:
E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) ≥
∑N
i=1 x(
M−1
M )
i−1
xmin(M,N)
(3.14)
Now, consider the following two cases within this market, namely M < N and N ≤M . In the
former case, the inequality given by 3.14 becomes:
E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) ≥
∑N
i=1 x(
M−1
M )
i−1
xM
≥
∑M
i=1 x(
M−1
M )
i−1
xM
≥
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
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and in the latter case, the inequality is:
E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) ≥
∑N
i=1 x(
M−1
M )
i−1
xN
≥
∑N
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
N
≥
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
N
−
∑M
i=N+1(
M−1
M )
i−1
N
≥
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
+
M −N
N
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
−
∑M
i=N+1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
− M −N
N
∑M
i=N+1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
≥
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
−
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
+
M
N
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1 −∑Mi=N+1 M−1M )i−1
M
≥
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
−
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
+
∑N
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
N
>
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
Hence, we can deduce from both scenarios that:
E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) ≥
∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
Now, ∑M
i=1(
M−1
M )
i−1
M
=
1
M
1− (M−1M )M
1− M−1M
= 1−
(
M − 1
M
)M
Hence, the limit of minimum efficiency as M tends to infinity is:
lim
M→∞
E(η, v1, . . . , vN ,M) = lim
M→∞
[
1−
(
M − 1
M
)M]
= 1− lim
M→∞
(
M − 1
M
)M
= 1− 1
e
Chapter 3 A Mechanism Employing Simultaneous Auctions 56
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
M
Local
Bidders
Global
Bidder
2 Dynamic No
2 Dynamic Yes
2 Static No
2 Static Yes
6 Dynamic No
6 Dynamic Yes
6 Static No
6 Static Yes
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
(average) number of local bidders (N l)
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
(η K
)
FIGURE 3.6: Average efficiency for different market settings as shown in the legend. The
error-bars indicate the standard deviation over the 10 runs.
This lower bound is significant in two ways. From a theoretical perspective, it shows that dis-
tributed markets have an inherent efficiency, despite the fact that there is no centre coordinating
the allocation within the system. From a practical perspective, this provides a benchmark for
the design of a distributed system involving coordination (e.g. buyers/sellers forming coalitions
to buy/sell goods, the overall actions of buyers and sellers being transparent via a communicat-
ing device (such as in the CDA)). The designer will have to compare the cost of implementing
the communication protocol developed for coordination with the gain in efficiency of the sys-
tem over 1 − 1/e. Hence, in terms of requirement 1 (outlined in Chapter 1), this implies that
distributed mechanisms can be implemented without too high a cost in terms of efficiency.
3.7.2 With Global Bidders
Now, in order to measure the efficiency of the market and the impact of a global bidder, we run
simulations for the markets with the different types of local bidders. The experiments are carried
out as follows. Each bidder’s valuation is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1].
The local bidders bid their true valuations, whereas the global bidder bids optimally in each
auction as described in Section 3.5.3. The experiments are repeated 5000 times for each run to
obtain an accurate mean value, and the final average results and standard deviations are taken
over 10 runs in order to get statistically significant results.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 3.6. As can be observed, the efficiency
increases when N becomes larger. This is because the differences between the bidders with the
highest valuations become smaller, thereby decreasing the loss of efficiency.
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Furthermore, Figure 3.6 shows that the presence of a global bidder has a slightly positive effect
on the efficiency in case the local bidders are static. In the case of dynamic bidders, however,
the effect of a global bidder depends on the number of sellers. Thus, if M is low (i.e., for
M = 2), a global bidder significantly increases the efficiency, especially for low values of Nl.
For M = 6, on the other hand, the presence of a global bidder has a negative effect on the
efficiency (this effect becomes even more pronounced for higher values of M ). This result is
explained as follows. The introduction of a global bidder potentially leads to a decrease of
efficiency since this bidder can unwittingly win more than one item. However, as the number
of local bidders increase, this is less likely to happen. Rather, since the global bidder increases
the number of bidders, its presence makes an overall positive (albeit small) contribution in case
of static bidders. In a market with dynamic bidders, however, the market efficiency depends on
two other factors. On the one hand, the efficiency increases since items no longer remain unsold
(this situation can occur in the dynamic model when no bidder turns up at an auction). On
the other hand, as a result of the uncertainty concerning the actual number of bidders, a global
bidder is more likely to win multiple items (we confirmed this analytically). As M increases,
the first effect becomes negligible, whereas the second one becomes more prominent, reducing
the efficiency on average.
To conclude, the impact of a global bidder on the efficiency clearly depends on the information
that is available. In case of static local bidders, the number of bidders is known and the global
bidder can bid more accurately. In case of uncertainty, however, the global bidder is more likely
to win than one item, decreasing the overall efficiency.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we derive utility-maximising strategies for bidding in multiple, simultaneous
second-price auctions. We first analyse the case where a single global bidder bids in all auc-
tions, whereas all other bidders are local and bid in a single auction. For this setting, we find
the counter-intuitive result that it is optimal to place non-zero bids in all auctions that sell the
desired item, even when a bidder only requires a single item and derives no additional benefit
from having more. Thus, a potential buyer can considerably benefit by participating in multiple
auctions and employing an optimal bidding strategy. For most common valuation distributions,
we show analytically that the problem of finding optimal bids reduces to two dimensions. This
considerably simplifies the original optimisation problem and can thus be used in practice to
compute the optimal bids for any number of auctions.
Furthermore, we investigate a setting with multiple global bidders by combining analytical solu-
tions with a simulation approach. We find that a global bidder’s strategy does not stabilise when
only global bidders are present in the market, but only converges when there are local bidders
as well. We argue, however, that real-world markets are likely to contain both local and global
bidders. The converged results are then very similar to the setting with a single global bidder,
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and we find that a bidder benefits by bidding optimally in multiple auctions. For the more com-
plex setting with multiple global bidders, the simulation can thus be used to find these bids for
specific cases.
Finally, we compare the efficiency of a market with multiple simultaneous auctions with and
without a global bidder. We show that, if the bidder can accurately predict the number of local
bidders in each auction, the efficiency slightly increases. In contrast, if there is much uncertainty,
the efficiency significantly decreases as the number of auctions increases due to the increased
probability that a global bidder wins more than two items. These results show that the way
in which the efficiency and thus social welfare is affected by a global bidder depends on the
information available to a global bidder.
In sum, this chapter has studied a basic distributed allocation mechanism and in doing so has
addressed requirement 1 outlined in Chapter 1. Furthermore, whilst we focused on deriving
the strategies of the bidders within this distributed mechanism, we will change the focus to the
design of protocols in the following chapters. Hence, this chapter provides us with a baseline
efficiency of a distributed allocation mechanisms since the simultaneous auctions environment
studied has not been engineered to achieve efficiency. Finally, in the context of MSNs, this
chapter has shown that whilst a decentralised control regime can be achieved, it potentially
comes at the cost of the efficiency of the whole system (i.e. the services provided by the selling
sensors will not always end up with those sensors valuing it the most).
Chapter 4
Mechanisms with Constrained
Capacity Suppliers
In the previous chapter, the focus was on the design of strategies for agents within a predefined
decentralised protocol (namely the simultaneous auctions environment). In contrast, the focus
of this chapter is on the design of the task allocation protocols. Such protocols define how
tasks are allocated within a system of self-interested agents [Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994;
Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1996; Sandholm, 2003; Sarne and Kraus, 2005]. Specifically, we
will continue studying distributed allocation within this context by designing and analysing a
CDA mechanism. In so doing, we address both requirements 1 (distributed allocation) and 2
(constrained capacity) outlined in chapter 1 by achieving the following:
• Designing and analysing a centralised reverse auction mechanism that effectively deals
with cases where sellers have a constrained capacity.
• Designing a decentralised CDA mechanism and analysing its performance using very
simple strategies when the sellers have the same cost structure and capacity constraints as
in the centralised mechanism.
We require both a centralised and decentralised version of the mechanism since the former
guarantees efficiency within the system and provides us with a benchmark against which the
performance of the latter can be measured.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 explains the general setting
of task allocation in selfish MASs to which the research carried out in this chapter can be ap-
plied. In Section 4.2, we present the MSN context in which such a research problem arises
and in Section 4.3 we detail the relevant related work. Section 4.4 describes the task allocation
problem in more detail. Section 4.5 then develops our centralised auction mechanism, which is
based around the VCG mechanism (see section 2.4), for the cost structure and limited capacity
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constraint of our domain and proves the economic and computational properties of our mech-
anism. In section 4.6, the decentralised CDA mechanism is then developed and analysed. We
summarise the main contributions of this chapter in Section 4.7.
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we concentrated on studying the strategies that a buyer should adopt in a distrib-
uted market based on simultaneous auctions. We assumed that the sellers have a publicly known
single unit capacity and bear no cost in providing their service. In this chapter, we remove
the assumption that sellers have publicly known and equal capacities. Instead, we consider the
case where they have finite production capacities which are privately known to them. We then
consider the design of market mechanisms for the provision of services with these constrained
capacity sellers. Furthermore, we deal with the case in which the cost structure of the sellers
consists of a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost. We believe that these traits (con-
strained capacity, fixed overhead cost and constant marginal cost) are typical of many real world
applications such as electricity markets, job-shop scheduling and grid computing applications.
For example, a power plant will typically have a fixed startup cost and a constant marginal cost of
running the plant upto its maximum capacity [Hobbs et al., 2000]. The classic job shop schedul-
ing problem consists of running periods composed of an initial machine set-up time (overhead
cost) plus a cost per unit time (the marginal cost) and a finite capacity which these machines
can run upto [Chen et al., 1998]. Finally, agents providing computational resources on the grid
incur an overhead cost (computational cost of setting up the agent managing the resource on the
machine) and marginal costs as they accept tasks upto the limit that their machines can support
[Wolski et al., 2001].
In general, there are two broad classes of market mechanisms that can be considered when deal-
ing with such task allocation problems. The first class, the reverse auction, involves a centralised
mechanism in which sellers report their values to a centre (that has already aggregated the de-
mand from the buyers) which then decides on the optimal allocation and the payments. The
most popular such mechanism is the VCG. Its popularity arises from two attractive economic
properties: it is allocatively efficient and it is individually rational (as defined in chapter 2).
Unfortunately, in our case, the finite capacities of the sellers and the particular cost structure of
our problem mean that the VCG no longer preserves these desirable economic properties. Thus,
we need to extend the VCG mechanism in order to restore them. Such modification is impor-
tant because we wish to guarantee that we find the cheapest providers and we want to ensure
that participants willingly join the system. Here, we achieve these dual objectives by allowing
agents to report on the triples (fixed cost, unit cost, and capacity) that characterise their types
and via the use of a novel penalty scheme (detailed in section 4.5). We prove that the ensuing
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mechanism is strategyproof and robust to sellers being uncertain about their production capac-
ity1. Furthermore, we show that the mechanism is computationally tractable since the optimal
allocation can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time via the use of a dynamic programming
solution.
However, a potential drawback of our modified VCG mechanism (indeed of all the mechanisms
in this class) is that it is inherently centralised (as we discussed in chapter 1). That is, the task
allocation is computed by a single entity, the auctioneer, who does so by collecting all the private
information about the costs and capacities from the various agents. Now, in some cases, this is
not a problem and the optimality of the mechanism is the over-riding concern. However, in other
cases, issues such as robustness to a single point of failure and scaleability are more important
and this gives rise to the desire for decentralised mechanisms (see chapter 1). Thus to cope with
this situation, we also consider the decentralised CDA [Smith, 1962; Friedman and Rust, 1992].
In this protocol, buyers and sellers continuously submit bids (an offer to buy at price pb) and asks
(an offer to sell at price pa) respectively (which are listed on a billboard) and the market clears
(i.e. a transaction occurs) whenever the bid of a buyer matches the ask of a seller (i.e. when
pb ≥ pa). Such an auction is decentralised in that the allocation of the tasks is not computed
by any single agent, but rather emerges out of the interactions of the agents in the protocol2.
Nevertheless, despite this decentralisation, CDAs still produce solutions that are very close to
the optimal, even when the participants adopt very simple strategies3.
However, most work on CDAs assumes a cost structure that consists of a fixed marginal cost for
each unit supplied and no start-up cost. This choice of cost structure is quite natural in macro-
economic models and it results both in an equilibrium market price (a unique price at which
buyers and sellers agree to trade) for the commodity and in efficient allocations [MasColell
et al., 1995]. Unfortunately, the particular cost structure of our domain implies that no such
equilibrium exists. This is due to the fact that the average unit cost of producing lower quantities
is greater than that when producing larger quantities as a result of the start-up cost (this is
akin to models where there are economies of scale in which the start-up cost is shared over
a greater product run [MasColell et al., 1995]). The presence of a capacity constraint further
complicates matters since, in general, a single seller will not be able to fully satisfy the total
demand. Furthermore, since we are developing a protocol for task allocation, we consider buyers
with inelastic demand (i.e. buyers do not vary their demand according to price) which, in turn,
means that the CDA is focused on finding the cheapest set of seller(s) given an exact demand
1In certain scenarios, sellers may be uncertain about their capacity and would only have a best estimate of that
capacity (e.g. in power generation scenarios a wind farm’s capacity will depend on the strength of the wind and in a
job-shop scheduling context the capacity of a machine might degrade stochastically over time).
2Even the seemingly centralised billboard in the CDA can be implemented using a broadcast communication
protocol that mimics the typical “shouts” in the original trading pit [Friedman and Rust, 1992].
3In this context, a strategy is simply a method of generating a bid or an ask given the observed current market
conditions (see Chapter 2). In CDAs, it has been shown that a strategy that randomly generates bids/asks between
a set lower and upper bound can be extremely efficient (both for the individual participant and in terms of the
effectiveness of the overall market). Such strategies are known as zero-intelligence (ZI) strategies [Gode and Sunder,
1993].
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from the buyers4. Given these points, we need to modify the standard CDA mechanism by
designing suitable clearing rules and constraining the type of offers allowed in the market in
order to deal with the aforementioned issues. We then assess the allocative efficiency of our
market mechanism using the same methodology as was employed by Gode and Sunder in their
seminal study of the standard CDA mechanism5 [Gode and Sunder, 1993]. This assessment
shows that the allocative efficiency of our CDA protocol is fairly high (with an average value of
83% in the scenario we consider) and that our ZI2 agents are always profitable (this condition is
broadly equivalent to the individual rationality condition of the centralised mechanism).
These two mechanisms have been developed because they represent complementary task alloca-
tion mechanisms for the same domain (i.e. where the sellers have finite production capacity and
the cost structure we outline). Both mechanisms address requirement 2 in that they both deal
with constrained capacity suppliers. However, while the extended VCG mechanism guarantees
that the cheapest set of seller(s) is always found, it is centralised. In contrast, the mechanism
derived from the CDA is decentralised (thereby addressing requirement 1), but it does not guar-
antee to find the cheapest set of sellers. Thus, in some cases, the centralised mechanism is more
appropriate because efficiency cannot be compromised (e.g. when the costs involved are high or
the set of agents participating in the market is low, thereby abating the disadvantages of centrali-
sation). However, when decentralisation is a more desirable aspect (such as in cases where there
are large numbers of agents or when robustness to failure is important), the CDA-based solution
is more appropriate. Furthermore, our experimental results quantify the loss in efficiency that
occurs when the decentralised system is implemented instead of its centralised counterpart (an
average of 17% in the case we study). It is important to note that under both mechanisms, the
sellers, though competitive, are profitable and they are hence always incentivised to participate
in our systems.
In the next section, we detail the particular part of the scenario we introduced in Section 1.2
which gives rise to the challenges addressed in this chapter.
4.2 Constrained Capacity Suppliers within the MSN Scenario
The scenario in this chapter demonstrates how the cost structure (consisting of a fixed overhead
cost and a constant marginal cost) and finite production capacities arise in the MSN scenario
(as highlighted in figure 4.1). To this end, consider the sensors in the region of interest of the
environment that can be tasked to gather data by another sensor lying outside of the region.
Since the sensor requesting the task will need sufficient data in order to study a trend, we will let
4Inelastic demand also ensures a fair comparison with the centralised case. This is because allowing for elastic
demand will result in an allocation which satisfies a demand defined by the demand and supply curves, rather than
a prior demand that has been made by the buyers (which would occur with inelastic demand). It also allows us to
characterise the cost of decentralising the market-based mechanism in terms of its efficiency loss.
5While their study employed ZI agents that operate purely on price, in our case, the sellers have to provide both
a price and quantity vector. Thus we modify the ZI strategy to a ZI2 strategy that applies the same basic idea to both
price and quantity.
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the smallest unit of the tasks be discrete intervals of time over which the task is carried out (e.g.
temperature data over 3 hours, visual data over an interval of 5 minutes). Now, when a sensor
performs a sensing task, the following costs will arise:
• Start-up cost: This is the cost (which is measured in terms of energy loss) of powering
up the sensor.
• Marginal cost: This additional cost per time interval is borne by the sensor as it spends
energy sensing the environment.
FIGURE 4.1: Figure of the MSN scenario highlighting the constrained capacity of suppliers
and the centralised and decentralised mechanism considered within this chapter.
Furthermore, as a result of the limited bandwidth and power available to the sensor, it can only
do a certain maximum number of tasks at any one time, thereby resulting in a capacity constraint.
This leads us to the particular cost structure studied within this chapter.
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Moreover, in this chapter, we again study a distributed mechanism. As we have argued in section
3.2, a distributed mechanism may sometimes be required in the MSN scenario especially if a
trusted centre does not exist (as highlighted in figure 4.1). However, as opposed to chapter
3, the auction bandwidth in the scenario we consider here is not severely constrained. This is
justifiable in cases where the data transmitted during an auction (bids and prices) requires much
less bandwidth than the sensed data (such as visual or audio data). We therefore analyse the CDA
where the allocation is calculated in a distributed fashion as the buyers and sellers continuously
submit bids and asks.
Having thus described our scenario, we now provide an overview of related work on the two
market mechanisms considered in this chapter, with particular focus on the cost structure we
consider here.
4.3 Related Work
The VCG mechanism and its various extensions have been used in a variety of computer systems
for task allocation situations. The two broad issues that have been investigated are the economic
and computational properties of these mechanisms under various scenarios (see chapters 1 and 2
for an in-depth discussion). Most solutions in this area consider standard demand functions (not
our cost structure) in order to derive approximate solutions to the problem or to find instances
where these can be solved exactly in polynomial time [Rothkopf et al., 1998; deVries and Vohra,
2003; Fujishima et al., 1999].
However, recently, there has been increasing interest on the economic and computational prop-
erties of mechanisms using non-standard cost functions. In particular, a decreasing marginal
cost structure has been considered in [Kothari et al., 2003] and a polynomially solvable, approx-
imately strategyproof and approximately efficient (i.e. solutions which are within a bound of the
optimal) auction mechanism has been devised. In addition, more general piece-wise linear con-
tinuous curves have been considered in [Eso et al., 2001], but the incentives for truthful bidding
were not taken into account. Furthermore, Sandholm [2002b] and Giovannucci et al. [2004]
have investigated more realistic cost curves (such as those related to volume-quantity discounts)
whereas in multi-attribute bidding [Bichler and Kalagnanam, 2005] has been considered. How-
ever, none of these approaches would work for the cost structure of our domain since they do
not consider both the economic and computational properties of problems with overhead cost,
constant marginal cost and limited capacity simultaneously. Furthermore, unlike our work, they
do not derive an efficient, strategyproof and individually-rational solution or compare it with a
decentralised auction. Also, they do not consider the problem of suppliers not fulfilling their
commitment. This latter problem is studied in [Dash et al., 2004] (Chapter 6) and [Porter et al.,
2002]. However, the mechanism in [Porter et al., 2002] considers success and failure as a binary
variable and thus does not try to incentivise agents to produce upto their maximum if ever they
cannot fulfil their commitment. In [Dash et al., 2004], both the producers and consumers report
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over the success of a transaction and thus their mechanism is more appropriate in an iterated
marketplace where the consumers can form an opinion about the success rate of each producer.
As a result, in their case, the consumers bear the risk of correctly evaluating the success rate of
a producer, unlike in our mechanism where it is upto the producers to correctly estimate their
capacities.
The double auction class of market mechanism consists fundamentally of two categories: the
clearing-house and the CDA. The former involves all bids and asks being submitted to an auc-
tioneer and the market being cleared periodically by that auctioneer (who calculates the alloca-
tion) [Friedman and Rust, 1992]. In contrast, the latter clears continuously, with the competition
in the market deciding the allocation rather than an auctioneer[Friedman and Rust, 1992]. In
this context, one particularly relevant application of the double auction is by [Nicolaisen et al.,
2001] in a wholesale electricity market. Specifically, they use a clearing-house double auction
with discriminatory pricing. Now, while they do not look at the complexity involved with a cost
structure, they do describe a market mechanism for resource allocation. In particular, the agents
populating their markets adopt a sophisticated bidding behaviour (a modified Roth-Erev Rein-
forcement Learning algorithm [Roth and Erev, 1995]), and they evaluate the efficiency of their
mechanism using such strategies. Other relevant works on the double auction include that by
[McCabe et al., 1992] on the design of a clearing-house, and [Xia et al., 2004] on solving com-
binatorial double auction mechanisms. However, none of these mechanisms are decentralised
since they involve an auctioneer that computes the allocation and prices.
Speaking more generally, most research on the CDA has been on the structure and behaviour of
the mechanism. Indeed, the initial stimulation for this work comes from the field of experimental
economics where experiments with human volunteers showed that small groups of traders could
quickly find the equilibrium price in simulated single commodity markets [Smith, 1962; Gode
and Sunder, 1993]. In line with this seminal work, many researchers then extended these simple
trading strategies to generate sophisticated software agents that are capable of observing the
trading behaviour of other agents in order to learn the market equilibrium price of a commodity,
and thus trade more efficiently [Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; He
et al., 2003; Vytelingum et al., 2004]. However, in all of this work, the existence of the market
equilibrium at which both buyers and sellers seek to trade is a consequence of the assumption
of a cost structure with an increasing marginal cost and no startup cost. Unfortunately, the
cost structure of our domain destroys this market equilibrium and thus the close to optimal
efficiency usually obtained by CDAs cannot be guaranteed. Specifically, this is because the
different startup costs and the inelastic demand mean that a single price on which buyers and
sellers agree to trade cannot be reached. To remedy this, we develop a variant of the CDA that is
still reasonably efficient, but that can deal with the specific cost structure and capacity constraint
in our domain.
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4.4 The Allocation Problem
We now discuss in more detail the problem structure that we consider in the remainder of this
chapter. The system that we wish to control consists of a set J = {1, . . . , n} of sellers of a
resource and a number of consumers with total demand D. Each seller, j ∈ J , is characterised
by a maximum capacity that it can provide, capj , and a cost function, cj . The cost function
is defined as a combination of a fixed price, fpj , payable for any amount of production and a
separate per unit price, upj :
cj =
0 if kj = 0,fpj + kjupj if 0 < kj ≤ capj (4.1)
where kj is the quantity of production allocated to seller j. Thus, an allocation vector K ∈ K
is one in which each agent j is asked to supply a quantity kj . We assume that both the demand
and the details of the cost function are private information of the producers (also referred to
as suppliers or sellers) since they represent distinct self-interested stakeholders. Given this, the
overall aim of the system is to satisfy the total demand by allocating production between the
different producers. Here, we assume that the resource is bought and sold in small indivisible
units (as is common in most billing systems) and thus kj ∈ N.
As the designer of the whole system, we are interested in ensuring that the overall allocation,
K∗, of the resource under consideration is optimum in the sense that it minimises the total cost
of production. In this case, it is an optimisation problem where we minimise the sum of the
individual production costs, whilst satisfying the total demand,
∑
j∈J kj = D, and the capacity
constraints of each individual producer:
K∗ = arg min
K∈K
∑
j
(αjfpj + upjkj) (4.2)
such that 0 ≤ kj ≤ capj and where:
αj =
 0 if kj = 01 otherwise.
The problem as described here is somewhat similar to two standard problems from the literature
of operational research and scheduling; specifically the knapsack problem [Martello and Toth,
1990] and the capacitated lot-size problem [Bitran and Yanasse, 1982]. Comparing this problem
to the knapsack problem, we note that we can consider each supplier to be an item to be fitted
into a knapsack. The size and value of each of these items is represented by the number of units
of production allocated to this supplier and the cost of producing this allocation. Unlike the
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standard knapsack problem, where we seek to maximise the value of items without exceeding
the size of the knapsack, our goal here is to exactly fill the knapsack (i.e. satisfy demand) whilst
minimising the value of items placed inside (i.e. minimise the production costs). Although we
can place fractional items within the knapsack, the size of these items is restricted to integer
units of production and the corresponding value of the item is given by the cost structure shown
in equation 4.1.
Comparing to the standard capacitated lot-size problem, which attempts to schedule the pro-
duction of a single producer over a number of days to meet a specific daily demand, we are
attempting to schedule production over a number of different producers to satisfy an aggregate
demand. Despite this difference, both problems share a similar cost structure, most specifically
the combination of a fixed and per unit cost, and most importantly, both models share the con-
cept of producers who have a constrained production capacity. We could thus adapt algorithms
developed for the capacitated lot-size problem to our problem. However, in this chapter the goal
is to show that the problem can be solved in a computationally efficient manner rather than solve
the problem in the most computationally efficient manner.
Now, both the knapsack and the capacitated lot-size problems have been shown to be NP-
hard [Florian et al., 1980; Garey and Johnson, 1979]. However both can be solved in pseudo-
polynomial time using a dynamic programming approach [Garey and Johnson, 1979] and we
use this fact to present a suitable implementation of this technique for our specific problem in
section 4.5.3.
Given this problem description, in the following sections we describe our two task allocation
mechanisms, starting with the centralised one.
4.5 The Centralised Mechanism
We build upon the standard VCG mechanism since this has a number of desirable economic
properties with respect to task allocation. Specifically, it is efficient, incentivises the agents to
reveal their costs truthfully to the auctioneer in dominant strategy and guarantees a non-negative
utility to the participating agents (see chapter 2 for a more detailed description of the VCG
mechanism).
The standard VCG mechanism for task allocation represents the producers as agents participat-
ing in a reverse auction to satisfy the demand of the auctioneer. The agents submit their type, θj ,
in sealed bids to the auctioneer. Given these bids, the auctioneer finds the efficient allocation and
then calculates the payments or transfers for each agent. It is this transfer scheme that results in
the agents having truthful reporting as a dominant strategy.
However, there are two key differences between our setting and that of a standard VCG mecha-
nism. Firstly, each agent’s type has three dimensions that characterises its cost function instead
of the usual one. Specifically, these dimensions are the fixed price, fpj , the unit cost, upj ,
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and the capacity, capj i.e. θj = (fpj , upj , capj). Secondly, the capacity of the agent does not
directly affect the cost of supplying an allocated quantity of a resource, but rather puts a limit
on the amount that it can supply. This differs from the standard setting where an agent’s type
directly affects its cost.
To deal with this, the VCG needs to be extended in two ways. The first change is to have agents
report the defining characteristics of their cost functions rather than a single cost price. The
second change is a penalty scheme that incentivises the agents to report truthfully on their ca-
pacities6. Given this, we present the mechanism as a two-part scheme which is a transfer scheme
and a penalty scheme (in sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). This two-part mechanism is presented for
explanatory purposes only since the revelation principle (see Chapter 2) tells us that we can
certainly find the equivalent one-stage scheme which will incentivise truthtelling (see section
4.5.3).
4.5.1 The Transfer Scheme
The problem at hand is then to determine the optimal allocation K∗ (i.e. the one that min-
imises the total cost of production), while satisfying the demand ∑ kj = D. If the agents
are incentivised to report truthfully, then the auctioneer can just take their reports and solve
the optimization problem introduced in section 4.4. More generally, however, if agents report
θ̂j =
(
f̂pj , ûpj , ĉapj
)
, the auctioneer then solves:
K̂∗ = arg min
K∈K
∑
j
(
αj f̂pj + ûpjxj
)
(4.3)
such that 0 ≤ kj ≤ ĉapj .
Hence, comparing equations 4.2 and 4.3, in order to achieve an efficient allocation we are left
with the problem of incentivising the agents to report truthfully. If we assume rational self-
interested agents, then this implies that they should maximise their own utility when reporting
truthfully (otherwise they will lie!). Like most work in this area, we consider the case that the
agents have a quasi-linear utility function (as defined in chapter 2).
The standard VCG mechanism achieves truth-telling by aligning the goal of each agent with that
of the mechanism designer via the use of the transfer part of the mechanism (see chapter 2 for
more details). It imposes a transfer on the agent which is equivalent to its marginal contribution
to the society. Now, applying this insight to our multi-dimensional type domain, we advocate
6We should note here that the second difference does not result in interdependent valuations (as discussed in
Chapter 1). While the capacities of each agent do affect the allocation of other agents (the cheapest agent will
determine how much the remaining agents will obtain via its capacity), it only does so in an indirect way. Therefore,
we can still aim to achieve an efficient mechanism despite the multi-dimensionality of the types since we are firmly
in the realm of private values [Krishna, 2002].
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TABLE 4.1: A set of three producers bidding to satisfy a demand of 200 units.
Sellers
S1 S2 S3
Capacity 100 150 175
Fixed Price 100 200 120
Unit Price 1.5 1 2
the following transfer scheme in which the agents report on all three dimensions of their types
(i.e. on θj = (fpj , upj , capj)) :
tj =
[
min
K∈K
kj≤capj
∑
l∈J\j
(
αf̂pl + ûplkl
)]
−
[ ∑
l∈J\j
(
α∗f̂pl + ûplk̂l
∗
)]
. (4.4)
where k̂l
∗
is the allocation to agent l in the optimal allocation, K̂∗, calculated with the reports
of all the agents.
In more detail, the transfer, tj , is the payment that agent j receives from the auctioneer for
providing an allocation kj . The transfer scheme above, as in the VCG mechanism, consists of
two parts. The first calculates the total cost of the optimal allocation if agent j were not included
in the set of suppliers. In the second part, first the optimal allocation with agent j is found, and
then the total cost of this allocation is calculated minus the cost of this allocation to agent j.
Thus, the payment that j receives is its marginal contribution to reducing the total cost of the
optimal allocation. It can be observed that j will always receive a non-negative payment since
the addition of a seller will only decrease the cost of the optimal allocation.
We now present an example to show why this extension of the VCG mechanism is not the only
change that needs to be applied so as to incentivize the agents to report truthfully. Consider a
set of sellers (1, 2, 3) with different types who are participating in a reverse auction to fulfill a
demand of 200 units (i.e. D = 200). The producers’ types, (i.e. θj = (capj , fpj , upj)), are
depicted in table 4.1. They report their types to the auctioneer which then calculates the transfers
according to equations 4.3 and 4.4.
Let us suppose for now that the capacity capj of the agents are known by the auctioneer. Then,
implementing our mechanism with the transfer described by equation 4.4, the auctioneer first
chooses the optimal allocation. In this case, it would be S2 producing 150 units and S1 producing
50 units (i.e K = {50, 150, 0}) thereby giving a total cost of 525 to the system. The transfers
would then be 220 to S1, 395 to S2 and 0 to S3 (i.e. t = {220, 395, 0}). However, given this
scheme, S3 has an incentive to lie about its capacity and give a capacity greater than 200 (i.e.
ĉap3 ≥ 200). It would then be allocated to produce the whole demand and would be paid 525
to do so. However, as its true capacity is only 175 units, demand will not be satisfied.
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Thus from the above example, we can observe that an agent has an incentive to report a higher
capacity than it actually has. An agent, however, has no incentive to report a lower capacity.
This is because the utility derived by an agent is equal to its marginal contribution to the society.
Now, if an agent reports a capacity lower than its actual one and this misreport has an effect on
the optimal allocation (i.e the capacity it reports is lower than the allocation it would have got
under an optimal allocation), then it increases the total cost to the society since the minimisation
in equation 4.3 would have tighter constraints. This would mean that the marginal contribution
of the agent to decreasing the total cost in the society is less and hence the agent would derive
a lower utility. We thus only need to worry about agents reporting a higher capacity than they
actually have. We therefore impose a penalty scheme that incentivises agents to report truthfully
about their capacity. In a standard VCG, such a penalty scheme does not exist since it is as-
sumed that the producers have unlimited capacity. Furthermore, a penalty scheme imposed after
the agents have supplied their allocations is the only way we can incentivise agents to report
truthfully about their capacity. This is because the auctioneer will only know whether an agent
has overstated its capacity if ever that agent has been allocated to produce over its true capacity
(but under its declared one) after the agent has supplied its allocation.
4.5.2 The Penalty Scheme
We wish to penalise agents that report a higher capacity than they have. However, we are not
concerned with untruthful reporting if this does not affect the resulting efficient allocation. This
is because such agents will not derive a higher utility if their untruthful reporting has not affected
the efficient allocation. Thus, we will call agents whose reported capacities affect the optimal
outcome active agents.
In order to know whether the active agents have truthfully reported their capacity, we require a
post-production stage that checks how much they actually produced. We shall assume that if an
agent is asked to supply a certain amount k̂j
∗
, and actually produces only kj , (kj < k̂j∗), then
the capacity of that agent is kj . We shall see that given the penalty we design, this assumption
is satisfied with rational agents. It is only in the case of malicious agents who want to increase
the cost to the system with no consideration to their own utility for which the following penalty
scheme would not work.
In more detail, we impose the following penalty, pj , if the agent does not supply the amount that
it was required to supply under the optimal allocation (i.e. if kj < k∗j ):
pj = tj(kj ≤ ĉapj)− tj(kj ≤ kj) + δ (4.5)
where ti(xj ≤ ĉapj) is the transfer in equation 4.4 computed with the constraint kj ≤ cˆj and
tj(kj ≤ kj) is the one computed with the constraint kj ≤ kj .
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This penalty scheme, which is a transfer of money from the agent to the auctioneer, consists
of three parts. The first is the transfer that occurs with the reported capacity cˆj . The second
part is the transfer that would have resulted if the agent had reported its capacity as the amount
that it has successfully supplied. This penalty scheme thus only penalises agents in the case
where their misreported capacity has changed the allocation of supply. The third part is the one
that ensures that the utility an agent derives from misreporting its capacity is strictly lower than
when it tells the truth (i.e it is then a strongly dominant strategy for the agent to report its truthful
capacity).
It should also be noted that though this penalty scheme has been developed for the case of agents
misreporting their capacity, it would also penalise agents that have not produced the specified
amount due to other reasons. This penalty scheme thus puts the onus on the agents to provide
an accurate report of the amount they can produce. The δ can thus be set by the mechanism
designer depending on how critical it is to meet demand. The more critical the requirement, the
higher δ should be set. Evidently, this sacrifices efficiency (the agents report a lower capacity
than their most likely capacity) for robustness. Another attractive aspect of this penalty scheme
is that if ever an agent realises after the allocation that it cannot produce the amount assigned to
it, it would still produce till its limit so as to reduce the ultimate penalty.
Thus, in our example in table 4.1, if agent S3 reported ĉap3 = 200, it would be penalised 525+δ
(from equation 4.5). As a result, the agent does not profit by lying. In the case of the two other
agents, S1 and S2, misreporting their types, they incur a loss in utility equal to δ.
4.5.3 The Equivalent One-Stage Mechanism
We can amalgamate the two-part mechanism presented in sub-sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 into an
equivalent one-stage mechanism:
1. First the seller agents, Sj , provide reports of their types θ̂j = (f̂pj , ûpj , ĉapj) to the
center.
2. The center, having gathered total demand from the buyer agents, solves equation 4.3 and
assigns production to the agents according to the optimal allocation vector K̂∗.
3. The center then provides the overall payment rj to the agents once they have produced
their allocation:
rj = tj − pj
= tj(kj ≤ kj)− δβj
(4.6)
where βj is an indicator function which is equal to 1 when kj < k̂j
∗
and 0 otherwise.
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4.5.4 Properties of the Mechanism
We now prove the properties of our mechanism.
Proposition 4.1. The mechanism is strategyproof (as defined in chapter 2).
Proof. Here, we need to prove that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for the agents given
the transfer and penalty schemes in our mechanism. We first consider the case that the agent has
not over-reported its capacity. Then its strategy is to report θ̂ so as to maximise its utility:
θ̂j = (ûpj , f̂pj , ĉapj) = arg max
bθj∈Θj
(upj(θ̂j),K)
= arg max
bθj∈Θj
[(
α̂j
∗(f̂pj − fpj) + (ûpj − upj)k̂j∗
)
− min
K
kj≤dcapj
∑
j∈J
(
αj f̂pj + ûpjkj
)
+ min
K
kj≤ ˆcapj
∑
j∈J\i
(
αj f̂pj + ûpjkj
) ]
= arg max
bθj∈Θj
[(
α̂j
∗(f̂pj − fpj) + (ûpj − upj)k̂j∗
)
− min
K
kj≤ bcj
∑
j∈J
(
αj f̂pj + ûjkj
) ]
The first part of the maximisation is the gain/loss that an agent makes by misreporting its type,
whereas the second part is the effect misreporting has on the allocation and the global cost.
Hence any misreport on its type is cancelled out by the effect on the global cost. The important
point to note here is that the minimisation is not carried out by the agent, but by a centre that
is only aware of θ̂j . Hence, in order to maximise the term in [.] above, an agent should report
θ̂j = (fpj , upj , ĉapj) (i.e. truthtelling in (fpj , upj) is a weakly dominant strategy). Thus, we
have proved that the mechanism is strategyproof in (fpj , upj). Furthermore, we know that an
agent will not report a lower capacity. Now, we prove that under the penalty scheme, the agent
will not report a capacity higher than its actual one. The utility of an agent i, given that it has
reported a higher capacity, is the sum of its cost, transfer and penalty. We now prove that in
the case of an active agent overreporting its capacity is a strongly dominated strategy. From
equations 2.6 and 4.6, the utility of an agent would then be:
uj(.) = max
bθj∈Θj
[
(α̂j
∗(f̂pj − fpj) + (ûpj − upj)k̂j∗)− δβ − min
K
kj≤kj
∑
j∈J
(αj f̂pj + ûpjkj)
]
< max
bθj∈Θj
[
(α̂j
∗(f̂pj − fpj) + (ûpj − upj)k̂j∗)− min
K
kj≤ bcj
dcapj=capj
∑
j∈J
(αj f̂pj + ûpjkj)
]
Thus, together with the fact that an agent would not report a lower capacity (since such a report
would mean that its resulting allocation is less or equal to the one when it reports truthfully), the
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above proves that an agent will always report its truthful capacity, capj . Hence we have that the
agent always reports truthfully about its type, θj .
Proposition 4.2. The mechanism is efficient (as defined in chapter 2).
This implies that the centre finds the outcome given by equation 4.2.
Proof. The above is a result of the strategyproofness of the mechanism. Since the goal of the
centre is to achieve efficiency, then given truthful reports, the centre will achieve efficiency.
Proposition 4.3. The mechanism is individually-rational (as defined in chapter 2).
We again assume that the utility an agent derives from not joining the mechanism is 0. Then, we
need to prove that the utility an agent derives in the mechanism is always ≥ 0.
Proof. Given the strategyproofness of the mechanism, the utility of an agent is:
uj(upj , fpj , capj) = − min
K
kj≤capj
∑
j∈J
(αjfpj + upjkj) + min
K
kj≤capj
∑
j∈J\i
(αfpj + upjkj)
The first minimisation is over a larger set than the second one. Thus:
min
K
kj≤capj
∑
j∈J
(αjfpj + upjkj) ≤ min
K
kj≤capj
∑
j∈J\i
(αfpj + upjkj)
Hence, uj(upj , fpj , capj) ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.4. The mechanism is robust to uncertainties about the capacity of agents.
In this case, we impose less stringent information requirements on the agents when reporting
their capacity. So far, we have considered the case where prior to revealing its type, an agent
is aware of its capacity. However, we believe that this may not be always practical since the
capacity of a supplier may depend on numerous external factors (as discussed in section 4.1).
We therefore relax this requirement and consider the case where an agent is aware of only the
probability distribution function (pdf) relating to its capacity. We next prove that the designer
can, via the setting of δ, force the agent to either report safe values (i.e. the agent is nearly
certain that it will produce at least this capacity) or more risky but potentially more profitable
ones.
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Proof. We start by looking at the expected utility of an agent given that the probability distrib-
ution function of its capacity, f(capj), ranges from a lower bound capj to an upper bound capj
(the associated cumulative density function is given by F (capj)) and that the agent reports a
capacity of ĉapj :
E[uj(ĉapj , fpj , upj)] =E
[
− min
K
ki≤dcapi
∑
i∈J
(αifpi + upiki) + min
K
ki≤ ˆcapi
∑
i∈J\j
(αfpi + upiki)
− δβj
]
=−
∫
dcapj
capj
min
K
ki≤dcapi
∑
i∈J
(αifpi + upiki) f(capj)dcapj
− δF (ĉapj) + min
K
kj≤dcapj
∑
i∈J\j
(αifpi + upiki)
Now, let us analyse how the reports of the agents affect their utility. The safest report is the
minimum report capj . Reporting a higher capacity ĉapj would then yield a gain of:
∆E[uj(capj , fpj , upj)] =− δF (ĉapj) +
[
min
K
kj≤capj
∑
j∈J
(αjfpj + upjkj)−
∫ capj
dcapj
min
K
ki≤dcapi
∑
i∈J
(αifpi + upiki) f(capj)dcapj
]
(4.7)
The agents would then try to maximise the above gain given a certain δ. Thus, the setting of
δ would then depend on how certain we want the agents to be about being able to satisfy their
capacity. Hence, setting δ as:
δ =
[
min
K
kj≤capj
∑
j∈J
(αjfpj + upjkj)− (4.8)
∫ capj
dcapj
min
K
ki≤dcapi
∑
i∈J
(αifpi + upiki) f(capj)dcapj
]/
F (ĉapj)
results in no expected gain for the agent. In fact from equation 4.7, if we consider a fixed δ,
then as ĉj increases, the part in [.] increases while−δP (capj < ĉapj) decreases. Thus there is a
ĉapj for a fixed δ that results in a maximum gain. We can therefore conclude that as δ increases,
ĉapj → capj and as δ decreases, ĉapj → capj .
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Calculate initial row of matrix c
c[0,0]← 0
for d = 1 to D do c[0,d]←∞
Loop through the total number of producers
for j = 1 to n do
Loop through the total demand
for d = 0 to D do
c[j,d]← c[j-1,d]
Loop through the total capacity of producer i
for kj = 1 to min{d,capj} do
Compare the previous result to the current
result and select the minimum of the two
c[j,d]← min{c[j,d],c[j-1,d-kj] + fpj + kjupj}
Return the final result
return c[n,D]
FIGURE 4.2: Pseudo-code representing the dynamic programming solution to find the opti-
mum centralised solution in pseudo-polynomial time.
The second part of the robustness is that even if the agent realises after reporting ĉapj that
capj < k̂j
∗
, it will still produce upto capj as a result of the payment and penalty scheme.
Proof. This is evident from the way the centre pays the agents. The agents get a higher utility
with a higher production since the transfer depends on how much they produce, (i.e. x, after the
allocation) We have shown that reporting a higher capacity (upto the true capacity) is a weakly
dominant strategy. Along with the penalty scheme, this can be viewed as producing as much as
it can upto its optimal allocation is a weakly dominant strategy for any agent.
Proposition 4.5. The optimal task allocation to the agents can be computed exactly by the centre
in pseudo-polynomial time.
Proof. The centre can calculate the task allocation to the agents exactly using dynamic program-
ming. Specifically, we wish to calculate c[n,D] — the minimum total cost to satisfy a demand
of D with access to n producers. This can be solved using the recursive expressions:
c[0, d] =
0 if d = 0∞ if d > 0
c[i, d] = min
kj
c[j − 1, d]c[j − 1, d− kj ] + fpj + kjupj
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such that 0 < kj ≤ capj . As the production allocated to each producer is in indivisible units, we
can calculate c[n,D] by evaluating all nD possible values. This results in an algorithm which
operates in pseudo-polynomial time.
In particular, a simple algorithm for this solution is presented in figure 4.2. Here we calculate all
the values of the array, c[n,D], starting from the known case c[0, 0] = 0 and using the recursive
expressions above to calculate subsequent values. A more efficient solution could perhaps be
found using primal-dual algorithms [Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1982]. However for the size
of problem tackled here, the above solution is extremely efficient. Moreover, the same approach
can then be used to calculate the resulting task allocation to the agents.
4.6 The Decentralised Mechanism
So far we have considered a centralised mechanism in order to deal with our task allocation
problem. However, as discussed in section 4.1, we sometimes require a mechanism for task
allocation in which there is no centre that governs the allocations. Therefore, in this section, we
consider the CDA which is just such a decentralised mechanism.
Our task allocation problem involves multiple suppliers and multiple buyers, and the matching
of the two is determined by the sellers and buyers that successfully transact with one another.
As discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.3, the most common CDA format assumes buyers and sellers
have an increasing marginal cost and no startup cost and that the offers in the trade are via price
alone. However, in our case, the total production cost depends on both the startup cost and the
number of units to be sold (given the marginal cost). In fact, since the startup cost is distributed
over the sale quantity, the cost price is not fixed for different numbers of units sold. As a result,
the supplier cannot firmly decide on an asking price (based on the production cost per unit or cost
price) that would allow it to be profitable and to participate in the task allocation (by transacting
with potential buyers). This is because the sale quantity cannot be known a priori. To overcome
this, we assume that it is possible for the supplier to make a prediction about the amount of units
it expects to sell (since exact demand can only be estimated)7. Now, in traditional cost settings,
a supplier can start making bids for a low quantity and slowly ramp up its price so as to ensure
it does not make a loss. However, in our setting, low quantities correspond to higher unit prices.
Thus the supplier is faced with the problem that reducing its price may not guarantee that it
transacts and in certain cases may lead to a loss (if a buyer specifies a demand such that the ask
price becomes lower than the cost price). We therefore allow sellers to communicate the amount
they wish to sell to the market via a multidimensional bid consisting of both quantity and price.
We also specify in our clearing rules that a transaction only occurs when a buyer makes a bid
for this amount.
7In fact, in CDA scenarios demand cannot be known even after the bids have been submitted [Cliff and Bruten,
1997]. This is why sellers try to predict the demand in order to be more profitable [He et al., 2003].
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Given this background, a key objective for the decentralised mechanism is to be individually
rational (as defined in chapter 2). In this case, this means ensuring the suppliers can be profitable
in the market so that they are incentivised to enter it in the first place. Furthermore, while the
mechanism has to be individually rational, our global objective is to achieve the most efficient
outcome (task allocation) that we can. Now, as we discussed in section 4.4, this is equivalent to
finding the allocation that minimises total cost. In a typical CDA mechanism, the optimal task
allocation occurs when the total profit of all buyers and all sellers is maximised [Friedman and
Rust, 1992] and this occurs when the combined cost of sellers is minimised on the sell side8, as
the sellers with the lowest cost would be successful.
However, given our additional constraints of limited capacity and a startup cost, the seller’s
strategic behaviour would be more complex than that of the buyer, since, as we mention before,
it additionally has to strategise over the quantity it is expected to sell. In this context, we cannot
achieve full efficiency because no agent has complete information about every other agent in
the market (unlike in section 4.5 where the centre is aware of everyone’s cost functions and
capacities) and the sellers do not have increasing marginal costs which would guarantee an
equilibrium price for trade [MasColell et al., 1995].
Given this, our aim is to design a protocol that achieves a level of efficiency that is reasonably
close to the optimal solution given by our centralised mechanism. To do this, we now outline
our protocol, and then go on to compare its performance with its centralised counterpart in terms
of task allocation efficiency.
4.6.1 The Mechanism
The protocol we propose is a variant of the multi-unit CDA. Buyers and sellers can submit
offers to buy and sell multiple units of the resource, respectively, and those orders are queued in
an order book which is cleared continuously (with additional constraints as a result of buyers’
inelastic demands). The protocol proceeds as follows:
• Buyer i submits an offer, bid(q, p, i), to buy exactly q (q ≥ 1) units of the good at the unit
price p. The utility of buyer i for a quantity other than q is 0.
• Conversely, supplier Sj submits an offer, ask(q, p, j), to sell a maximum of q (q ≥ 1)
units at unit price p.
• These bids and asks are queued in an orderbook, which is a publicly observable board
listing all the bids and asks submitted to the market (see table 4.2). The bids in the order
book are sorted in decreasing order of price and the asks are in increasing order (higher
bids and lower asks are more likely to result in transactions).
8Sell side refers to the market from the sellers’ perspective.
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• The clearing rule in the market is as follows. Whenever a new bid or ask is submitted,
an attempt is made at clearing the order book. The orderbook is cleared whenever a
transaction can occur (that is, when the lowest asking price is higher than the highest
bidding price and any bidding offer can be cleared completely and the bidding quantity
for each offer is completely satisfied by the supply to be cleared). The transaction price is
set at the bidding price which we experimentally find to result in the total market profits
being equally divided between the sell side and the buy side9 [Vytelingum et al., 2004].
Order Book
Bids
(quantity, price, buyer)
Asks
(quantity, price, seller)
(30, 2.95, 2)
(40, 2.75, 5)
(30, 2.70, 1)
(24, 2.16, 3)
( 60, 2.20, 3)
( 25, 2.60, 1)
( 40, 3.22, 2)
(100, 3.50, 5)
( 25, 3.69, 7)
...
TABLE 4.2: Multi-unit CDA Order Book - before clearing
To further illustrate this process, we present a graphical representation of the clearing rule in
figure 4.3. As can be seen, the offers queued in the orderbook are used to build demand and
supply curves. All bids with a unit price lower than the lowest unit ask price and, similarly,
all asks with a unit price higher than the highest unit bid price, cannot result in any transaction
and are not represented in the figure. The transaction price and quantity are clearly shown in
the figure (2.75 and 70 respectively), as the point where the demand curve crosses the supply
curve under the additional constraint that bid offers are not divisible. At this transaction price,
the total profit of all buyers and sellers that transact is maximised with all constraints specified
by our protocols satisfied. The orderbook in table 4.2 can thus be cleared as shown in figure
4.3 resulting in the new orderbook given in table 4.3. The market clearing is then similar to
solving an optimisation problem where the objective is to maximise the total profit of buyers
and sellers that will transact given that cleared demand must be equal to cleared supply and no
partial clearing of bid is allowed. 10
Now in order to compare the efficiency of this protocol with that of the centralised mechanism,
we assume that the buyers have high limit prices (this represents price inelasticity because buyers
are willing to pay any price to acquire the goods and this is equal to an arbitrary maximum price
that a bid or an ask can be submitted at). Furthermore, we adopt the approach of Gode and
Sunder [1993] in employing a zero-intelligence strategy in order to find the underlying efficiency
9We chose this option because a mechanism where most of the profits in the market were distributed among
sellers would be less appealing to buyers than one where a larger share of profits were distributed among buyers.
Thus, with a similar preference among sellers (who will join a market where more profit is distributed among the sell
side), a mechanism that equally distributes market profits among the buy and sell side is the rational preference for
both buyers and sellers.
10We note that other clearing rules are also possible, for example to maximise the number of transactions or to
maximise profits of the sellers only [Friedman and Rust, 1992]. However, the aim of a market mechanism is to
maximise social welfare by maximising the total profit extracted in the market, and it is achieved through the simple
ordering order books that publicly shows which buyers (with highest valuation of the goods) can transact with which
suppliers (with the lowest ask prices).
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(a)
Order Book
Bids
(quantity, price, buyer)
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(quantity, price, seller)
(30, 2.95, 2)
(40, 2.75, 5)
(30, 2.70, 1)
(24, 2.16, 3)
( 60, 2.20, 3)
( 25, 2.60, 1)
( 40, 3.22, 2)
(100, 3.50, 5)
( 25, 3.69, 7)
...
(b)
FIGURE 4.3: Panel (a) shows the demand and supply (curves) of the order book, with the
shaded region representing allocations. Panel (b) points out the clearable bids and asks in the
order book (shaded area in panel (a)).
Order Book
Bids
(quantity, price, buyer)
Asks
(quantity, price, seller)
(30, 2.70, 1)
(24, 2.16, 3)
( 15, 2.60, 1)
( 40, 3.22, 2)
(100, 3.50, 5)
( 25, 3.69, 7)
TABLE 4.3: Multi-unit CDA Order Book - after clearing
of our market. To this end, we next present the ZI2 that is tailored to the bidding structure of our
CDA protocol, before we detail the actual evaluation.
4.6.2 The ZI2 Strategy
One of the principal concerns in developing a market mechanism is to ensure that it is efficient
even when the participants adopt a simple strategic behaviour. The underlying intuition here is
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that by considering such behaviour, we are able to establish a lower bound on the efficiency of
the mechanism and we can consider the extent to which the market mechanism itself affects the
efficiency of the market. Thus, the ZI strategy is widely used for this purpose since it is not
motivated by trading profit and effectively ignores the state of the market and past experience
when forming a bid or an ask. It simply draws its offer price from a uniform distribution over a
given range.
Since in our mechanism, the asks consist of price and quantity, we extend the ZI strategy to our
ZI2 strategy that randomises over both price and quantity. As discussed earlier, any sophisticated
strategy, on the sell side, would make some form of prediction on the number of units it is likely
to sell as part of its price formation process (because information about the actual demand is
not available and there is uncertainty as to whether the agent is more competitive than the other
participating suppliers). Our ZI2 supplier j, instead, randomises over the expected transaction
quantity to form a limit price ℓj which is used as in the original ZI strategy. Thus the ZI2 strategy
is11:
For seller j,
qˆj ∼ U(0, capj)
ℓj = (fpj + qˆjupj)/qˆj
pj ∼ U(ℓj ,max)
offer = ask(capj , pj , j) (4.9)
For buyer i,
pi ∼ U(0, ℓi)
offer = bid(qi, pi, i) (4.10)
Buyers are endowed with high limit prices at the beginning of the auction (because they have in-
elastic demand), while sellers are endowed with their cost functions and capacities (collectively
referred to as the production function). Buyer i submits offers to buy the quantity qi it requires
at a unit price drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to its limit price ℓi (see equation
4.10). Conversely, seller j submits an ask between its limit price and max as per equation 4.9,
where capj is its production capacity, fpj is its startup cost, and upj is its marginal cost.
11X ∼ U(A,B) describes a discrete uniform distribution between A and B, with steps of 0.01.
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FIGURE 4.4: The multi-unit CDA simulator
4.6.3 Empirical Evaluation
In order to perform empirical evaluations, we have developed an implementation of this distrib-
uted mechanism12 (shown in figure 4.4) based on the protocol and strategies described here. As
the experimental setup, we ran the simulations over 2000 rounds13 for two different markets,
more specifically a small market with 3 buyers and 3 sellers (market A) and a larger market
with 15 buyers and 15 sellers (market B). We consider both the small and large markets so as to
demonstrate the scaleability of our mechanism.
In each market, each seller was given a production function (supply for market A is given in
table 4.1), while each buyer was required to procure an exact quantity of units with a relatively
high limit price. We ran different simulations for each market, with different total demands
ranging from 1 to the maximum production quantity. The total demand, D, was distributed
12Available at http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/∼rkd02r/simulator
13The results were validated using a students t-test with two samples of 2000 runs, assuming equal variance with
means µ1 = 0.7198 and µ2 = 0.7218 and p-value p = 0.3660. This means that the difference between the means
is not significant and thus 2000 runs are sufficient for statistical significance at a confidence level of 95%.
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FIGURE 4.5: Optimal and CDA production cost
among the buyers (see table 4.4 for the demand in market A, where D = ∑i qi, D ∈ [1, 425]
given the sellers’ production functions in table 4.1). Thus, the total demand in market A was
varied from 1 to 425 (the maximum supply quantity of market A), while in market B the total
demand ranged from 1 to 2400.
Buyers’ Demand
Bi B1 B2 B3
allocation 1 100 150 50
... ... ... ...
allocation n q1 q2 q3
TABLE 4.4: A set of three buyers with different demands.
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FIGURE 4.6: Average market efficiency
In order to empirically evaluate the efficiency of the mechanism, in terms of minimising the total
cost of production, we measure this property and compare it to the optimal solution found in the
centralised mechanism. Given each total demand, the mean efficiency of the market (averaged
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over 2000 independent rounds) is shown in figure 4.6, where the optimal production cost is nor-
malised to 1, while the total production cost of the centralised and the decentralised mechanisms
are shown in figure 4.5. As can be seen, the mechanism is efficient with an average efficiency
of 83% (and a minimum efficiency of 53% when demand is relatively low) for market B and an
average efficiency of 86% (and a minimum efficiency of 67%) for market A. In both cases, the
minimum efficiency case occurs when the demand is split amongst many more suppliers than
are actually needed (with respect to the optimal allocation). This increases the overall cost of
supply as a result of the fixed cost of the extraneous suppliers. However, in the typical CDA, the
worst-case analysis considers the average efficiency of ZI agents [Gode and Sunder, 1993]. This
is because although it is theoretically possible for an allocation of very low efficiency to occur,
in almost every run (higher than 99% of the time), the CDA implemented with agents employing
the ZI strategy has a high efficiency. Thus, it is the zero-intelligence nature of the strategy which
provides a lower bound on measuring efficiency and, we expect the average efficiency with a
more informed strategy to be better [Cliff and Bruten, 1997; He et al., 2003; Vytelingum et al.,
2004]. We thererefore adopt this approach in discussing the inherent efficiency of our CDA
mechanism.
In the experiments with each market, we observe an increasing trend whereby the market effi-
ciency increases as total demand approaches the maximum capacity of the sellers. It can also be
seen that there is a high variance when the total demand is relatively low. Considering specif-
ically the set of experiments with market A, the intuitions behind these observations are as
follows. The variance of the market efficiency is generally higher when the total demand is low.
This is because the optimal allocation for a total demand of 100 is completely covered by seller
1 (with a marginal cost of 1.5 and a startup cost of 100). However, our market mechanism does
not ensure that only seller 1 will trade and, thus, sellers 2 and 3 may also be part of this alloca-
tion for the total demand of 100. The high variance is principally an artifact of the additional
startup costs if more than one seller were to trade. As the total demand increases past 175, the
optimal allocation is covered by at least two sellers. Again, the variance past the demand of 175
is the result of sellers supplying different numbers of units at different marginal costs, with at
most one additional startup cost. When the total demand is very high, close to the total capacity,
all the sellers participate in the allocation, and the small variance is solely due to the sellers
providing different numbers of units (a difference which is relatively low compared to the total
startup cost). The observations in the set of experiments with market B can also be explained by
the same reasoning, with the higher variance occurring when demand that can be covered by a
single seller is distributed among multiple sellers.
Furthermore, we can explain the increasing trend of the market efficiency seen in figure 4.5.
Considering market A, a demand of up to 175 can be provided by only 1 seller. The jumps in
figure 4.5 correspond to the optimal allocation changing between a combination of one to three
sellers. For example, jumps at 100 and 150 correspond to the optimal allocation starting with
seller 1, changing to seller 2 and finally to seller 3. The increase in efficiency as total demand
increases is the result of the number of sellers involved in the optimal allocation, changing from
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FIGURE 4.7: The sellers’ total profit given different demands (for market A with 3 buyers and
3 sellers and market B with 15 buyers and 15 sellers.
a single seller (up to a total demand of 175) to three sellers (past a total demand of 325 which is
the highest demand any two sellers can cover). However, in our market, any number of sellers
can trade at any time. Thus, as total demand increases, the loss in efficiency that arises from
the extra startup costs (compared to the optimal allocation) decreases which in turn explains the
generally increasing trend. In the simulations with market B, a similar trend can be observed,
with a lower efficiency when demand is lower than the minimum sellers’ capacity (210). As
in market A, there are more inefficient allocations that can arise when demand is low (and can
be satisfied by a single seller), which would decrease the average efficiency much more than
it would given a smaller number of inefficient allocations. Here, we use the same reasoning
as in market A to explain the jumps, which are larger in number given the larger number of
participants.
As well as being efficient, the simulation results in figure 4.7 show that, broadly, the sellers and
buyers do indeed equally share the market profits (the ratio of sellers’ profits to total market
profit is approximately equal to 0.5 in both cases). This fair division of profits arises from the
design of the clearing rule (see section 4.6.1). This is important because this profitability means
that the agents are incentivised to enter the market which means our distributed mechanism can
be viewed as being individually rational.
Having analysed two different markets (A and B) in detail, we now examine how the efficiency
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of our mechanism scales up over different markets (see figure 4.8). In order to do so, we find the
average efficiency of markets as the number of buyers and the number of sellers are respectively
varied from 214 to 20. We run the auctions over 500 iterations with sellers randomly allocated
their supply and buyers having a demand ranging from 1 upto the total supply divided by number
of buyers. As can be seen, the average efficiency of the mechanism is maintained as the size of
the market increases. The average efficiency ranges between 0.65 and 0.95 with no correlation
to the market size, which implies that it is unaffected by the size of the market. In short, this
means that the market scales.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented our work on the development of two complementary mech-
anisms for task allocation. We considered a scenario where production costs are characterised
by a cost function composed of a fixed cost, a constant marginal cost and a limited capacity and
where we were seeking the minimal total production cost that satisfies demand.
Specifically, in the first mechanism we extend the standard VCG mechanism to our problem do-
main in order to incentivise selfish agents to report truthfully about their types thereby enabling
the mechanism to find the efficient allocation. This required a novel penalty scheme to ensure
that the mechanism is strategyproof for agents misreporting both their cost and their capacities.
Individual rationality is conserved under this new mechanism and we show how this mechanism
14A minimum of two sellers and two buyers is required for a double auction.
Chapter 4 Mechanisms with Constrained Capacity Suppliers 86
is robust to uncertainties in the capacities of the agents. We then presented a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm, that solves the task allocation problem of the centre in pseudo-polynomial
time.
In the second mechanism, we extend the standard format of a CDA so as to develop a decen-
tralised mechanism for resource allocation in the same context. We find that this mechanism has
a fairly high inherent average efficiency (over 65% in the examples we study) by testing it with
a variant of the ZI strategy.
When taken together, we find that these mechanisms represent a trade-off in terms of efficiency
and the decentralisation of a mechanism (in the examples we consider, the loss in efficiency
can range from 0% to 50% depending on the demand and number of buyers and sellers in the
market). However, both mechanisms still ensure that the participants derive a profit by joining
the mechanism, thereby justifying their use with selfish agents.
In sum, in this chapter, we have designed two mechanisms for addressing requirement 2 in the
list detailed in chapter 1(namely the requirement for mechanisms that deal with constrained ca-
pacity). Furthermore, the distributed CDA mechanism addresses requirement 1 in that it is a
distributed allocation mechanism. This chapter concludes part I of this thesis. We have found
that whilst there are numerous advantages to implementing distributed allocation mechanisms
(see Chapter 1) there is usually an efficiency cost associated with distributed allocation mech-
anisms. Chapter 3 showed that in the case of rational agents, this efficiency is lower bounded
at 1 − 1e . In this chapter, we showed that the average efficiency of a mechanism based on the
CDA can drop to around 65% when agents within the system are employing a zero-intelligence
strategy. Thus, in the context of MSNs, it will be imperative to judge whether these distributed
mechanisms justify their efficiency cost. The next part of this thesis will now consider distrib-
uted information mechanisms. In these mechanisms, the agents do not form their valuation or
cost solely their privately observed type (as considered so far) but also on those of other agents
within the system.
Part II
Distributed Information Mechanisms
87
88
The previous part of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) considered issues associated with mechanisms
that enable distributed allocations. In this part of this thesis, we switch the focus to distributed
information which is another core challenge within distributed mechanisms (as depicted in fig-
ure II.1). Specifically, this challenge considers how to design mechanisms when the agents
determine their valuations of goods within a market from distributed pieces of information that
are privately known by other agents within the system.
 Distributed Mechanism
Employing Simultaneous
Auctions (Chapter 3)
Distributed
Allocation
(Part I)
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Design of
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Strategy Design
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FIGURE II.1: The challenges addressed and the design perspective of part II of the thesis.
Now, it could be argued that traditional auction mechanisms already aggregate distributed pieces
of information from different agents in order to determine the outcome of the mechanism. How-
ever, these mechanisms only deal with private signals, where an agent can formulate its valuation
of a good or service once it is aware of its own signal. This is, therefore, only a very limited
form of distributed information whereby only the centre requires these distributed pieces of in-
formation so as to determine the outcome of the mechanism (i.e. the allocation of resources
and transfers of money). A more general form of distributed information occurs when every
agent within the system is potentially reliant on the signals observed by other agents in order to
formulate their valuations of goods or services. In this case, the agents cannot determine their
valuations until they know the signals observed by the other agents. However, since the agents
are selfish, they would not share this information unless they have an incentive to do so. Given
this, this part of the thesis considers how to provide these incentives to the agents within the sys-
tem, whilst still preserving certain desirable system properties such as efficiency and individual
rationality.
In more detail, Chapter 5 reports on the design of an efficient and individually rational protocol
for allocating multiple items to buyers who have interdependent valuations. Here the distributed
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information occurs since the agents require the private observations of other agents in order
to formulate their interdependent valuation. We then consider in Chapter 6 a specific type of
interdependent valuation which arises out of the uncertainty that agents have concerning the
success rate of other agents within the system. In this case, the distributed information is of
the form of the reports an agent gathers from other agents within the system in order to form
perceptions about the success rates of agents within the system.
Chapter 5
Mechanisms for Interdependent
Valuations
This chapter is the first of two that concentrates on designing a centralised protocol for sce-
narios where the agents form their valuations from distributed information. Specifically, we
consider the case where agents form their valuations based on the private signals that they ob-
serve, as well as those observed by other agents within the system (which is the problem that
requirement 3 seeks to tackle). This particular case is termed an interdependent valuations en-
vironment and arises in our MSN scenario when sensors fuse different observations about the
same event. Specifically, we use an information-theoretic measure to derive this interdependent
valuation function. Now, as we later show in this chapter, the VCG mechanism does not con-
serve its desirable economic properties of being incentive compatible, efficient and individually
rational in this case. We therefore address requirement 3 by designing a new mechanism for
interdependent valuations that does exhibit these properties. Furthermore, we show that the new
mechanism does not add any additional computational burden over and above that of the VCG.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 introduces the research on
efficient protocols for interdependent valuations. We then explain how interdependent valuations
are relevant to the running MSN scenario in Section 5.2. This research is then put into the
context of general MAS settings in Section 5.3 where related work is discussed. In Section 5.4,
we demonstrate how values can be assigned to the measured data using information theoretic
principles. We then discuss certain assumptions that are critical for any interdependent valuation
mechanism to be efficient. Section 5.6 goes on to presents an efficient, incentive-compatible,
individually-rational mechanism when buyers wish to have only a single good. This mechanism
is then generalised for the case where buyers requires more than one item in Section 5.7. We
then prove the economic properties of the mechanism and discuss its computational properties
in Section 5.8. The main contributions of this Chapter are summarised in Section 5.9.
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5.1 Introduction
We have demonstrated in Chapter 4 how auction mechanisms are valuable for task and resource
allocation problems in MASs consisting of selfish agents. However, a key shortcoming of tra-
ditional mechanisms is that they are based on the assumption of private independent valuations
to achieve these desirable properties. Such private valuations arise when an agent forms its val-
uation of the goods or services based solely on its own observation or signal (e.g. the value of
a particular car to an agent depends solely on the agent’s own perception of the car’s use and is
not dependent on the valuations of other bidders). Thus the private observations of agent i are
usually encompassed by θi, the type of agent i (refer to chapter 2 for more details). However,
the more general case is that valuations are actually interdependent (e.g. if the agents’ valua-
tions were to consider not only the car’s use, but also its potential re-sale value, the valuation
would clearly be dependent on the valuations of other bidders). In this case, the bidders form
their perception of the value of an item based on the distributed information gathered by other
agents within the system. Now, as we show in section 5.7, the desirable properties of the VCG
mechanism no longer hold in this case and the auction is not guaranteed to be efficient when
agents have interdependent valuations. To rectify this, we develop a new mechanism that is.
In more detail, interdependent valuations occur most commonly within MASs when agents have
noisy or uncertain estimates of the true value of a good. For example, consider the case of agents
bidding for a service in some form of computational economy (as is found, with web services
or grid computing). In such cases, the value of a service to an agent is often dependent on the
time of response between submitting a request and receiving the desired service. However, in
many such cases, the dynamic and open nature of most of these systems means that each agent
is only likely to have limited previous experience of a given service and thus it will only have an
imprecise estimate of its expected response time. Now, if the agent knew the response time of
other agents that have used this service (e.g. by asking them about their previous experience or
by deducing it from their bidding behaviour), it would be able to form a more accurate estimate
of the future response time (by cross-correlating from a broader set of experiences). Hence each
agent’s valuation is dependent on the signals (in this case, the response time) observed by the
other agents bidding for the service and thus we again have interdependent valuations. Another
instance where interdependent valuations have been documented is in the FCC spectrum auc-
tions [Cramton, 1997] where it was found that bidders formed their valuations based around the
beliefs and actions of other bidders. In these auctions, each bidder wanted to infer from the
bidding actions of the other bidders how much they valued the spectrum licenses that were be-
ing offered. Thus, whilst each bidder had carried out independent research to gauge the market
profitability of these spectrum licenses (i.e. how much money can an agent potentially make by
using the license if it wins it), they wanted to use the information gained by the other bidders as
well.
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To overcome the independent valuation limitation, a number of researchers have developed effi-
cient auctions for interdependent valuation scenarios where a single item is allocated (see Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.6 for more details). However, in this work we are interested in the case of
multiple items being allocated (i.e where agents may be interested in combinations of items
such as a bundle of services). This extension also allows us to consider the important case of
combinatorial allocations. These allocations deal with items exhibiting complementarities and
substitutabilities and are known to be more efficient than multiple concurrent auctions of single
goods (as shown in chapter 3). Such allocations occur in many real world scenarios such as the
grid services and FCC spectrum auctions we mentioned earlier.
Now, as we discuss in Section 5.2, such distributed information also needs to be catered for
within MSNs when data fusion needs to be carried out. In order to address this problem, we
first formulate a function that characterises the value that an agent places on a particular piece of
data originating from other agents. We then develop, for the first time, a direct mechanism that
can allocate multiple items in an interdependent valuation scenario where each agent receives
a single-dimensional signal (for example, a time of response in the computational economy
or market profitability in the case of the FCC spectrum). We restrict our attention to single-
dimensional signals because in an interdependent valuation scenario it is not possible to develop
an efficient auction for multi-dimensional signals [Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001]1. Moreover, the
single-dimensionality of the signal is not overly restrictive because in many cases the necessary
information can be encompassed into a representative single-dimensional signal. In fact, we
demonstrate in section 5.2, that this is indeed the case for the MSN scenario we study. In
developing this mechanism and studying its application, we advance the state of the art in the
following ways:
1. We formulate a novel valuation function based around the information form of the Kalman
filter [Manyika and Durrant-Whyte, 1997] since this is the simplest and most elegant
way of fusing different measurements of the same observation. This function equates
the valuation to the expected gain in information when data from a number of sources is
fused.
2. We extend the standard VCG mechanism to deal with interdependent valuations in the
case of multiple goods in which agents receive a single-dimensional signal.
3. We prove the economic properties of our mechanism. In particular, we show that it is
incentive-compatible, individually rational and efficient.
4. We analyse the computational properties of our mechanism and show that it does not
impose any additional computational load on the agents compared to an independent val-
uation scenario. However, there is a corresponding increase in the centre’s computational
load.
1However Mezzetti [2003] shows that if we adopt a two-stage approach to the auction design, we can then
achieve efficiency and incentive-compatibility in certain cases.
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5.2 Interdependent Valuations within the MSN Scenario
We now discuss how sensors can have interdependent valuations within the running MSN sce-
nario that we consider (as highlighted in the red rectangles in figure 5.1). To this end, consider
multiple selfish sensors that are monitoring a particular area under the constraint of limited com-
munication bandwidth between the sensors. These sensors are interested in obtaining the data
gathered by other sensors and, as a result, are willing to pay for this data. Now, in contrast to
chapters 3 and 4, the sensors in this case cannot place a value on the data before the sensors
communicate their signals to the centre. Instead, they can only provide a function describing
how the signals from other sensors would affect their valuation. Such a case arises in our MSN
when sensors fuse uncertain information about target estimates in order to obtain a more pre-
cise measurement. Then, the knowledge about a particular measurement’s precision affects how
much value another agent places on it. However this knowledge is only known to the agent that
has carried out the measurement. This results in an interdependent valuation scenario where the
sensors can only provide a function stating how much value they will place on the data given the
signals from the other sensors.
In section 5.4, we shall derive an information-theoretic valuation function which prescribes
the value that sensors should place on a piece of data when the sensors wish to fuse target
information. In so doing, we also generalise the target-detection scenario to the case where the
different sensors have different regions of interest (as opposed to the single region of interest
considered so far).
5.3 Related Work
The derivation of valuation functions for MSNs has recently become an active area of interest
since it enables a host of cooperative and competitive task allocation mechanism to be employed
[Chu et al., 2002; Zhao et al., 2002; Lesser et al., 2003; Iyengar and Brooks, 2005]. On one
hand, in [Lesser et al., 2003], the valuation functions do not have an information-theoretic basis.
Rather they are specified by the system designer and take into account subjective measures such
as how many readings of a target is enough and what is the most important target. On the other
hand, [Chu et al., 2002; Zhao et al., 2002] provide guidelines for adopting information-theoretic
valuation functions for collaborative target-detection and tracking. Here we adopt this latter
approach and use one of these measures, namely the entropy measure, and develop it for the
target-detection scenario we consider. Finally, in [Iyengar and Brooks, 2005], it is assumed that
there is some information measure which guides the decision-making in the sensors. However,
in contrast to our work there are no detail about which information measure should actually be
used.
Auctions for interdependent valuations have also been considered by a number of researchers
[Krishna, 2002; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001]. In particular, there
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FIGURE 5.1: Figure of the MSN scenario highlighting the interdependent valuation of buyers
considered within this chapter
are currently two main approaches to finding an efficient mechanism for the allocation of items
with interdependent valuations. Krishna considers a direct mechanism for efficient allocations
for multi-unit single items with single-dimensional signals. In this case, agents submit their
interdependent valuation functions, as well as their signals, to a central auctioneer who then
decides on the efficient allocation. The payment scheme was then devised so that the agents are
incentivised to reveal their signals truthfully. Dasgupta and Maskin have also developed an effi-
cient mechanism for the case of two non-identical items, again with single-dimensional signals.
In their case, agents make contingent bids rather than submitting their valuation functions and
observed signals (i.e. agent 1 submits a range of bids that describes its bid when agent 2 bids a
particular value and vice versa). Thus the bidding is more complex than in Krishna’s mechanism
because the agents have to submit bids based on what other agents might bid, rather than just
revealing their valuation function and signals. This bidding becomes even more complex in the
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FIGURE 5.2: Figure showing a MSN detecting a target which falls in the region of interest of
two sensors and region of observation of three sensors.
indirect mechanism they have developed for the case where multiple items need to be allocated.
Given this, in this chapter, we adopt the approach by Krishna, since the bidding is more straight-
forward for the agents. Specifically, we develop a direct mechanism in order to deal with the
allocation of multiple items where each agent receives a single-dimensional signal. A naı¨ve
extension of the VCG mechanism is known not to work in this case [Krishna, 2002] and given
this we show how to change the payment scheme in order to achieve the desirable economic
properties of the VCG. We should note here that we do not concern ourselves with the problem
of multi-dimensionality of these signals since it is known that allowing for multi-dimensionality
of signals leads to inefficient allocations in direct mechanisms [Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001].
If the agents can observe the outcome of their reports, then an efficient allocation with multi-
dimensional types is possible [Mezzetti, 2003]. However, we believe that this is impractical
in many cases because an agent might not be able to observe the outcome from a report (see
[Mezzetti, 2003] for an example). Thus, in this chapter we consider direct mechanism where the
agents can report on their types only once.
5.4 An Information-Theoretic Valuation Function
We now develop our valuation function based on the information form of the Kalman filter
[Manyika and Durrant-Whyte, 1997]. To this end, we demonstrate how the distributed infor-
mation filter can be used to fuse different pieces of information together. We then show how
sensors in our scenario (depicted in greater detail in figure 5.2) can value the data held by other
sensors according to the information gain they receive when obtaining the data.
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To recap, the Kalman filter is an efficient recursive filter that estimates the state of a dynamic
system from a series of incomplete and noisy measurements [Kalman, 1960]. The observations
within a Kalman filter are of the form:
z(t) = H(t)y(t) + n(t)
where y(t) is the state of the system at time t, H(t) is the linear observation model and n(t) is a
zero mean random variable drawn from a normal distribution with variance R. The covariance
update component (which measures how the uncertainty in the measurement varies as more data
is collected), P−1(t | t), of the information form of the Kalman filter for N observations is:
P−1(t | t) = P−1(t | t− 1) +
N∑
j=1
HT (j)R−1(j)H(j)
The summation in the above expression represents the decrease in covariance and thus the gain
in information at time t when all the N observations are fused. In the case of our problem the
value of receiving data from another agent can thus be represented by the gain in information
this observation engenders.
In order to achieve an efficient allocation, this gain in information must be calculated from
the measure of the data accuracy prior to actually fusing the data. Thus, we can represent the
measure of accuracy of a data point, θj (which becomes an agent’s type), as its covariance which
is calculated from the covariance of its observation, R(j):
θj = H
T (j)R−1(j)H(j) (5.1)
Thus the gain in information of agent i when all relevant data is transmitted to it and fused, can
be expressed as a sum of this measure of accuracy provided by each of the other agents:
vi(θ) = θi +
∑
j∈−i
θj (5.2)
where −i = I \ i.
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 thus cast our valuation function in the Kalman filter form. However, we
need to modify this so as to incorporate the characteristics of our scenario. In particular, in our
scenario each of the sensors has a region of observation which is the area it can sense and a
region of interest which is the area it wishes to gather information about (as shown in figure
5.2). As a result, all observations may not fall in an agent’s region of observation (as depicted in
figure 5.2). Furthermore, an agent may not be able to receive all the data due to the bandwidth
constraints of the communication network. Defining αij as the probability that the data observed
by agent j is relevant to agent i and a vector K describing the allocation of the flow of data in
the network, then the expected valuation is:
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vi(θ,K) = θi +
∑
j∈−i
fijαijθj (5.3)
By slight abuse of notation, we shall hereafter refer to the expected valuation vi(.) as vi(.). From
the valuation function, we can observe that the valuation of an agent i depends on θj , which are
signals measured by other agents. This firmly puts us in the realm of interdependent valuations.
We next describe the mechanism developed by Krishna for such valuations and single items,
before detailing our mechanism for the multiple good scenario. However, before presenting the
interdependent mechanisms, we shall discuss the assumptions that are critical for the auctions
to be efficient.
5.5 Assumptions in Mechanisms with Interdependent Valuations
In this section, we discuss the assumptions that are required so that the mechanisms developed
for interdependent valuations are efficient. In fact, it has been shown that when these assump-
tions are violated, then no efficient direct mechanism can be developed [Krishna, 2002; Jehiel
and Moldovanu, 2001]. We shall also demonstrate how these assumptions are not overly re-
strictive for our sensor network scenario and are naturally satisfied by the MSN scenario we
discuss.
Recapitulating, in this scenario, each agent i, i ∈ I, observes a signal θi ∈ Θi and forms its
valuation vi(.) based on the vector of signals observed by all agents (i.e. θ) and the particular
allocation K ∈ K being implemented. Thus, vi : Θ × K → ℜ+. The mechanism, (M, r),
then consists of an allocation rule M : Θ→ K that chooses the allocations and a payment rule
r : Θ→ ℜ|I|+ that determines the payments ri from each agent, both being based on the reports
of the signal values θ. Finally, we shall denote allocations induced by the true report of θi (all
other agents −i being truthful) as K∗0 . As θi is decreased, it is quite natural to expect that the
allocation which is deemed efficient will change because the valuations of each allocation by
the agents would also change. These allocations will be denoted by Kil with l being the index
of each successive induced allocation as θi is decreased. Mirroring this, as θi is increased, the
successive efficient allocations are denoted by Ki−l.
Assumption 5.1. ∂vi∂θi > 0.
This implies that higher values of the signal lead to higher valuations for the agent. This
restricts the signal of the agent to vary in one direction only, thereby making it impossible
for an agent to have the same valuation of a particular allocation for two different signal
values. For example, in the case of a computational economy, this would imply that the
valuation always increases with rapidity of service (which is the measured signal θi). In the
case of the multi-sensor network scenario, this condition is automatically satisfied since new
data cannot decrease information.
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Assumption 5.2. ∂vi∂θi >
∂vj
∂θi
∀i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
This implies that an agent’s signal affects its own valuation more than it affects the valu-
ation of any other agent. This assumption is the single-crossing condition analogue in the
interdependent scenario [Krishna, 2002; Mirrlees, 1971]. Without this condition, no efficient
mechanism can exist. In the case of a computational economy, this implies that the agent
puts more credence on the rapidity of service it measured, as opposed to the one observed
by other agents. In our scenario, this assumption implies that the region of observation of
any sensor is not a subset of the region of observation of any other sensor (i.e. no agent is
redundant in this system).
Assumption 5.3. ∂vi∂θi (.,K
i
p) ≥ ∂vi∂θi (.,Kiq) if p < q
This implies that if a higher value of θi induces an allocation Kip, then agent i’s value changes
more rapidly in this new allocation than in the previous one Kiq. This implies that on receiv-
ing a higher θi, the centre allocates a set of goods to i in the new allocation Kip where i’s
valuation changes more rapidly, than in the previous set Kip+1. To better explain this as-
sumption, consider a situation where there are two services to be allocated and an agent has
a complementary valuation of them. Suppose that the agent is allocated a particular service
when θi = α. Now, if θi is increased, there will come a point θi = β > α when it will be
efficient to allocate both services to the agent (since from assumption 5.2, its valuations will
increase more rapidly than that of other agents). This assumption then implies that the rate of
change of the valuation with respect to θi is greater in this new allocation than in the previous
one. Consider, for example, two agents bidding for two pieces of data in our MSN scenario.
Then suppose that as θi is increased, it first becomes more efficient to allocate one piece of
data (denote this allocation as Ki−1) and then both pieces of data to agent i (denote this al-
location as Ki−2). Then this assumption implies that ∂vi∂θi (θi, θ−i,Ki−2) ≥
∂vi
∂θi
(θi, θ−i,K
i
−1)
(i.e. agent i’s valuation increases more rapidly with θi when it is allocated both pieces of
data rather than only one).
In the next section, we present the mechanism developed by Krishna for efficient allocation in
single good scenarios.
5.6 A Mechanism for Single Goods
Having discussed the assumptions that are required for an efficient mechanism, we now pro-
vide an exposition of an efficient, individually rational and incentive-compatible mechanism
developed in [Krishna, 2002]. Though this mechanism is limited to single good allocations, it
provides an introduction to the design of efficient interdependent mechanisms.
In more detail the mechanism proceeds as follows:
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1. Each agent i transmits to the centre its valuation function vi(θ)2.
2. Each agent i also transmits its observed signal θ̂i.
3. The centre then allocates the item to the buyer that has the highest value it3:
K∗i =
1 ifvi(θ̂) > maxj 6=ivj(θ̂)0 ifvi(θ̂) < maxj 6=ivj(θ̂)
4. The centre also calculates the payment ri made by agent i if it wins the allocation (i.e.
K∗i = 1) as:
ri = vi(zi(θ̂−i), x−i)
where
zi(θ−i) = inf {yi : vi(yi,θ−i) ≥ maxj 6=ivj(yi,θ−i)}
The buyers, j (j ∈ I \ i), for whom Kj = 0, pay nothing (i.e. rj = 0)
Thus, the signal zi(θ−i) is the smallest value of θi that i could report and still receive the
item, given the reports of the other agents θ̂−i. In more detail, figure 5.3 demonstrates how the
payment is calculated when allocating a good when there are two agents i and j wishing to have
that good. The value of θi which has been observed by i implies that it should be awarded the
object. The payment is calculated at the point in Θi when vi > vj , keeping θ−i constant.
Krishna proves this mechanism to be incentive-compatible, individually-rational and efficient in
an ex-post Nash equilibrium. Having thus detailed the mechanism for the single-good scenario,
we now develop our mechanism for multiple goods that builds upon it.
5.7 A Mechanism for Multiple Goods
In this section, we extend Krishna’s approach in order to develop a direct mechanism that is
incentive-compatible, efficient and individually-rational for the case of multiple goods with
single-dimensional signals.
Specifically, the mechanism we have developed proceeds as follows:
1. The centre announces the set of items M that are to be auctioned off.
2. Each agent i transmits to the centre its valuation function vi(K,θ) for all the possible
allocations K ∈ K.
2We refer to the valuation as vi(θ) meaning vi(K, θ) = vi(θ) if Ki = 1 and is 0 otherwise.
3Ties are decided by a random function assigning equal probability of winning to each of the agents in the tie.
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FIGURE 5.3: Figure demonstrating how payments are calculated in Krishna’s mechanism for
single good and interdependent valuations.
3. Each agent i also transmits its observed signal θ̂i. 4
4. The centre then computes the optimal allocation K∗0 which is calculated as:
K∗0 = argmax
K∈K
(∑
i∈I
vi(K, θ̂)
)
(5.4)
5. The centre also calculates the payment ri made by each agent i. To do this, the centre first
finds the m next best allocations as the reported signal θ̂i is decreased, until the presence
of i makes no difference to the allocations. That is, find allocations Ki1 . . .Kim and the
signal values zli such that:
zli = inf
{
yi :
∑
i∈I
vi(K
i
l , yi,θ−i) =
∑
i∈I
vi(K
i
l+1, yi,θ−i)
}
(5.5)
(where each allocation Kil is different) until:
zmi = inf
{
yi :
∑
i∈I
vi(K
i
m−1, yi,θ−i) =
∑
i∈I
vi(K
i
m, yi,θ−i)
}
(5.6)
4Of course, bθi may not be equal to θi. However, we prove in section 5.8 that it is a best strategy for the agent to
set bθi = θi.
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where the allocation Kim is the optimal allocation when i does not exist:
Kim = argmax
K∈K
∑
j∈−i
vj(K,θ)
Then the transfer 5 to buyer i is:
ri =
m−1∑
l=0
[∑
j∈−i
vj(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)−
∑
j∈−i
vj(K
i
l+1, z
l
i,θ−i)
]
(5.7)
The above scheme rests upon making an agent derive a utility equal to the marginal contribution
that its presence makes to the whole system of agents (which is the same intuition as used in
the VCG). Thus the additional part of this mechanism is to take into account the effect that an
agent’s signal θi has on the overall utility of the system.
This mechanism is general and is shown (below) to reduce to the well-known multiple-good
private value model if we take the case of independent valuations (i.e when (vi(θ, .) = vi(θi, .)).
Then the optimal allocation (from equation 5.4) is:
K∗0 = argmax
K∈K
(∑
i∈I
vi(K, θ̂i)
)
To calculate the payment scheme, we first note that with independent valuations θi only affects
vi(.). Thus repeatedly decreasing θi, until the stopping condition on equation 5.6, does not
change the valuation of the other agents −i on the different allocations. This then implies that
in the payment (as computed by equation 5.7) all the terms cancel each other, except for the first
and last, leading to a payment of:
ri =
∑
j∈I\i
vj(K
∗
0 , θ̂j)−
∑
j∈I\i
vj(K
i
m, θ̂j) (5.8)
This is exactly the payment scheme for the multiple-good private values model which we dis-
cussed in section 2.4.1. Thus, this shows that the classical VCG mechanism is an instance of
the generalised mechanism developed here. Furthermore, notice that assumption 5.2 is automat-
ically satisfied in this independent valuation scenario, since ∂vj∂θi = 0 in such a scenario. Also,
since an increase in θi would only increase vi(., θi), any increase in θi that induces a new al-
location would imply that the rate of change of vi(., θi) with respect to θi is higher in the new
allocation than in the previous one. Thus, assumption 5.3 is also automatically satisfied in the
independent valuation scenario.
5If the transfer is negative, it implies that buyer i pays to the centre.
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TABLE 5.1: Valuations of the players with each allocation
Allocation v1(K,θ) v2(K,θ) vI(K,θ)
(AB,∅) 4θ1 + 2x2 0 4θ1 + 2θ2
(A,B) 2θ1 + θ2 θ1 + 2θ2 3θ1 + 3θ2
(B,A) θ1 + θ2 0.5θ1 + 2θ2 1.5θ1 + 3θ2
(∅, AB) 0 θ1 + 4θ2 θ1 + 4θ2
5.7.1 Example of Interdependent Valuations
In order to further explain how the mechanism operates to achieve efficiency and incentive-
compatibility we present an example that demonstrates how it computes the efficient allocation
and the payments. We show why a straightforward implementation of the VCG mechanism
would fail in this case. We will also consider the assumptions that we made in section 5.7 and
show how the mechanism fails when these do not hold.
We consider a very simple case, namely that with two agents, 1 and 2, bidding for two different
spectrum licenses A and B. The set of possible allocations consists of four members, which
are K = {(AB,∅), (A,B), (B,A), (∅, AB)}. In this case, each agent perceives a particular
signal θi that determines the market profitability of the spectrum licenses. Table 5.1 shows the
valuations of players 1 and 2 for each allocation, as well as the sum of their valuations.
We shall now consider how agent 1 views the mechanism as it reports its signal θ1. The ex-
planation for agent 2 is the same and is therefore omitted. Figure 5.4 shows how the value of
each allocation varies for agents 1, 2 and the set of agents I, as agent 1’s reported signal θ1 is
increased. We denote agent 1 by i and agent 2 by −i to demonstrate how this works in cases of
more than two agents. Suppose that agent 1 has observed θ1 = 1.5 and agent 2 has observed
a value of θ2 = 2. Then from the figure, we see that the efficient allocation in this case is
K∗0 = (A,B) (the efficient allocation is the one that maximises the value of I). Furthermore,
the values of θi at which it becomes more efficient to implement allocations Ki1 = (∅, AB) and
Ki−1 = (AB,∅) are z
0
i = 1 and z
−1
i = 2 respectively (shown in figure 5.4).
Hence we can calculate the overall utility that agent 1 derives from reporting truthfully, which
from equation 5.7, is vi(K∗0 ,θ) + v−i(K∗0 , z0i θ−i) − v−i(Ki1, z0i θ−i) = 5 + 5 − 9 = 1. Now,
any report in the range 1 ≤ θi ≤ 2 will induce the same allocation and transfer and thus agent
1 has no incentive to report θi in this range different from the truthful value. If agent 1 reports
θi > 2, it will then derive a utility of vi(Ki−1,θ) + v−i(Ki−1, z−1i θ−i) − v−i(K∗0 , z−1i θ−i) +
v−i(K
∗
0 , z
0
i θ−i)− v−i(Ki1, z0i θ−i) = 10+ 0− 6+ 5− 9 = 0, which is less than what it would
derive from truthful reporting. Thus agent 1 would not over-report its observed value. The
reason why this occurs is because, as shown in figure 5.4, vi(Ki−1,θ)−vi(K∗0 ,θ) is always less
than v−i(K∗0 , z
−1
i θ−i)− v−i(Ki1, z−1i θ−i) when the true value of θi is in the range 1 ≤ θi ≤ 2.
If, on the other hand, the agent reports θi < 1, it would then derive a utility of vi(Ki1,θ) = 0
which is again less than what it would derive from truthful reporting. We have thus demonstrated
how an agent finds it in its best interest to report truthfully (see section 5.8 for a more general
proof).
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FIGURE 5.4: Valuations of 1, 2 and I for each bundle as θ1 is increased
Now consider applying a traditional VCG mechanism (as presented in section 2.4.1) to the above
example. We shall assume that if ever an agent is not present in the system, then its related
observation is zero. Then, the efficient allocation when θ = (1.5, 2) is again K∗0 = (A,B).
However the payments from each agent in this case will differ. In the case of truthful reporting,
agent 1 will pay (from equation 2.8) maxK∈K v−i(K, (θ1 = 0, θ2)) − v−i(K∗0 ,θ) which is
8 − 5.5 = 2.5, thereby deriving a utility of 5 − 2.5 = 2.5. However, the agent can lie and
report, for instance θ1 = 1.8 and obtain a utility of 5 − (8 − 5.8) = 2.8. The incentive to lie
is present because the traditional VCG does not take into consideration the effect that agent i’s
signal has on the valuation of other agents. Of course, in a private valuation scenario, this effect
is by definition non-existent and thus the VCG exhibits its desirable properties in such scenarios.
However, these properties are no longer conserved in an interdependent valuation scenario, as
presented here.
The mechanism is guaranteed to work in the above example because the valuations satisfy the
assumptions presented in section 5.7. We will now show how this mechanism would fail if ever
any one of these assumptions does not hold.
In order to show what happens when assumption 5.1 fails, consider only the single good A.
Suppose that agent 1 has a valuation of (θ1 − 2)2 + θ2 for A and agent 2 still has the same
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valuation of 0.5θ1 + 2θ2. Then the auctioneer in this case has to decide only between two
allocations, namely K = {(A,∅), (∅, A)}. With these valuations, it is efficient to allocate A
to agent 2 when 2.25 − √[(2.25)2 − (4 − θ2)] ≤ θ1 ≤ 2.25 + √[(2.25)2 − (4 − θ2)]. If
θ1 ≤ 2.25−√
[
(2.25)2− (4−θ2)
]
agent 1 obtains the good and pays 2θ2 according to equation
5.7. If θ1 ≥ 2.25 −√
[
(2.25)2 − (4− θ2)
]
, then agent 1 again obtains A, but this time, it pays
6 (again using equation 5.7). Thus, it is always in the interest of agent 1 to state that its signal is
in the lower range if its signal happens to occur in either of these ranges. Although assumption
5.1 may seem to be required only for our mechanism to work, this is not so, as it is required for
any efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism [Mirrlees, 1971].
Now consider that the valuations of the good A are such that v1((A,∅),θ) = 2θ1 + θ2 and
v2((∅, A),θ) = 3θ1 + θ2 − 6 (thus assumption 5.2 is not satisfied). In this case, it is efficient
to allocate A to agent 1 when θ1 < 6 and to agent 2 otherwise. However, it is not possible to
achieve an efficient mechanism in this case, since agent 1 will always state θ1 < 6 no matter what
the real value of θ1 is. In the case of our mechanism, agent 1 pays θ2−6 if it allocated the good.
Since v1((A,∅),θ) is always higher than this, agent 1 will thus lie and always state a value of
θ1 < 6. This problem can again be shown to extend to be symptomatic of any mechanism rather
than our mechanism [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000]. Notice that with the original valuations in
table 5.7.1, such a situation would not arise.
We next consider valuations that break assumption 5.3. Here the valuations of agents 1 and 2 for
the allocation K = (AB,∅) are v′1((AB,∅),θ) = 0.5θ1 + 2θ2 and v′2((AB,∅),θ) = 3.5θ1
as shown in figure 5.56. Since vI remains the same for all the allocations, then z−1i is still the
same as shown in figure 5.5. Using these modified valuations, agent 1 derives a higher utility
of 1.75 (using equation 5.7 and the valuation function) if it reports θi > 2 thereby leading
to the mechanism no longer being incentive-compatible. The reason this occurs is because if
assumption 5.3 is broken we then have that vi(Ki−1,θ) − vi(K∗0 ,θ) > v−i(Ki−1, z−1i θ−i) −
v−i(K
∗
0 , z
−1
i θ−i) as shown in figure 5.5. As a result, the agent has an incentive to lie and quote
a higher value than z−1i . Notice that this did not occur with the original valuations. Again this
assumption is required in order to find an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism and is thus
not idiosyncratic to our mechanism [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000].
Having thus illustrated the working of our mechanism and the necessity of the assumptions via
the use of an example, we now turn to formally proving the properties of our mechanism.
5.8 Properties of the Mechanism
We next prove the properties of our mechanism. We first consider the economic properties;
namely that it is incentive-compatible, efficient and strategy proof, whilst intuitively explaining
6Of course, in practice, agent 2 having a valuation for nothing is highly unlikely to occur. However, we need to
use this particular valuation in this case due to the simplicity of our example in order to demonstrate what happens
when one of the assumptions fails.
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FIGURE 5.5: Modified valuations of 1, 2 and I for allocations (AB,∅) and (A,B) as θ1 is
increased
why the mechanism has the aforementioned properties. We then consider the computational
properties, showing that the mechanism does not impose any added computational burden on
the agents’ bidding process (compared to what it would already face in an independent value
scenario). However, it does increase the amount of computation required in the calculation of
the payment, a computational load borne by the centre.
5.8.1 Economic Properties
Proposition 5.1. The mechanism is incentive-compatible in ex-post Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let v−i(.) =
∑
j∈−i(vj(.)) and vI(.) =
∑
i∈I(vi(.)). Suppose now that all players
except i report their signals truthfully (i.e. θ̂−i = θ−i). Let the optimal allocation when i
reports truthfully be K∗0 . We can then analyse the utility ui(.) that agent i derives by reporting a
certain θ̂i. There are two cases that should be analysed, namely when θ̂i < θi and θ̂i > θi. The
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utility of an agent on reporting θ̂i = θi is:
ui(K
∗
0 ,θ) = vi(K
∗
0 ,θ) +
m−1∑
l=0
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− v−i(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
(5.9)
Now suppose an agent reports θ̂i 6= θi but this does not change the optimal allocation K∗0
implemented. Then, ui(K∗0 ,θ) = ui(K∗0 , θ̂i,θ−i). This is because the agent will derive the
same value vi(K∗0 ,θ) if the allocation does not change and the payment will be the same as the
signals z0i . . . zmi computed by the centre. Now consider the case that an agent reports θ̂i < θi
such that this changes the allocation. Then some other optimal allocation, which is necessarily
one of the allocations Ki1, . . . ,Kim, is implemented. Denoting the resulting allocation when
θ̂i < θi as K
i
n (i.e. zni < θ̂i ≤ zn−1i ), the utility that the agent gets from this new allocation is
then:
ui(K
i
n,θ) = vi(K
i
n,θ) +
m−1∑
l=n
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− v−i(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
(5.10)
The difference, Dn = ui(Ki0,θ)−ui(Kin,θ) between truthful reporting and under reporting (as
given by equations 5.9 and 5.10 respectively) is:
Dn = vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)− vi(Kin,θ) +
n−1∑
l=0
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− v−i(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
= vi(K
∗
0 ,θ) + v−i(K
∗
0 , z
0
i ,θ−i)− v−i(Kin, zni ,θ−i)− vi(Kin,θ)
+
n∑
l=1
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− v−i(Kil , zl+1i ,θ−i)
)
Since ∂v−i(K
i
l
,θ)
∂θi
≥ 0, we thus have:
Dn > vi(K
∗
0 ,θ) + v−i(K
∗
0 , z
0
i ,θ−i)− v−i(Kin, zni ,θ−i)− vi(Kin,θ)
Now, we can recast the above as:
Dn > vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)−vi(K∗0 , z0i ,θ−i)−vi(Kin,θ)+vi(Kin, zni ,θ−i)+vI(K∗0 , z0i ,θ−i)−vI(Kin, zni ,θ−i)
However, by construction we know that vI(K∗0 , z0i ,θ−i) > vI(Kin, zni ,θ−i) and from assump-
tion 5.3 we also know that vi(K∗0 ,θ) − vi(K∗0 , z0i ,θ−i) > vi(Kin,θ) − vi(Kin, zni ,θ−i). We
thus have Dn ≥ 0.
On the other hand, if an agent reports θ̂i > θi and this induces an allocation Ki−n, then the utility
it derives is:
ui(K
i
−n,θ, ) = vi(K
i
−n,θ, ) +
m−1∑
l=−n
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i, )− v−i(Kil+1, zli,θ−i, )
)
(5.11)
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The difference, D−n = ui(K∗0 ,θ)−ui(Ki−n,θ) between truthful reporting and under reporting
(as given by equations 5.9 and 5.10 respectively) is:
D−n = vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)− vi(Ki−n,θ)−
−1∑
l=−n
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− v−i(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
= vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)− vi(Ki−n,θ)−
−1∑
l=−n
(
vI(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vI(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
+
−1∑
l=−n
(
vi(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vi(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
Thus:
D−n = vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)− vi(Ki−n,θ) +
−1∑
l=−n
(
vi(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vi(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
= vi(K
i
−n, z
−n
i θ−i)− vi(Ki−n,θ)− vi(K∗0 , z−1i θ−i) + vi(K∗0 ,θ)
−
−1∑
l=−n+1
(
vi(K
i
l , z
l−1
i ,θ−i)− vi(Kil , zli,θ−i)
)
Using assumption 5.3 implies that D−n ≥ 0. We thus see that i derives highest utility when
reporting θ̂i = θi.
Proposition 5.2. The mechanism is efficient.
This implies that the centre finds the outcome such that:
K∗ = argmax
K
∑
i∈I
vi(K,θ) (5.12)
Note that this is different from equation 2.10 in that in this case, we allow the valuations of the
agents to depend on the vector of all types θ, as opposed to only the type observed privately by
an agent θi.
Proof. The above is a result of the incentive-compatibility of the mechanism. Since the goal of
the centre is to achieve efficiency, then given truthful reports, the centre will achieve efficiency.
Proposition 5.3. The mechanism is individually rational (as defined in chapter 2).
We begin by assuming that the utility an agent derives from not joining the mechanism is 0.
Then, we need to prove that the utility an agent derives in the mechanism is always ≥ 0.
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Proof. Given that the agents are incentivized to report truthfully, an agent i derives utility:
ui(K
∗
0 ,θ) = vi(K
∗
0 ,θ) +
m−1∑
l=0
(
v−i(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− v−i(Kil+1, zli,θ−i
)
= vi(K
∗
0 ,θ) +
m−1∑
l=0
(
vI(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vI(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
−
m−1∑
l=0
(
vi(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vi(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
(5.13)
Since vI(Kil , zli,θ−i) = vI(Kil+1, zli,θ−i) (from equation 5.5):
ui(K
∗
0 ,θ) = vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)−
m−1∑
l=0
(
vi(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vi(Kil+1, zli,θ−i)
)
= vi(K
∗
0 ,θ)− vi(K∗0 , z0i ,θ−i) + vi(Kim, zmi ,θ−i)
+
m−1∑
l=1
(
vi(K
i
l , z
l
i,θ−i)− vi(Kil , zl+1i ,θ−i)
) (5.14)
From equation 5.6, vi(Kim, zmi ,θ−i) = 0. Now, since
∂vi(K,θ)
∂θi
≥ 0, ui(K∗0 ,θ) > 0.
5.8.2 Computational Properties
In order for a mechanism to be of use in real world scenarios, we must not only consider its
economic properties, but also its computational porperty. An important distinction which was
pointed out in chapter 1 is to differentiate between the computational load that is imposed on
the agents within the auction and that imposed on the auctioneer or centre. We will analyse
the computational properties of the mechanism as opposed to that faced by agents in a VCG
mechanism. In so doing, we aim to quantify the computational cost that the added richness of
this mechanism (namely the ability to express interdependent valuation) imposes.
Outcome Determination. In our mechanism, the centre will need to solve equation 5.4 as op-
posed to 2.8 in the VCG mechanism in order to determine the efficient allocation. In
both cases the computation involves solving the combinatorial allocation problem which
is a NP-hard combinatorial optimisation [Rothkopf et al., 1998]. In fact, the size of the set
over which the optimisation is carried out is the same in both cases since this is determined
by the number of items |M |. Thus our mechanism imposes no additional computational
load in terms of the centre calculating the allocation.
However, in terms of calculating the payments to the agents, our mechanism does im-
pose a much larger computational load. In the case of the VCG mechanism, calculating
the payment involves performing the winner determination problem |I| times over the
reduced set of agents I \ i (see equation 2.8). However in our case, the centre needs to
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successively reduce the value of the report from each agent (and calculate the optimal
allocation at each stage) until it reaches an allocation which is the optimal one for the
reduced set of agents I \ i (see equation 5.7). In the worst case scenario, we have to
traverse through all possible allocations (except the efficient one) when calculating the
different zli for each agent i ∈ I. For m goods in a combinatorial auction, this requires
2m−1 calculations and is thus exponential in complexity. However, typically the number
of allocations that need to be traversed (i.e the Kil ) will be less than 2m and there is some
redundancy between the calculation of the Kil in between the agents in I. We will exploit
this redundancy in future work so as to reduce the computational load on the centre.
Preference Formulation. In the case of a direct mechanism such as the VCG or our mech-
anism, the agents do not have additional computational load in formulating their prefer-
ences over all possible outcomes. This is because the agents transmit their observed signal
θi to the centre and thus do not actually compute vi(K,θ) over all K ∈ K. Rather, it is
the centre which performs this calculation for each agent when solving the winner deter-
mination problem. Thus, our mechanism in this case does not add any computational load
on the agents.
Strategy Selection. In the VCG mechanism the agent knows a priori that it has a dominant
strategy, and thus this computational problem does not arise. In our case, an agent has an
ex-post Nash strategy. Thus if all the agents are behaving rationally, there is no computa-
tional load on the agent in this particular case. However, if it becomes common knowledge
that some agent is not playing its best-response strategy (i.e. some agent is not rational)
then the agents will have to search through their space of strategies again to find their
best-response.
Thus, we can observe that there is no additional computational load on the agents when com-
pared to a standard VCG mechanism and thus we can use the computationally efficient bidding
languages developed for VCG mechanisms [Parkes, 2001; Nisan, 2000]. This is important since
it is conceivable that while the centre in a multi-sensor network may have enough computa-
tional power, this is not necessarily so for the individual sensors that will typically be much
more limited.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have first developed a utility function for sensors in our MSN scenario based
on the information form of the Kalman filter. Since these utility function exhibit interdepen-
dence, we could not use standard resource allocation mechanisms. We thus developed a generic
mechanism for interdependent valuations which significantly extends the standard VCG mech-
anism and proved that the ensuing mechanism has the ideal economic properties of being effi-
cient, incentive compatible and individually rational. Our mechanism is general and reduces to
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the VCG mechanism whenever there are independent valuations (as seen in section 5.7). Thus,
we can visualise our mechanism being used even in MAS where the designer is unsure whether
the valuations are interdependent or not. Finally, we analysed the computational complexity
of implementing the mechanism and compared it to the complexity of implementing its closest
equivalent (in the private value case), namely the VCG mechanism.
Whilst we have presented our mechanism in terms of resource allocation, it can be easily con-
verted into a task allocation scenario. In such a case, agents will first submit cost functions
instead of valuation functions. Then, we need to perform a minimisation instead of a maximisa-
tion in equations 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 and take supremums instead of infimums in equations 5.5 and
5.6. With these changes, the mechanism still conserves both its computational and economic
properties in the task allocation scenario.
In sum, this chapter has considered an important class of auctions in which the bidders have
interdependent valuations (based on a single dimensional signal measured by each bidder) and
bid for multiple goods. In so doing, requirement 3 from Chapter 1 (namely the requirement
for mechanisms that deal with distributed information) has been addressed. In the next chapter,
we shall consider a particular type of distributed information that arises when agents depend on
other agents’ reports in order to gauge the success rate of task providers.
Chapter 6
Mechanisms with Uncertainty in Task
Completion
In this chapter, we incorporate the uncertainty that an agent may face in completing its assigned
task into the design of the task allocation mechanism (which is the problem that requirement
4 seeks to address). Such uncertainty was briefly discussed in Chapter 4, when an agent was
only aware of the probability distribution over its capacity. However, this chapter goes further
in exploring uncertainties that can occur when an agent’s success is dependent upon the task to
which it is assigned. In more detail, for each set of tasks, task performers have an associated
Probability of Success (POS) which determines the probability that it successfully completes
the task. Now, the agents may have differing views on how successful a particular agent is in
offering a certain task. This differing view is termed the trust that an agent has on another agent.
Furthermore, agents communicate between themselves their perceptions of the POS of the tasks
offered by other agents. This allows an agent to form its own perception about the POS of other
agents from its own experience, as well as from reports from other agents. Hence, we have
a distributed information environment since the information required to formulate an agent’s
expected valuation (what it expects to obtain before the task is attempted) is distributed amongst
potentially many agents. Hence, this chapter also addresses requirement 1 which is to develop
mechanisms that deal with distributed information.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 introduces the research on
uncertainty in task completion and explains its importance in general MAS settings. We then put
this research into the context of the running MSN scenario in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses
related work in the areas of trust and mechanism design. In Section 6.4, we explain the general
task allocation problem that we seek to tackle. Section 6.5 then explain the generic properties
that such a trust model should incorporate so as to lead to efficient allocations in our setting. We
also demonstrate via an example why the VCG mechanism fails when considering uncertainty
in task allocation. We then present our mechanism and prove its properties in Section 6.6. In
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Section 6.7, we demonstrate the generality of our mechanism. We then discuss the computa-
tional aspects of implementing our mechanism in Section 6.8 and then go on and empirically
evaluate it in Section 6.9. Finally, the main contributions of this Chapter are summarised in
Section 6.10.
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we challenge the assumptions made in traditional MD that an agent always
completes every task it starts or it does not default on payment for a good. The result of this
assumption is that an agent chooses to interact with partners based on their costs or valuations
only. However, cheapest is not always best and these agents may ultimately not be the most
successful. For example, in the MSN scenario we study in more detail in section 6.2, sensors
may decide to pay more for a service from a sensor which is more likely to provide a good quality
of data more reliably. Thus, in many practical situations, the choice of interaction partners is
motivated by an agent’s individual model of its counterparts, as well as by information gathered
from its environment about them. For example, on eBay, buyers determine the credibility of
particular sellers by considering their own interaction experiences with them (if they have any)
and by referring to the historic evaluation information provided by other buyers. To capture this
phenomenon, we exploit the notion of trust to represent an agent’s perception of another agent’s
probability of success (POS) in completing a task [Dasgupta, 1998]. This, in turn, leads us to
propose the area of trust-based mechanism design (TBMD) as an extension of traditional MD
that adds trust as an additional factor to costs and valuations in decision making.
In more detail, the trust in an agent is generally defined as the expectation that it will fulfill
what it agrees to do, given its observable actions and information gathered from other agents
about it [Dasgupta, 1998] 1. By their very nature, different agents are likely to hold different
opinions about the trust of a particular agent depending on their experiences and the specifics
of the trust model they use [Ramchurn et al., 2004]. As a result, we cannot simply extend
the conventional MD solutions (e.g. the VCG mechanism) to encompass the notion of trust
because such work is predicated on the fact that agents have private and independent information
which determines their choice over outcomes. Trust, on the other hand, implies public and
interdependent information (in the sense discussed in Chapter 5). For example, our trust in a
seller in a market would result from other agents in the market telling us about the seller’s output
quality (efficiency), combined with our own notion of the seller’s output quality. A high degree
of trust in the seller’s efficiency would mean that we believe that the seller is highly efficient,
while a low value indicates that we believe it will not be efficient.
In this work, we specifically consider MD in the context of task allocation (where it has often
been applied [Sandholm, 2003; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994]). Specifically, in our scenario,
1The term “trust”’ has also been used in connection with the dependability of information about other agents
[Ramchurn et al., 2004].
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agents may have different probabilities of success in completing a task assigned to them (e.g. it
may be believed that a particular builder has a 95% chance of making a roof in five days, while
another one may be believed to have a 75% chance of doing so). Moreover, an agent may assign
different weights to the reports of other agents depending on the similarity of their types. For
example, consider a “repair engine” task assigned to a garage. In this case, two agents owning
a Ferrari would be likely to assign higher weights to each other’s report about the POS of the
garage than they would to the report of another agent which owns a Robin Reliant.
Against this background, this chapter develops and evaluates the notion of trust-based mecha-
nism design. In doing so, we advance the state of the art in the following ways:
1. We first define the general properties that trust models must exhibit to allow a trust-based
mechanism (TBM) to generate an optimal allocation of tasks.
2. We extend the standard VCG mechanism in order to deal with uncertainties in task com-
pletion.
3. We prove the economic properties of our TBM and show that it is incentive-compatible,
efficient and individually-rational.
4. We study the computational properties of our mechanism. Specifically we show that the
task allocation problem is NP − complete and develop algorithms based on dynamic
programming for the generation of possible allocations and pruning of the search space.
5. We also empirically evaluate our mechanism when faced with seller’s bias (i.e. the seller is
biased concerning its POS) and show that our mechanism achieves the efficient allocation
in the long run.
We now detail the MSN scenario from which the requirement of addressing uncertainty in task
completion is inspired.
6.2 Uncertainty in Task Completion Within the MSN Scenario
This section discusses how the research question we address in this chapter, namely uncertainty
in task completion, can arise in the MSN scenario (as highlighted in red in figure 6.1). To this
end, consider the multiple selfish sensors which can be tasked with monitoring a certain region
which is of interest to other sensors within the MSN. Now, these sensors may provide different
qualities of service depending on a number of factors such as the hardware on which they are
based, the immediate environment in which they are situated and the state of their hardware
(e.g. whether it is faulty or not). Furthermore, the sensors may have different costs in actually
completing their tasks which may be due to the different hardware they utilise or the different
amount of time they spend in fulfilling the service. As a result, the sensors requesting the tasks
may choose to pay a premium for a better POS of the task being completed.
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FIGURE 6.1: Figure of MSN scenario highlighting faulty sensors which are considered within
this chapter
Now, the sensor may not be aware of the POS of another sensor, since there may not have been
sufficient interactions between them for the sensor to learn the POS of the other sensor. Then, it
may query other sensors that have had previous experience with the particular service provider
so as to gauge its POS. However, different sensors may require data for different reasons and
thus place different ratings on the POS provided by a provider. For example, a sensor interested
in environment monitoring may impose less restrictive quality levels on the visual data provided
than one which is involved in target tracking. As a result, it may rate the POS of a particular
sensor at a much higher level than another sensor. Therefore the sensors will also have to learn to
judge the levels of importance to place on the ratings and experiences provided by other sensors
(i.e. it will have to develop a trust model).
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6.3 Related Work
In associating trust to mechanism design, we build upon work in both areas. In the area of trust
and reputation, a number of computational models have been developed (see [Ramchurn et al.,
2004] for a review). While these models can help in choosing the most successful agents, they
are not shown to generate efficient outcomes in any given mechanism. An exception to this
is the work on reputation mechanisms [Dellarocas, 2002; Jurca and Faltings, 2003]. However,
these mechanisms only produce efficient outcomes in very constrained scenarios and under strict
assumptions (e.g. in [Dellarocas, 2002] sellers are monopolists and each buyer interacts at most
once with a seller and in [Jurca and Faltings, 2003] the majority of agents must already be
truthful for the mechanism to work2).
In the case of MD, there has been comparatively little work on achieving efficient, incentive-
compatible and individually-rational mechanisms that take into account uncertainty in general.
An exception to this rule is the dAGVA mechanism (see section 2.4) which considers the case
when the types of agents are unknown to themselves, but are drawn from a probability distri-
bution of types which is common knowledge to all agents. However, in our case, the agents
know their types and these incorporates their uncertainty related to fulfilling a task. Porter et al.
[2002] have also considered this case and their mechanism is the one that is most closely related
to ours. However, they limit themselves to the case where agents can only report on their own
POS. This is a drawback because it assumes the agents can measure their own POS accurately
and it does not consider the case where this measure may be biased (i.e. different agents perceive
the success of the same event differently). Thus our mechanism is a generalisation of theirs (see
section 6.7).
Finally, our work may also seem to be a case of interdependent, multidimensional allocation
schemes [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000] where there is an important impossibility result of not
being able to achieve efficiency when considering interdependent, multidimensional signals (see
Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion on interdependent valuations). However, we circum-
vent this by first relating the trust values to a probability that an allocation is completed, rather
than to an absolute valuation or cost signal and second by achieving an ex-ante equilibrium
rather than the stronger ex-post equilibrium.
6.4 The Allocation Problem
We now discuss in more detail the problem structure that we consider in the remainder of this
chapter. The system that we wish to control consists of a set of agents I = {1, . . . , I} that
are requesting tasks from a set of atomic tasks T = {τ1 . . . , τn} to be performed for them.
2This is different from a best-response Nash strategy of truthful reporting since the majority of agents are known
a priori to be truthful and thus they can be counted upon to report truthfully even if it is not rational for them to do
so.
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FIGURE 6.2: Graphical depiction of the allocation problem studied with this chapter.
We shall call these agents task requesters. Furthermore, there is another set of agents, called
task providers, J = {1, . . . , J} that can perform these tasks3. Now, define the set 2T =
{τ 1, . . . , τm, . . . , τ 2n−1} as the power set of T . Then, a task performer j would have a cost
cj(τm, θj) for performing the set of tasks τm. Furthermore, dependent upon its capabilities and
constraints, task provider j would perform the set of tasks τm requested by agent i to a certain
POS level. Let γij,τm be an indicator function denoting whether the task τm requested by agent
i and performed by agent i has been deemed successful by agent i. Thus:
γij,τm =
1 if τm is evaluated by agent i as successfully completed0 otherwise
We shall assume that the cost incurred by a task provider is independent of whether it has been
successful or not in completing the task. Furthermore, a task requester i would have a valuation
vi(τm, θi) for a set of tasks τm when those tasks are successfully performed. Otherwise, it
derives a value of 0. Figure 6.2 shows a graphical depiction of the problem structure we deal
with in this chapter.
In more detail, each task provider has a cost vector cj that specifies the cost it incurs for different
sets of tasks. Similarly, each task requester has a valuation vector vi that specifies the value it
derives for different sets of tasks when these tasks are performed for it at a POS of 1. Then, given
3It is naturally possible for task requesters to be task performers as well (i.e. I ∩ J 6= ∅). However, we shall
present them as different sets since this clarifies the explanation.
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the set of values, V = {v1, . . . ,vI}, and costs, C = {c1, . . . , cJ}, an allocationK (amongst the
set of possible allocations K) matches task requesters to the task providers by specifying which
requested tasks are performed and which task providers perform them (i.e. K : I × T → J ).
Once the tasks have been completed and the POS levels have been determined, we can then
calculate the overall value (i.e system value), U(K, θ,γ), of an allocation as:
U(K, θ,γ) =
I∑
i=1
vi(K, θ,γ
i)−
J∑
j=1
cj(K, θj) (6.1)
where vi(K, θ,γi) is the value that task requester i derives when the set of tasks specified by K
are completed to the POS level given by γi and cj(K, θj) is the cost incurred by task performer
j when it performs the tasks specified by K. Once a certain allocation K has been decided, an
agent i is then asked to pay for the task(s) it requested (if they are implemented in K), whereas
an agent j receives payment for the task(s) it has performed. Let the overall transfer of money
to a particular agent i be denoted by ri ∈ ℜ. As is common in this domain, we assume that an
agent is rational (expected utility maximiser) and has a quasi-linear utility function (see Chapter
2 for more details). Then a task requester has a utility given by:
ui(K, ri, θi,γ
i) = vi(K, θi,γ
i) + ri (6.2)
and a task performer has a utility given by :
ui(K, rj , θj) = cj(K, θj) + rj (6.3)
The problem at hand is then to find a mechanism that fulfills the following commonly sought
objectives in MD (as discussed in Chapter 2):
• Efficiency: an allocation K∗ that maximises the total utility of all the agents in the system.
• Individual Rationality: an allocation scheme that ensures agents are willing to participate
rather than opt out (i.e. ui ≥ 0).
Now, in the traditional case, γij,τm is always assumed to be equal to 1. In this case, one can use
the VCG mechanism described in chapter 2 for the task allocation problem. In effect, our task
allocation problem is then reduced to the following protocol which is shown in figure 6.34:
4We should here note that in the above scheme, an agent is reporting its cost and valuation rather than its type.
Though technically it is thus not a direct mechanism (since the agents do not report their types), it can easily be
converted into a direct scheme by having the agents report the two dimensions of its type instead of the cost and
valuation.
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FIGURE 6.3: Task allocation model without uncertainty in task completion.
1. The centre receives the set of tasks τm to be allocated from the task requesters along with
their reported valuations v̂i(τm, θi) for each set of tasks, they are requesting (step 1 in
figure 6.3).
2. The centre then posts these tasks in the vector τ (step 3). Each task performer j then
reports its cost ĉj(τm, θj) for completing the sets of tasks (step 4).
3. The centre then solves the following standard VCG auction equation (step 5):
K∗ = argmax
K∈K
∑
i∈I
v̂i(K, θi)−
∑
j∈J
ĉj(K, θj)
 (6.4)
and computes each transfer ri in the vector r for task requesters as:
ri =
∑
l∈−i
v̂l(K
∗, θj)−
∑
j∈J
ĉj(K
∗, θj)−max
K∈K
∑
l∈−i
v̂l(K, θl)−
∑
j∈J
ĉj(K, θj)
 (6.5)
and for task performers as:
rj =
∑
i∈I
v̂i(K
∗, θi)−
∑
l∈−j
ĉl(K
∗, θl)−max
K∈K
∑
i∈I
v̂i(K, θi)−
∑
l∈−j
ĉl(K, θl)
 (6.6)
4. The centre allocates the tasks according to the optimal allocation K∗ and implements the
transfers ri (step 6).
The VCG mechanism described above thus receives bids and asks from agents and imple-
ments the allocation K∗ that maximises
∑
i vi(K
∗, θi) − ci(K, θi). Each task requester makes
a payment vi(K∗, θi) − (U(I ∪ J ) − U(I ∪ J \ i)) where U(I ∪ J ) is the total utility
of K∗ and U(I ∪ J \ i) is the total utility of the choice that would be implemented with-
out agent i. Similarly, each task performer would receive a payment (as rj will be negative)
cj(K
∗, θi) − (U(I ∪ J ) − U(I ∪ J \ j)) where U(I ∪ J \ j) is the total utility of the
choice that would be implemented without agent j. In equilibrium, each agent receives as
utility the marginal value that it contributes to the system. This is why the VCG mechanism
will be incentive-compatible (as argued in chapter 2) and thus lead to an efficient mechanism.
Furthermore, assuming that the utility derived from opting out of the system is zero then it can
also be deduced that the VCG is also individually-rational.
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Thus in the traditional setting, the VCG mechanism can provide an efficient, individually ratio-
nal and incentive compatible allocation since the centre can determine the overall utility of an
allocation before the allocation is actually carried out. In contrast, in our problem setting, the
POS is not known a priori since the tasks which have been allocated under K are evaluated by
the respective task requesters after they have been performed. Thus, the ex-post value of an al-
location cannot be determined whilst deciding upon the allocation. This implies that one cannot
achieve ex-post efficiency in this setting. Instead, the efficiency we aim to achieve is ex-ante
efficiency where the expected utility is maximised. The expected utility of an allocation is then
calculated based upon the perception that an agent has about another agent’s POS at fulfilling a
certain task. We shall term this perception the trust that an agent has in another agent fulfilling
a task.
Definition 6.1. Trust. A task requester i has a trust tij,τm in agent j if it believes that agent j
will fulfill the set of task τm with a POS given by tij,τm.
Now, as argued in section 6.1, an agent can formulate its trust based on reports from different
agents within the system. This is especially relevant when the POS of an agent is viewed differ-
ently by the agents within the system and needs to be learned within the system. Thus, typically,
the trust of an agent in a particular task provider will be calculated as an amalgamation of the
experience that the agent has had with the task provider, as well as reports from other agents
about their experience. The variable encapsulating the experience of a particular agent shall be
termed the POS measure. Specifically the POS measure is defined as:
Definition 6.2. POS Measure. The POS measure of a task performer j, ηij,τm, as measured by
a task requester i with respect to the set of tasks τm, is the frequency with which agent j has
successfully completed τm when it was allocated to perform this task for agent i
Having thus explained the allocation problem that we tackle in this chapter, in the next sub-
section, we will now expand on the properties that a generic trust model needs to satisfy for
an efficient mechanism. We will also show how to augment the task allocation problem to
encompass trust measures and demonstrate via an example why a simple extension of the VCG
mechanism cannot guarantee efficiency.
6.5 Trust Model Requirements
Many computational trust models have been developed to allow agents to choose their most
trustworthy interaction partners (as discussed in section 6.3). However, at their most funda-
mental level, these models can be viewed as alternative approaches for achieving the following
properties5:
5Note that we do not focus on a particular trust model. This is because trust models implement the above prop-
erties in their own ways and in different contexts. Therefore, we concentrate on these abstract properties to keep the
focus on the relationship between trust and the design of an efficient mechanism. In so doing, we ensure that the
properties of our mechanism are independent of any specific trust model.
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1. The trust measure of an agent i in an agent j depends both on i’s perception of j’s POS and
on the perception of other agents on j’s POS. This latter point encapsulates the concept
of reputation whereby the society of agents generally attributes some characteristic to
one of its members by aggregating some/all the opinions of its other members about that
member. Thus, each agent considers this societal view on other members when building
up its own measure of trust in its counterparts [Dasgupta, 1998]. The trust of agent i in
its counterpart j with respect to a certain set of tasks τm, tij,τm ∈ [0, 1], is given by a
function, g : [0, 1]|I| → [0, 1], (which, in the simplest case, is a weighted sum) of all POS
measures sent by other agents to agent i about agent j as shown below:
tij,τm = g({η1j,τm, . . . , ηij,τm, . . . , ηIj,τm}) (6.7)
where ηij,τm ∈ [0, 1] is the POS of agent j as perceived by agent i with respect to task
τm and g is the function that combines both personal measures of POS and other agents’
measures. In general, trust models compute the POS measures over multiple interactions.
Thus, the level of success recorded in each interaction is normally averaged to give a
representative value (see [Ramchurn et al., 2004] for a general discussion on trust metrics).
2. Trust results from an analysis of an agent’s POS in performing a given task. The more suc-
cessful, the more trustworthy the agent is. Thus, the models assume that trust is monotonic
increasing with POS. Therefore, the relationship between trust and POS is expressed as:
∂ti
j,τm
∂ηj,τm
> 0.
Given the above, agents can update the trust rating for another agent each time they interact (both
by recording their view of the success of their counterpart and by gathering new reports from
other agents about it). Thus, if an agent’s POS does not change, the trust measure in it should
become more precise as more observations are made and received from other agents. Moreover,
having the trust monotonic increasing with POS ensures the condition given by Mirrlees [1971]
regarding fixed points in allocation schemes is satisfied (this is a necessary condition for the
mechanism to be efficient).
6.5.1 Augmenting the Task Allocation Scenario
In this section we show how trust is to be calculated and taken into account in the task allocation
problem we described in section 6.4. Here, any trust model satisfying the properties discussed
in the previous section can be used when actually building the system. The following changes
are made (as shown in figure 6.4):
• Each task requester i and each task requester j reports to the centre their POS vector (i.e.
η̂i = [η̂i1 . . . η̂
i
J ] and η̂j = [η̂
j
1 . . . η̂
j
J ] (step 1)). This is the POS that an agent has observed
about the task performers. This vector may not be complete if agents have not experienced
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FIGURE 6.4: Trust-based task allocation model. The dotted lines represent the modifications
we make to the mechanism when using trust in the feedback loop.
any past interactions with other agents. However, this does not affect the properties of the
mechanism since the centre will only pick those POSs that are relevant (and calculate trust
according to these).
• The agents must also submit their respective trust calculation function (equation 6.7) that
applies over the vector of all (or part of) other agents’ reported POSs (i.e. η̂), ti = g(η̂)6,
to the centre before the allocation of tasks (step 2). This allows the centre to compute
the trust of agent i in all other agents (given i’s own perception, as well as other agents’
perceptions of the task performer’s POS). Given that the trust ti only affects the allocation
of tasks being requested by agent i, the latter has no incentive to lie about its trust function
to the centre (otherwise it could result in i’s task not being allocated to the agent deemed
most trustworthy by i).
The trust function g(.) may assign different weights to the reports of different agents depending
on the level of similarity between the types of agents i and −i. Thus, given the trust functions
and reports of POS of each agent, we now require the centre to maximise the overall expected
valuation of the allocation (in step 5), as opposed to the valuation of the allocation independent
of trust (i.e. which the standard VCG does). This is because an agent has a certain probability
of completing the task to a degree of success which may be less than one. Thus, the expected
value of an allocation is then
(
E
[γi|K,ti]
[∑
i∈I v̂i(K, θi,γ
i)
]−∑i∈I ĉi(K, θi)) given the
trust vector ti. This captures the fact that the agent i, that allocated the task, determines the
value of γi for all tasks which it has requested and been allocated in K. This effectively means
that the valuations are non-deterministic, while the costs are deterministic. The centre thus
determines the efficient allocation K∗ (step 7) such that the value of the efficient allocation is
maximised.
6We drop the task subscript of the trust and POS variable when the task is not relevant in the explanation.
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TABLE 6.1: A set of four agents in which agent 4 has proposed a task.
Agent i ci ηi1 ηi2 ηi3 t4i
1 40 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.5
2 80 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.0
3 50 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.86
4 ∞ 0.525 1.0 0.95 na
Having shown how to fit trust into the process of determining the value of allocations, in the next
subsection we provide a simple example to show why the VCG solution presented in section 6.4
is not incentive compatible (and thus not efficient) even when we modify it to consider expected
valuations. This then motivates the search for a mechanism that is.
6.5.2 Failure of the VCG Solution
Consider a system of four agents where agent 4 has asked for a task τ to be allocated and its
valuation of this task is v4(τ, θ4) = 210. Each agent i has a cost ci to perform the task proposed
by 4 (agent 4 has infinite cost to perform the task by itself) and does not derive any value from
the task being performed. Now, suppose that the trust function of agent 4 is a weighed sum of
the POS reports by the agents (i.e. t4i = α  η̂i where α = [0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4]). Note that we do
not concern ourselves with the reports ηi4 since the task is proposed by agent 4 itself. Table 6.1
shows the cost ci of attempting the task, and the observed POS value of each agent, ηi, as well
as the trust computed by agent 4, t4i , if each agent reports truthfully on its ηi.
The VCG solution of section 6.4 determines the allocation and payments based only on cost and
valuations. However, this would clearly fail to find an efficient allocation since agent 1 would
be allocated the task despite being the least trusted and hence most likely to fail. If we instead
implemented the VCG mechanism with the expected valuations (taking into account the trust
and POS reports), we then have K∗ = [0010] (i.e agent 3 is allocated the task), r1 = r2 = 0 and
r3 = 210γ−130. Thus, agent 3 will then derive an average payment of 0.87×210−130 = 52.7.
However, this scheme is not incentive-compatible because agent 2 can lie about η23 by reporting
η̂23 ≤ 0.7357 which will then lead to it being allocated the task and deriving a positive utility
from this allocation. Note that this scheme is exactly that of Porter et al. for a single-task
scenario (see section 6.7).
As can be seen, the VCG mechanism needs to be extended to circumvent this problem. Specif-
ically, we require a mechanism that is efficient given the reports of the agents on their costs
and valuations of allocations, as well as their observed POS vector (since the VCG is affected
by false reports of POS). In effect, we need to change the payment scheme so as to make the
truthful-reporting of POSs an optimal strategy for the agent again. Once this is achieved, the
centre can then choose the efficient allocation based on expected utilities. The difficulty with
designing such a mechanism is that the centre cannot check on the validity of POS reports of
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agents because it is based on a private observation carried out by the agent. Thus two agents
may legitimately differ in their observed POS of another agent due to their different interaction
histories with that agent.
6.6 The Trust-Based Mechanism
Before presenting our trust-based mechanism (TBM), we first introduce some notation. Let
the expected utility before the allocation is carried out be U(K,θ, γ) = E
[γ|K,ti]
[U(K,θ, γ)]
where θ is the vector containing all agent types. We also denote the marginal contribution
of the agent i to the system given an efficient allocation K̂∗ as mci = U−i(K̂∗,θ, γ) −
maxK∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i, γ)
]
where maxK∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i, γ)
]
is the overall expected utility of
the efficient allocation that would have resulted if agent i were not present in the system. Now,
we can detail TBM:
1. Find the efficient allocation K̂∗ such that:
K̂∗ = argmax
K∈K
U(K,θ, γ) (6.8)
This finds the best allocation; that is, the one that maximises the sum of expected utilities
of the agents, conditional on the reports of the agents. We note here that we do not take
into consideration the reward functions of the agents when calculating the overall utility
since these rewards are from one agent to another and therefore do not make a difference
when calculating the overall utility of the agents.
2. We now calculate the efficient allocation that would have resulted if an agent i’s report is
taken out:
K∗−i = argmax
K∈K
E
[γ|K,t˜i]
[U(K,θ, γ)]
where t˜i = g(η̂ \ η̂i). This computes how η̂i affects which allocation is deemed efficient.
3. We now find the effect that an agent’s η̂i has had on its marginal contribution. Thus, find:
Di = U(K̂
∗, .)− U(K∗−i, .)
This distils the effect of an agent’s η̂i reports.
4. Given K∗, the payment ri made to the agent i is then 7:
ri = mci −Di (6.9)
Naturally, if ri is negative it implies that i makes a payment to the centre. The first part
of the payment scheme, mci, calculates the effect that an agent’s presence has had on the
7The calculation is the same for a task provider j and is thus omitted.
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overall expected utility of the system. We also subtract Di to take into account the effect
that an agent’s POS report has on the chosen allocation. This is in line with the intuition
behind VCG mechanisms in which an agent’s report affects the allocation, but not the
payment it receives or gives.
We will now prove each of the properties of TBM in turn, whilst intuitively explaining why the
mechanism has the aforementioned properties.
6.6.1 Properties of the Mechanism
Proposition 6.3. TBM is incentive-compatible in ex-ante Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. We first need to calculate the expected utility, E
[γ|K,ti]
[ui(K, θi,γ)], that an agent de-
rives from TBM because the goal of a rational agent is to maximise its expected utility. We
note here that we are assuming that the agent is myopic in that it is only concerned with its
current expected utility given the cost vector, c(K,θ), the value vector, v(K,θ), and the trust
vector t. The expected utility that an agent (since the proofs are identical for the task providers
and requesters, we shall refer to an agent i ∈ I ∪ J ), ui(K̂∗, θi,γ), derives from an efficient
allocation, as calculated from equation 6.8, given the reports of all agents in the system is:
ui(K̂
∗, θi,γ) = E
[γ| bK∗,ti]
[
vi(K̂
∗, θi,γ)
]− ci(K̂∗, θi)
+mci(K̂
∗, θi,γ)−Di
= E
[γ| bK∗,ti]
[
vi(K̂
∗, θi,γ)− v̂i(K̂∗, θi,γ)
]
−
(
ci(K̂
∗, θi)− ĉi(K̂∗, θi)
)
+
U(K∗−i,θ,γ)−max
K∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i,γ)
] (6.10)
From 6.10 we will firstly prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6.4. An agent has an equilibrium strategy to reveal its observed POS values.
Proof. We consider how η̂i affects ui(K̂∗, θi,γ). From equation 6.10 we observe that η̂i
cannot affect U(K−i,θ,γ) − maxK∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i,γ)
]
. Thus, an agent only has an in-
centive to lie so that K̂∗ is selected such that E
[γ| bK∗,ti]
[
vi(K̂
∗, θi,γ) − v̂i(K̂∗, θi,γ)
] −(
ci(K̂
∗, θi)− ĉi(K̂∗, θi)
)
is maximised. If an agent reveals its cost and valuation truthfully,
i.e. v̂(.) = v(.) and ĉ(.) = c, we then have the term as zero. Then an agent cannot gain from
an untruthful reporting of η̂i. If, however, an agent is to gain from such an untruthful reporting,
it needs to set either v̂(.) < v(.) and ĉ(.) > c or both. However, doing so would decrease the
chance of i successfully allocating a task or winning an allocation. Therefore, i would not reveal
untruthful values for ĉ(.) and v̂(.). Moreover, i will actually report truthfully its η̂i since this
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allows the centre to choose those agents that i deems to have a high POS (as well as helping
other agents choose i as having a perception close to theirs). Thus, reporting η̂i = ηi is an
ex-ante Nash equilibrium strategy.
Given lemma 6.4, we can now show that TBM is incentive compatible. Suppose that an agent
is truthful about v̂(.) and ĉ(.). Then its utility is U(K∗−i,θ,γ) − maxK∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i,γ)
]
.
Now assume that the agent lies about v̂(.) and ĉ(.) so as to increase its utility. This then means
that E
[γ| bK∗,ti]
[
vi(K̂
∗, θi,γ)− v̂i(K̂∗, θi,γ)
]−(ci(K̂∗, θi)− ĉi(K̂∗, θi))+ U(K ′−i,θ,γ) >
U(K∗−i,θ,γ) where K ′−i is the efficient allocation found with ĉ(.) and v̂(.) without the report
of ηi. However, as argued earlier, an agent would not report a lower value or a higher cost.
Thus E
[γ|K,ti]
[
vi(K̂
∗, θi,γ)− v̂i(K̂∗, θi,γ)
]− (ci(K̂∗, θi)− ĉi(K̂∗, θi)) ≤ 0. Furthermore,
by the maximisation of step 2 of TBM, U(K ′−i,θ,γ) < U(K∗−i,θ,γ) if all other agents report
truthfully. Thus, TBM is incentive-compatible in a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6.5. TBM is efficient.
Proof. Given that the agents are incentivised to report truthfully (proposition 6.3), the centre
will calculate the efficient allocation according to equation 6.8 (i.e. K̂∗ = K∗).
Proposition 6.6. TBM is individually-rational in expected utility (as defined in section 2).
Proof. We need to show that the expected utility of any agent from an efficient allocation K∗
is greater than if the agent were not in the scheme (i.e. ui(K∗, θi,γ) ≥ 0). As a result of the
inherent uncertainty in the completion of tasks, we cannot guarantee that the mechanism will be
ex-post individually-rational for an agent. Rather, we prove that the mechanism is individually-
rational for an agent if we consider expected utility. Given truthful reports, the utility of an agent
from equation 6.10 is U(K∗−i,θ,γ) − maxK∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i,γ)
]
. The first maximisation is
carried out without the reports ηi
−i ,whereas the second one is carried out over the set of agents
I \ i. Thus, the second maximisation is carried out over a smaller set than the first one. As a
result, maxK∈K
[
U−i(K,θ−i,γ)
] ≥ U(K∗−i,θ,γ) such that ui(K∗, θi,γ) ≥ 0.
6.7 Instances of Trust-Based Mechanism
Having thus discussed the computational properties of TBM, we now demonstrate its generality.
Specifically, TBM can be viewed as a generalised version of both the VCG mechanism and the
mechanism by Porter et al. This is because in TBM, there exists uncertainties about whether a
set of agents will carry out an allocation and about the relevance of reports of POS by agents. In
this section, we demonstrate its generality by analysing two specific instances of the mechanism.
We first show that TBM reduces to Porter et al.’s fault-tolerant mechanism (FTM) and then to
the VCG mechanism described in section 6.4.
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6.7.1 Self-POS Reports Only
The mechanism developed in [Porter et al., 2002] is a special case of TBM. Specifically, agents
only report on their own POS (i.e. η̂i = η̂ii) and agents assign a relevance of 1 to reports by
all other agents. However, since in their model there is no notion of varying perceptions of
success, we need to introduce the notion of a report agent that has v(K, .) = 0 and c(K, .) =
∞. This acts as a proxy to agents reporting the ex-post POS to the centre. This also caters
for the problem of single POS reports (U(K∗−i, .) is undefined) as there is then no measure of
tij once j’s report is removed. The centre then calculates the efficient allocation as: K∗ =
argmaxK∈K
[
U(K̂∗,θ, γ)
]
and the payment to the agent i is ri = mci −Di = mci. The term
Di = 0 since, as a result of the report agent, U(K̂∗, .) = U(K∗−i, .) (because t is equal in both
cases).
6.7.2 Efficiency Independent Scenario
In this case we do not consider the reports of efficiency. Thereby, trust in the allocation and
payment schemes are equivalent to setting the trust to be constant at 1 for every agent. Thus,
from equation 6.8, the efficient allocation is:
K∗ = argmax
K∈K
[
E
[γ|K,ti=1]
[∑
i∈I
v̂i(K, θi)
]
−
∑
i∈I
ĉi(K, θi)
]
= argmax
K∈K
[∑
i∈I
v̂i(K, θi)−
∑
i∈I
ĉi(K, θi)
]
The payment scheme is:
ri = U−i(K̂
∗, γ, c−i)− E
[γ|
b
bK
∗
,t−i]
(U(
̂̂
K
∗
,θ−i))−Di
= U−i(K̂
∗, γ,θ−i)− (U( ̂̂K∗,θ−i))
since Di(.) becomes irrelevant and E
[γ|
b
bK
∗
,t
−i]
[
U(
̂̂
K
∗
,θ−i)
]
= U(
̂̂
K
∗
,θ−i). We thus have
both the allocation and payment scheme the same as the VCG mechanism presented in section
6.4.
6.8 Implementing the Trust-Based Mechanism
Having explained the economic properties of the TBM, we now consider its computational prop-
erties. In more detail, we present the implementation of TBM as an optimisation process that
combines integer programming (IP) and dynamic programming (DP) thereby greatly reducing
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the computational load. We first describe an optimisation model based on IP and discuss the
various constraints that must be applied to take into account expected valuations for all possible
allocations. Given this, we then show how the set of allocations to be considered can be reduced
using an algorithm based on DP. Therefore, our approach combines a preprocessing stage (along
the lines of [Sandholm, 2002a]) with an optimisation stage (along the lines of [Andersson et al.,
2000]) to produce an implementation that captures the model presented in section 6.6.
6.8.1 The Optimisation Model
In order to conserve the economic properties of the TBM discussed in section 6.6, it is imperative
that the algorithms used to determine the allocation produce the allocation that maximises the
expected utility (i.e. the algorithm needs to solve the optimisation problem presented in equation
6.8 exactly). This restricts our scope since we cannot use approximate algorithms such as those
developed by [Parkes and Schneidman, 2004; Lehmann et al., 2002].
The search space of the optimisation problem we seek to solve can be represented graphically
as shown in figure 6.5. Thus, as compared to figure 6.2, the task column has been expanded
in order to represent possible allocations of tasks from task requesters to task performers. Be-
fore explaining this mapping in more detail, we will first introduce some useful graph theory
notations.
Notice that in figure 6.5, each node in the valuation column, v, is potentially related to multiple
nodes in the expanded task column T (as shown by the dotted red sets) and each node in c
is potentially linked to multiple nodes in T (as shown by the dotted black sets). T contains
decomposed tasks from the bids denoting the bidder, one particular task, and the set of tasks in
the bid from which this particular task originates (e.g. t1[1, {t1, t3}] signifies task 1 from agent
1 in the bid placed for tasks {t1, t3} (as shown by the arrows on the figure)). The relationships
between the nodes of v, c, and T can be thus be regarded as a special type of edge involving
several nodes. Hence, the problem we are trying to solve contains hypergraphs.
Specifically, a hypergraph can be defined in the following manner [Berge, 1973]:
Definition 6.7. Hypergraph. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a finite set, and let E = {Ei|i ∈ I}
be a family of subsets of X. The family E is said to be a hypergraph on X if:
1. Ei 6= ∅ (i ∈ I)
2. ∪i∈IEi = X .
The pair H = (X, E) is called a hypergraph. The elements x1, x2, . . . , xn are called the vertices
and the sets E1, E2, . . . , Em are called the hyperedges.
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FIGURE 6.5: Graphical representation of the TBM search space.
In a hypergraph, two hyperedges are said to be adjacent if their intersection is not empty. Oth-
erwise they are said to be disjoint. We say that a hypergraph is weighted if we associate to each
hyperedge E ∈ E a real number, w(E), called the weight of E.
From the formal definition of hypergraph, we observe that figure 6.5 results from the overlapping
of two separate hypergraphs: (i) the valuation hypergraph resulting from linking valuations to
task bids and (ii) the bid hypergraph resulting from linking each bid to its task bids. In what
follows, we formally define both hypergraphs based on valuations and bids.
Let v = {vi(τ , θi)|vi(τ , θi) ∈ vi i ∈ I} and c = {cj(τ , θj)|cj(τ , θj) ∈ cj j ∈ J} be the
sets of all valuations and all bids respectively. Consider now that each bid cj(τ , θj) standing
for the offer of agent j for a set of tasks τ can be split into single-task bids for every task in
τ so that kτj (τj1 , θj), . . . , kτj (τjn , θj) represents the cost of agent j for tasks τj1 , . . . , τjn , and
cj(τ , θj) =
∑
τ ′∈τ k
τ
j (τ
′, θj). Thus, we define K = {kτj (τ ′, θj)|cj(τ , θj) ∈ c, τ ′ ∈ τ} as
the set containing the cost per single task for every bid in c. Notice though that the splitting
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of bids into single-task bids is, as shown below, an artefact to help us build our optimisation
model. Therefore, single-task bids must be regarded as dummy single-task bids since we shall
never require sellers to make explicit their values.
Hence, on the one hand, we define the valuation hypergraph as a pair Hv = (v ∪ K, Ev).
We say that e ∈ Ev where e = {vi(τ , θi)} ∪ K and K ⊆ K iff τ = ∪k(τ,θ)τ . Thus, each
hyperedge in Hv consists of a single valuation vertex corresponding to an element in v along
with a complete task allocation out of the dummy single-task bids in K. On the other hand,
we define the bid hypergraph as a pair Hc = (K ∪ c, Ec). For each bid cj(τ , θj) ∈ c such
that it splits into dummy single-task bids kτj (τj1 , θj), . . . , kτj (τjn , θj), there is a hyperedge e =
{cj(τ , θj), kτj (τj1 , θj), . . . , kτj (τjn , θj)}. In other words, each hyperedge in Hc consists of a
single bid vertex corresponding to an element in c along with the single-task costs inK resulting
from splitting the bid. Notice that our definitions of valuation and bid hypergraphs ensure that
each hyperedge in Hv contains a single valuation from v and each hyperedge in Hc contains a
single bid from c.
In addition to the definitions above, we shall require some auxiliary functions to operate on the
hyperedges of both hypergraphs:
• δ(x) = {e ∈ Hv|x ∈ e} returns all hyperedges in Hv containing x.
• λ(x) = {e ∈ Hc|x ∈ e} returns all hyperedges in Hc containing x.
• ν(e) returns the valuation vertex in v in hyperedge e ∈ Hv.
• α(e) returns the bid vertex in c in hyperedge e ∈ Hc.
• β(e) = {k ∈ K|k ∈ e} returns the cost vertexes in hyperedge e ∈ Hv.
Consider now that we turn both Hv and Hc into weighted hypergraphs as follows. On the one
hand, since each hyperedge e ∈ Hv stands for a local bid allocation, namely an allocation for
valuation vertex ν(e), we can associate to each hyperedge the expected valuation for ν(e) given
the local bid allocation represented by the cost vertexes in β(e) as its weight. We can thus recast
our calculation of expected valuations as follows:
E[vi(τ , θi),K] =
∑
τn∈2τ
vi(τn, θi) ∏
τl∈τn,(τ l→j)∈K
tij,τl
∏
τm∈τ /τn,(τm→k)∈K
1− tik,τm

(6.11)
where i assigns the tasks τl or τm to a given agent j and k respectively according to the local
bid allocation K chosen.
On the other hand, we can associate to each hyperedge e′ ∈ Hc the value of the bid vertex
α(e′) ∈ C. Henceforth, ω(e) shall stand for the weight of hyperedge e ∈ Hv, whereas κ(e′)
shall stand for the weight of hyperedge e′ ∈ Hc.
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Once bothHv andHc are completely constructed, we can then exploit these structures to obtain
an allocation for the TBM model. In order to do so, notice that if two hyperedges in Hv are
adjacent it means that two valuations sharing some tasks would be allocated the very same bid
for that task, which turns out to be an unfeasible allocation. Therefore, feasible allocations can
be expressed as sets of disjoint hyperedges, which leads to the well-known matching problem in
a hypergraph [Gross and Yellen, 1999]:
Definition 6.8. Matching problem. For a hypergraph H = (X, E), a family E ′ ⊆ E is defined
to be a matching if the hyperedges of E ′ are pairwise disjoint.
With respect to a given matching E ′, a vertex xi is said to be matched or covered if there is a
hyperedge in E ′ incident to xi. If a vertex is not matched, it is said to be unmatched or exposed.
A matching that leaves no vertexes exposed is said to be complete.
Therefore, our aim is to find a matching for Hv that is not necessarily complete (the optimal
allocation may demand that some valuations remain exposed). However, we are not interested in
any matching, but specifically in the one that maximises the sum of the total expected valuations
weighting the hyperedges in Hv. This leads us to the well-known maximum weighted matching
problem [Gondrand and Minoux, 1986] which consists of finding a matching for which the sum
of the weights of the hyperedges is maximised.
Nonetheless, we cannot solve the maximum weighted matching problem for Hv without taking
into account Hc. We also require a matching for Hc, but, in this case, a minimum weighted
matching so that the total cost of selected bids is minimised. In turn, the matching for Hc also
depends on the matching forHv: whenever hyperedge e ∈ Hv is selected (a valuation is selected
along with a set of task costs) we must enforce the fact that the hyperedges in Hc containing
the cost vertexes in e are also selected (and thus, a selected bid is considered along with its task
costs). In this way, any matching in Hv generates an associated matching in Hc. Our aim is to
obtain the maximum weighted matching in Hv that minimises its associated weighted matching
in Hc.
Finally, the surplus maximising task allocation in a trust-based scenario results from the solution
to the maximisation of the following expression:
∑
e∈Ev
xe · ω(e)−
∑
e′∈Ec
ye′ · κ(e′) (6.12)
subject to:
1.
∑
e∈δ(k) xe = yλ(k) ∀k ∈ K
2. ye + ye′ ≤ 1 ∀e, e′ iff c(e) = ci(τ j , θi), c(e′) = ci(τ k, θi) and τ j ∩ τ k 6= ∅
3. xe + xe′ ≤ 1 ∀e, e′ iff v(e) = vi(τ j , θi), v(e′) = vi(τ k, θi) and τ j ∩ τ k 6= ∅
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where xe ∈ {0, 1} is a binary decision variable representing whether the valuation in hyperedge
e is selected or not, and ye′ ∈ {0, 1} is a binary decision variable representing whether the bid
in hyperedge e′ is selected or not.
As to the side constraints restricting expression 6.12, constraint (1) ensures at the same time that
the very same bid cannot be allocated to the very same task of separate valuations and that a
valuation cannot have more than one bid allocation. Constraint (2) enforces the fact that over-
lapping bids owned by the very same agent are exclusive (XOR bids [Andersson et al., 2000]),
and hence they cannot be simultaneously selected. Finally, constraint (3) enforces exclusivity
among valuations with overlapping tasks (XOR asks). Notice that our optimisation model, as
formalised by equation 6.12, resembles the combinatorial exchange (which is a double auction
in which buyers and sellers submit sealed bids) since it consists of both bids and asks. Indeed,
we can consider the goods in the exchange to be the dummy tasks in K, the bids the elements
in c, and the asks the weights of the hyperedges in Hv. Thus, while the number of bids re-
main the same in the exchange, the number of valuations may significantly increase (since we
are considering Hv instead of v). This increased complexity can be attributed to the introduc-
tion of trust in our theoretical model which makes the initial valuations (asks) (the elements in
v), allocation-dependent. Hence, from every single valuation in v, several potential asks orig-
inate for the exchange when considering the bidder to which each task my be allocated. As
shown by Sandholm et al. [2001], the decision problem for a binary single-unit combinatorial
exchange winner determination problem is NP − complete and the optimisation problem can-
not be approximated to a ratio n1−ǫ in polynomial time unless P = ZPP . Our problem is thus
NP − complete.
6.8.2 Preprocessing Bids and Allocations
The previous section has considered the allocation problem; that is, to determine the allocation
that maximises the expected utility. However, in order to construct the objective function in
equation 6.12 we must first generate for each valuation vi(τ ) its expected valuations considering
the task allocations in Kvi(τ ). In this section we offer a dynamic programming approach to this
problem since, as detailed below, the problem observes the principle of optimality (in the sense
proposed in [Skiena, 1998]). Thus, partial solutions can be optimally extended with regard to
the state after the partial solution, instead of to the partial solution itself. In our particular case,
the local task allocations for vi(τ ) can be obtained from the allocations assessed for sets of tasks
τ ′ ⊆ τ .
To this end, algorithms 1 and 2 formalise our DP approach. Specifically, algorithm 1 calculates
the expected valuations for each ask vi(τ ) based on the potential task allocations for the tasks in
τ using the costs in c. Task allocations are stored in table A, which is employed by the algorithm
as a look-up table indexed by task vectors, whereas expected valuations are stored in E. Notice
that the first step in the algorithm (line 1) refers to the following preprocessing actions:
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PRE1: Remove non-competitive bids. Notice that we regard a bid over a set of tasks τ as non-
competitive if all the valuations for tasks in τ are lower than the bid. Formally, we remove cj(τ)
if max(v(τ )) < cj(τ ′), τ ′ ⊆ τ .
PRE2: Remove bids that cause free disposal. At this stage, we prune those bids containing tasks
for which no valuations exist. Formally, we remove cj(τ) if ∃τ ∈ τ such that ∄vi(τ ′) and τ ∈
τ ′.
Having carried out these two preprocessing actions, table A is then filled in by the recursive
function allocation outlined by algorithm 2. This algorithm differentiates two cases when as-
sessing task allocations, depending on whether the task τ received as an input is single (lines 2
to 4) or combinatorial (lines 5 to 8). For the single task case, the algorithm locates all bids in
c that contain the task (line 3). For combinatorial tasks, the algorithm generates two recursive
calls: one for all the elements in the task vector but the last one (line 6), and another for the
last element in the task vector (line 7). At this point the algorithm looks for stored results in
A to avoid revisiting the same subproblem. If such stored results do exist, they are retrieved,
otherwise the recursive calls proceed. Finally, the task allocations obtained in lines 6 and 7 are
combined to provide all possible task allocations (line 8). Notice, therefore, that algorithm 2
is in fact a memoized [Cormen et al., 1990] recursive algorithm: it maintains a table, A, with
subproblem solutions, but the control structure for filling in the table is recursive. A memoized
algorithm is desirable in this context because it only solves those subproblems that are definitely
required. For instance, consider a call to allocation with combinatorial task τ = 〈τ1, τ2, τ3〉 as
input. Such a call is split into two recursive calls with inputs 〈τ1, τ2〉 and 〈τ3〉.
In order to combine task allocations, in algorithm 2 we use the ⊗ operator over sets of task allo-
cations (line 8) that we define as follows: ∆⊗∆′ = {(δi, δj)|δi ∈ ∆, δj ∈ ∆′ and ∄(τ, ck(τ )) ∈
δi (τ
′, cl(τ
′)) ∈ δj such that ck(τ ) and cl(τ ′) are mutually exclusive. Notice that the⊗ operator
is defined as a variation of the Cartesian product that discards task allocations containing XOR
bids. Thus, the ⊗ operator implements the following pruning actions:
PRE3: Discard task allocations containing mutually exclusive bids.
After assessing a given task allocation, algorithm 2 returns the result (line 12) to algorithm 1 so
that it is stored in the look-up table (line 5). After that, algorithm 1 carries out the following
further preprocessing actions.
PRE4: Remove task allocations that cause free disposal. Eventually some sets of tasks (along
with their subtasks) may only be asked for by a single agent. In such a case, there is no sense
in considering local task allocations with overlapping bids (bids over some common task(s))
because their acceptance would only be possible if we allowed free disposal (line 7).
PRE5: Remove non-competitive task allocations. We regard a local task allocation as non-
competitive if the total cost of the bids composing the allocation is higher than the expected
valuation for the tasks being considered. For each allocation, the expected value is computed
using equation 6.11 and stored (line 9) if this value is greater or equal to the cost.
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Algorithm 1 function task allocations (V ,E,C,t)
1: C ′ ← PRE2(PRE1(V,C));
2: for i ∈ {1, . . . , I} do
3: for vi(τ , θ) ∈ vi do
4: if A[τ ] = ∅ then
5: A[τ ]← allocation(τ , A, C ′);
6: end if
7: Kvi(τ ) ← PRE4(A[τ ]);
8: for A ∈ Kvi(τ ) do
9: E[vi(τ ),K]← PRE5(vi(τ ),K, t);
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: return E
Algorithm 2 function allocation (τ ,A,C)
1: if A[τ ] = ∅ then
2: case τ = 〈τi〉:
3: α← {(τi, ck(τ ′))|τi ∈ τ ′, 1 ≤ k ≤ I, τ ′ ∈ 2T };
4: break;
5: case τ = 〈τi1 , . . . , τim+1〉:
6: ∆m ← allocation(〈τi1 , . . . , τim〉, A, C);
7: ∆m+1 ← allocation(〈τim+1〉, A, C);
8: α← ∆m ⊗∆m+1;
9: else
10: α← A[τ ]
11: end if
12: return α
Algorithm 1 runs in time O(n ·mr) in the worst case, where m stands for the total number of
bids, r stands for the number of tasks, and n stands for the total number of valuations. The
worst case occurs when all valuations and bids are combinatorial and over all tasks8. Otherwise,
the running time of the algorithm is highly dependent on the sparsity of bids and valuations.
Thus, the lower the degree of (task) overlapping of bids and valuations, the lower the running
time9. Besides, the pruning actions included in the algorithm are expected to further reduce the
search space, and thus the running time. The results of algorithm 1 are used for building the
optimisation model in section 6.8.1, which is solved using ILOG’s CPLEX.
Notice that a brute-force approach to our optimisation problem would be extremely expensive.
In this case, the number of feasible allocations for a given valuation would amount to
(
m
1
)r
.
Thereafter, considering a different valuation combined with the former one, would lead us to
consider
(
m−1
1
)r feasible allocations to be combined with the feasible allocations obtained so
far (and thus (m1 )r · (m−11 )r overall). In the general case, when jointly considering n valuations,
8 This case can be generated in CATS [Leyton-Brown et al., 2000] with the normal distributions with the para-
meters of their testbed set as follows, µgoods to high and σgoods to low.
9 This can be generated using the dual distributions within the CATS testbed.
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the total number of feasible allocations would amount to
∏n
i=0(m−i)r. This expression asymp-
totically converges to (m!)r if n ≃ m and mrn if n≪ m (which is much larger than the n ·mr
of our algorithm). Notice that a brute-force approach to our optimisation problem would be
extremely expensive. In this case, the number of feasible allocations for a given valuation would
amount to
(
m
1
)r
. Thereafter, considering a different valuation combined with the former one,
would lead us to consider
(
m−1
1
)r feasible allocations to be combined with the feasible alloca-
tions obtained so far (and thus (m1 )r · (m−11 )r overall). In the general case, when jointly consid-
ering n valuations, the total number of feasible allocations would amount to
∏n
i=0(m−i)r. This
expression asymptotically converges to (m!)r if n ≃ m and mrn if n ≪ m. Thus, very simple
problems, for instance with m=10, r=5 and n = 10, cannot be solved using a high performance
optimiser such as CPLEX as brute-force would explore a search space of cardinality (10!)5. On
the other hand algorithm 1 would generate 10 · 105 possible allocations, feeding a branch and
cut algorithm. Hoffman and Padberg [1993] report the possibility of solving an instance of a
very similar problem in under 25 minutes.
Having thus shown how to reduce the computational load whilst implementing TBM, we next
experimentally compare its performance against the mechanism developed in [Porter et al.,
2002].
6.9 Experimental Evaluation
Here we empirically evaluate TBM by comparing it with the fault tolerant mechanism (FTM) of
Porter et al. (this is chosen because it also deals with the POS of agents as discussed in sections
6.3 and 6.7) and the standard VCG. Here, we refer to task performing agents as contractors in
what follows. In our experiments we perform 500 successive allocations, in the scenario de-
scribed in section 6.5, with six agents each given one task to complete 10. After each allocation,
contractors perform tasks and the level of success is measured and reported to all agents. Each
agent can then update its measure of the contractors’ POSs, as well as the contractors’ trustwor-
thiness as discussed in section 6.5. The valuations and POS of each agent are obtained from a
uniform distribution and the costs are the same for all tasks. We iterate the process and average
the results (here for 200 iterations). Given the properties of TBM and FTM we postulate the
following hypotheses and validate them as shown below:
Proposition 6.9. TBM always chooses the efficient allocation (K∗) in the long run.
This hypothesis reflects the fact that we expect agents in TBM to take a number of interactions
to model the true POS of their counterparts, using their individual trust models. After this time,
however, the mechanism can choose those contractors that are most successful at completing
a given task. As can be seen in figure 6.6, the optimal allocation chosen by TBM, K∗TBM ,
10The general results of this experiment held with a number of setting. We chose this setting at random to display
the empirical results.
Chapter 6 Mechanisms with Uncertainty in Task Completion 135
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1 101 201 301 401 501
Iteration
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
o
f A
llo
ca
tio
n
K*FTM
K*TBM0.5
K*VCG
K* 
K*TBM0.25
K* TBM
116
FIGURE 6.6: Expected value of chosen allocations for TBM and FTM
reaches the efficient allocation K∗ (given real POSs) after 116 interactions11. After this, the
POS of each contractor is accurately modelled, as is the trust of agents in their contractors.
Thus, the most trusted and utility maximising allocation is found by the TBM. This result is
observed for all cases where the POSs of contractors are varied.
Proposition 6.10. TBM finds better allocations than FTM when contractors’ own reported POS
are biased.
While FTM only takes into account a contractor’s own reports, TBM uses the trust model of
the various individual agents (which take into account reports not only from the contractor) to
make an allocation. In the particular trust model we use in TBM, an agent can give different
weights to reports from different agents (as shown in section 6.5.2). We therefore varied the
weight w, assigned to a contractor’s report of its own POS in the trust model of an agent. Here
we exemplify the cases where w = 0.5 (i.e. the contractor’s report is given equal weighting to
the agent’s perceived POS), w = 0.25 and w = 0 (i.e. no importance is given to the contractor’s
report).
As can be seen, our hypothesis is validated by the results given in figure 6.6 (with normalised
expected values). Note here that K∗V CG is the allocation independent of POSs or if the POSs
of agents are all equal. We note as K∗TBMw the allocation chosen by TBM with a weight w.
In more detail, figure 6.6 depicts the following results: K∗V CG = 0.909. At equilibrium, the
following ranges are found for the expected value: K∗TBM = 1, 0.97 > K∗TBM0.25 > 0.94,
0.86 > K∗TBM0.5 > 0.84, and K∗FTM = 0.8. Specifically, TBM0 (i.e. TBM) reaches the
optimal allocation K∗ (i.e. equivalent to zero bias from the seller) after 116 iterations, while
11The results were validated using a Student’s t-test with two samples of 100 and 200 iterations assuming equal
variances with means µ1 = 0.99999 and µ2 = 1.0 and p-value p = 0.778528. This means that the difference
between the means is not significant.
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TBM0.25 and TBM0.5 settle around a sub-optimal allocation (the expected value of which
decreases with increasing w). Moreover, FTM is seen to settle at K∗FTM = 0.8 after 82
iterations. In general, it is noted that FTM always settles at K∗FTM < K∗ (and sometimes
even K∗FTM < K∗V CG as in figure 6.6 depending on the valuations the agents have for
the tasks). This result is explained by the fact that the biased reports cause biased trust values
to be obtained by the centre which then chooses a sub-optimal allocation (i.e. less than K∗
which chooses agents according to their ‘real POSs’). TBM0.25 and TBM0.5 are less affected
by biased reports since the weighted trust model reduces the effect of bias on the overall trust
values (but still affects the mechanism). In most trust models, however, w ≥ 0.5 is never given
to the contractors’ POS report and here it only represents an extreme case [Ramchurn et al.,
2004]. Moreover, if the bias is removed, then FTM and the weighted TBMs behave the same
as TBM since the agents then perceive the same POS and all achieve K∗. It was also observed
that the speed with which TBM and FTM achieve K∗ also depends on the difference between
the optimum allocation and the other allocations. This is because the smaller the differences,
the harder it becomes to differentiate these allocations given imperfect estimations of POSs (i.e.
the larger the samples, the more accurate the POSs are, hence the longer the learning rate).
6.10 Summary
In this chapter we have considered the case where uncertainties occur as to whether an agent
will complete its allocated task. In order to deal with this problem, we introduced the notion
of trust-based mechanism design (TBMD) which generalises the VCG mechanism by using
the trust model of individual agents in order to generate efficient allocations. We discussed
the properties that a generic trust model should possess in order to ensure efficient allocation.
We then developed a trust-based mechanism (TBM) and proved that it is efficient, individually
rational, and incentive compatible. We have also considered the computational properties of this
mechanism and shown that the allocation problem is NP − complete by reducing the problem
to two linked maximum weighted matching problems. Furthermore, we developed algorithms
based on DP so as to speed up the generation of possible allocations. We then demonstrated
the generality of the mechanism by reducing it to two known mechanisms, namely the VCG
mechanism and the FTM mechanism. We finally empirically evaluated our mechanism against
the FTM and showed that it is robust to bias in the system (unlike FTM).
In order to ground the theoretical work described in this chapter, we adopted a MSN scenario
where sensors can fail in completing their assigned tasks. Sensors typically fail due to a number
of reasons as outlined in section 6.2. These failures hampers the implementation of traditional
mechanisms within them, since as we have shown, traditional mechanisms such as the VCG
cannot cope with failures. Therefore, the mechanism presented here represent an important
advance in that it can deal with such failures within the context of individually-owned sensors.
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In sum, this chapter has considered an important class of auctions in which there is an uncer-
tainty in the completion of a task associated with each task performer. In so doing, we have
addressed requirement 4 from the list of requirements outlined in chapter 1 (namely that of un-
certainty in task completion). Furthermore, we have allowed the task requesters to exchange
information about their past experience with task performers. This has addressed requirement
1 since this information is distributed amongst potentially many agents and is not known to the
task performer before the allocation is decided. Moreover, we have empirically evaluated TBM
and shown that it always achieves the optimum allocation in the long run and achieves better
allocations than its closest comparison when contractors provide biased reports of POS.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this chapter, we will present a global view on what we achieved in terms of analysing and
designing distributed mechanisms. Thus, in Section 7.1, we will first summarise the research
carried out within each chapter. In doing so we will also explain how we addressed each of the
requirements that we initially set out at the beginning of this thesis. In Section 7.2, we use the
knowledge gained within this thesis to identify promising areas of future work.
7.1 Summary
Distributed mechanisms are fast becoming imperative for operating networked systems that al-
low software agents representing distinct stakeholders with different aims and objectives to in-
teract. Such mechanisms are gaining prominence since they are more robust, less prone to
bottlenecks, more tractable and more trusted than their centralised counterparts. Now, there
are two main points of focus from which the design process within distributed mechanisms can
be carried out: 1) the design of optimal strategies for agents given the prevailing protocol and
2) the design of protocols that govern the interactions between the agents. This thesis has re-
ported work from both of these. Using the former perspective, in Chapter 3, we developed an
optimal strategy for a bidder in a market consisting of simultaneous Vickrey auctions. Then,
using the latter perspective we designed protocols that seek to address the requirements of con-
strained capacity, interdependent valuations and uncertainty in task allocation (in Chapters 4, 5
and 6 respectively). Within this context, we can segment the work reported in these chapters
as addressing two broad issues that are associated with distributed mechanisms; namely that of
distributed allocation mechanisms (Chapters 3 and 4) where the allocation is not computed by
a centre and distributed information mechanisms (Chapters 5 and 6) where an agent requires
information from other agents in the system so as to determine its value (or cost) for an item
(or task). In order to ground our work, we have employed a running scenario within this thesis
that deals with a multi-sensor network that is composed of individually-owned sensors. Whilst
the results presented within this thesis can be generally applied to MASs, the sensor network
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scenario provides us with a canonical example of how the research problems addressed may
arise.
At a general level, this thesis has improved the understanding of distributed mechanisms for
multi-agent systems in the following ways:
• Distributed Allocation: We studied the simultaneous auctions mechanism in Chapter 3
and designed a modified continuous double auction in Chapter 4. In both of these dis-
tributed allocation mechanisms, we find that their efficiency is less than the full efficiency
that can be achieved with centralised mechanism. Specifically, we find that there is a
lower bound on the efficiency given by 1− 1e within simultaneous auctions, whilst in the
continuous double auction, the efficiency ranges between 0.64 and 0.95. From this, we
can infer that there is a cost of distributing a mechanism in that we can no longer achieve
full efficiency. Nevertheless, this cost may not be overly prohibitive in certain scenarios
where the advantages associated with distributed mechanisms are more important.
• Distributed Information: We designed distributed information mechanisms in Chapter 5
and 6 since the traditional mechanisms cannot incentivise the agents to choose strategies
that lead to desirable outcomes in cases where their valuation are interdependent. In both
these lines of research, we were able to achieve efficiency and, in so doing, showed that
efficient mechanisms can be designed within distributed information scenarios.
Furthermore, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have considered the computational aspects of mechanism de-
sign. In Chapter 4, a dynamic programming approach was sufficient to ensure that the solution
was found in pseudo-polynomial time. We then showed in Chapter 5 that the designed mecha-
nism does not impose additional computational burden on the agents. However, the centre still
faced an NP-hard problem since it was carrying out a combinatorial allocation. In Chapter 6,
we then considered how to combine a dynamic programming with a linear programming ap-
proach in order to speed up the computation. However, the problem remains NP-hard, since as
in Chapter 5, an exact solution is required.
Finally, the scenario considered within this thesis is itself novel in that it considers sensor net-
works in which the sensors are individually owned and that can trade information and services
amongst themselves. This scenario gave rise to the four requirements outlined in Chapter 1
which have been addressed by the research reported in each of the chapters.
In more detail, in Chapter 3, we studied utility-maximising strategies for agents participating in
multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions. In this context, we find the counter-intuitive result
that it is optimal for a global agent to place non-zero bids in all auctions that sell the desired item,
even when the bidder only requires a single item and derives no additional benefit from having
more. This result holds when the global agent is facing either local agents only or a mixture of
global and local agents. For this distributed allocation mechanism, we study the efficiency of
the market with and without a global bidder. We first derive a lower efficiency bound for such
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markets in the absence of global bidders. We then empirically study the efficiency of the market
as the number of bidders vary. We show that, if the global bidder can accurately predict the
number of local bidders in each auction, the efficiency slightly increases. In contrast, if there
is much uncertainty, the efficiency significantly decreases as the number of auctions increases
due to the increased probability that a global bidder wins more than two items. These results
demonstrate that the way in which the efficiency and, thus the social welfare is affected by a
global bidder depends on the information available to that global bidder.
In Chapter 4, we considered the design of both a centralised and a decentralised protocol in a
scenario where the production costs are characterised by a cost function composed of a fixed
cost, a constant marginal cost and a limited capacity. The centralised mechanism extends the
standard VCG mechanism to this problem domain by introducing a novel penalty scheme. This
resulted in the mechanism being strategyproof, individual rational, efficient and robust to uncer-
tainties in the capacities of the agents. A dynamic programming algorithm, that solves the task
allocation problem of the centre in pseudo-polynomial time, then shows how the mechanism is
also computationally efficient. However, the mechanism is centralised. Therefore, in the second
mechanism, we extend the standard format of a continuous double auction so as to develop a de-
centralised mechanism for resource allocation in the same context. We find that this mechanism
has a high inherent average efficiency (over 86% in the examples we study) by testing it with a
variant of the zero intelligence strategy. Thus, we find that these mechanisms represent a trade-
off in terms of efficiency and the decentralisation of a mechanism. However, both mechanisms
still ensure that the participants derive a profit by joining the mechanism, thereby justifying their
use with selfish agents.
Having dealt with distributed allocation in Chapters 3 and 4, the second part of this thesis (Chap-
ters 5 and 6) considers distributed information mechanisms. In Chapter 5, we first developed a
utility function for sensors in our MSN scenario based on the information form of the Kalman
filter. Since these utility function exhibit interdependence, we could not use standard resource
allocation mechanisms. Thus we developed a generic mechanism for interdependent valuations
that significantly extends the standard VCG mechanism and proved that the ensuing mecha-
nism has the ideal economic properties of being efficient, incentive compatible and individually
rational. We then showed that this more complex mechanism only increases the centre’s com-
putational burden and the bidding for the agents (which are more likely to be computationally
constrained) is no more demanding than that for the VCG.
In Chapter 6, we considered the case where agents are uncertain about whether other agents will
successfully complete their allocated tasks and have different perceptions about the probability
of success of other agents in the system. In order to deal with this problem, we developed a
trust-based mechanism and proved that it is efficient, individually rational, and incentive com-
patible. We then demonstrated the generality of the mechanism by reducing it to two known
mechanisms, namely the VCG mechanism and Porter et al.’s fault-tolerant mechanism. We
also considered the computational properties of this mechanism and showed that the allocation
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problem isNP−complete. Furthermore, we developed algorithms based on dynamic program-
ming so as to speed up the generation of possible allocations. Finally, we empirically evaluated
our mechanism against the fault-tolerant mechanism and showed that, unlike the fault-tolerant
mechanism, it is robust to bias in the system.
Looking back at the research requirements outlined in Chapter 1, the research carried out in this
thesis has successfully addressed each of them:
• Distributed allocation: We have studied two different distributed allocation mechanisms,
namely a simultaneous second-price auction in Chapter 3 and a continuous double auction
in Chapter 4. In the former case, in order to study the efficiency of the mechanism, we first
derived the optimal strategy of an agent under different market conditions. In the latter
case, we modified the standard CDA protocol so as to achieve distributed allocation of
tasks when agent have a certain capacity to which they can supply. We then investigated
the effect that distribution had on the efficiency of the system.
• Constrained capacity: In Chapter 4, we designed both a centralised and a decentralised
protocol for the case where agents have a constrained capacity. The former modified the
VCG mechanism by introducing a penalty scheme which ensures the economic properties
of incentive-compatibility, efficiency and individual rationality are preserved. We also
proved the robustness of the mechanism. The latter was based on the CDA.
• Distributed (Interdependent) valuations: We developed an efficient, incentive compat-
ible and individually-rational mechanism in Chapter 5 when agents have interdependent
valuations and are willing to acquire multiple items. Chapter 6 also studied a form of
distributed information by analysing a scenario where agents learn through the distrib-
uted experiences of all agents. This results in a distributed information scenario since
the agents require information about the distributed experience in order to know their ex-
pected valuation. We also developed an efficient, incentive-compatible and individually-
rational mechanism in this case.
• Uncertainty in task completion: In Chapter 6, we studied the case where there is un-
certainty as to whether the agents will actually fulfill their assigned tasks. We developed
an efficient, incentive-compatible and individually-rational mechanism for this case. We
also considered its computational properties and developed algorithms for speeding up
the computation of the task allocation and payments.
When taken together, this thesis has made significant advances in the state of the art of distrib-
uted mechanisms for multiagent systems. However, much still remains to be done.
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7.2 Future Work
Despite these achievements, there are still many issues that need to be addressed. On a theoreti-
cal level, there is a need to unify the different strands of distributed mechanisms so as to improve
their applicability in multi-agent systems. Thus, we require a mechanism that achieves distrib-
uted allocation and where the agents have distributed information. Furthermore, the distributed
allocation mechanisms studied within this thesis suffer from a lack of efficiency. Hence future
work should concentrate on ways of achieving distributed allocation, whilst still conserving ef-
ficiency. To achieve this goal, it is important to distribute the two tasks carried out by a centre,
namely the computation of the optimal allocation and the enforcement of these allocations. One
potential area to look for insights is in work on distributed constraint optimisation algorithms
[Modi et al., 2003; Mailler and Lesser, 2004] which distribute the computation of optimisation
problems over agents within the system. Furthermore, distributed enforcement mechanism (like
the one studied in [Blankenburg et al., 2005]) should be investigated in the context of mechanism
design. Finally one could investigate hierarchical systems whereby the control of the centre is
devolved to multiple centres who each have a subset of agents to control.
On a practical level, we have designed mechanisms that address each of the requirements arising
within multi-sensor networks. Future work should concentrate on addressing all these issues
simultaneously. Furthermore, the context of the application of the sensor networks will often
dictate the valuation/cost that these sensors have. Thus, there is a need to develop a more general
valuation function for the sensor networks that will consider the specificities of the context in
which they are deployed. Finally, the implementation of the mechanisms can involve a high
computational load. Thus, work is needed to develop algorithms that make these mechanisms
more tractable (perhaps based on techniques borrowed from linear and integer programming).
In cases where this is not possible, then a relaxation of the goals of the mechanism may be
required.
Having described future work on a broader plane, we now identify the following promising
directions for further research that stem from the specifics of the work discussed in each chapter:
• Chapter 3: Our analysis of simultaneous second price auctions focused on the case where
buyers wish to have a single item. Future work can expand this to the case of multiple
items and where buyers have combinatorial valuations. Also, optimal equilibrium strate-
gies for purchasing item in markets consisting of different types of auctions still remain
to be investigated. These would lead to a more general distributed allocation mechanism
and improve the applicability of this research within general multi-agent systems settings.
• Chapter 4: As future work in this chapter, one can extend these mechanisms to deal
with iterated allocations (i.e. ones in which new demand continuously appears) since in
several of the cases we consider it is conceivable that the agents can observe and learn
about the behaviours of other agents in the system. Also a deeper study is required to
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formally establish the consequence of requiring robust mechanisms on the efficiency of
the resultant mechanism. Finally, we aim to develop more sophisticated strategies for the
decentralised mechanism in order to enhance the efficiency of the system, whilst ensuring
that these sophisticated strategies derive higher profit than their simpler counterparts. This
has been shown to be achievable in simple continuous double auctions. [Cliff and Bruten,
1997; Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Vytelingum et al., 2004] and we believe it is also
achievable in our modified continuous double auction protocol. Such developments will
enable us to more effectively find the set of agents that can perform the required task at
the lowest cost (i.e. the efficiency will be increased).
• Chapter 5: This chapter developed a valuation function from a relatively simple informa-
tion theoretic base. An extension to this work can consider more complex information
theoretic measures (such as the Kullback-Liebler divergence and the Mahanalobis dis-
tance measure) and to also take into account the relative importance of targets. Another
line of work could consider the design of a distributed mechanism for choosing the op-
timal allocation and calculating the payment. To this end, by showing that a centralised
mechanism exists, one of the necessary conditions for the existence of a decentralised
mechanism has been satisfied. Given this, we intend to explore techniques such as those
developed in [Parkes and Shneidman, 2004] in order to develop a distributed form of this
mechanism. However, it is important to point out that in our mechanism, as it currently
stands, the agents only transmit a representative value to the centre (rather than the data
itself). Thus, any distributed data fusion algorithm can conceivably be implemented in our
scenario as long as we can formulate such a representative value (which would typically
have a much lower bandwidth requirement than the data itself).
• Chapter 6: In this chapter, the focus was on an efficient mechanism which therefore re-
quired exact solutions. In future work we aim to find an approximate mechanism that
is guaranteed to be efficient within a certain bound. This reduces the extra computa-
tional burden involved when taking into account trust in combinatorial exchanges. It will
also allow the development of local search algorithms that will further reduce the com-
putation involved in finding the efficient allocation. Furthermore, our current mechanism
is incentive-compatible, thus providing no incentive for agents to deviate from truthful
behaviour within a single-shot allocation. In future, we aim to investigate iterative mech-
anisms which prevent agents from strategizing over rounds and induces truthful behaviour
across rounds.
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